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FRANK L. HUNTLEY

Milton Studies in Japan

THE NAME "Miruton" in Japanese first appeared in an 1841 translation of a Dutch version of one of the innumerable editions of Lindley Murray's *English Grammar*.[1] The translator, Astronomy Officer Rokuzon Shibukawa, probably had no idea who Milton was; he was dealing with the mysteries of the English definite and indefinite articles through the Dutch. But he dutifully transliterated into *katakana* the names of Shakespeare, Milton, Pope, Addison, and Sterne. Little wonder that he translated a Dutch example of an article, "de verhevene gedachten van Milton" (the lofty thoughts of Milton), as though it were the title of a poem, " 'The Lofty Thought' by Milton." He also was the first Japanese to mention Milton's most famous work—not by title but as "Miruton-no gunji-no shi" or Milton's war poem, a translation of the Dutch for epic.

The next significant record of Milton in Japanese came by way of China. In 1861 *Eikokushi* was published in eight volumes in Nagato—a Japanese translation of a Chinese translation by the Rev. William Muirhead, a British missionary in Shanghai, of Thomas Milner's *The History of England: From the Invasions of Julius Caesar to the Year*

[1] The three main Japanese sources for this compilation are: Izumi Yanagida, "A Study of Milton at the Dawn of the Meiji Era," *Monthly Bulletin of World Literature* (Tokyo), Dec. 1929; Minoru Toyoda, "Tracing Milton in Japan," Hiroshima Bunrika University, *English Language and Literature*, IV (May 1933), and an expanded version in Toyoda's *A Study of English Literature in Japan* (Tokyo, 1939); and Keitaro Amano, "Milton Bibliography in Japan," *Kwansai University Gaku-ho* (1958). For translation and help in interpreting these and many other sources I am deeply grateful to two of my former students, Professor (Mrs.) Sueno Takiyama and President Fumio Ochi, both of Doshisha Women's College in Kyoto. My thanks go also to the many Japanese professors not only hosts and friends but wise and ardent participants in the international freemasonry of scholarship. I acknowledge my indebtedness to the Fulbright Commission in Tokyo and to the Rackham Fund of the University of Michigan Graduate School. Finally, Mrs. Hide Inada, divisional librarian of the University of Michigan's Far Eastern Library, has most kindly checked references for me.

A.D. 1852 (London, 1853). Its only relevance here is the rendering (VI, 45) of the title *Paradise Lost* as *Shitsurakuen*—the same as that used today.

The pragmatic and Darwinian direction of much Japanese thought in the Meiji period is illustrated by the omission of Shakespeare and Milton from Yukichi Fukuzawa's *Seiyo-no-Jijo* (The State of Affairs in the Western World), published in 1886. The emphasis is on Francis Bacon, Harvey, Newton, and the favorite early Meiji Western philosopher, Herbert Spencer. There is no mention of literature in *Eikokushi-Ryaku* (A Short History of England) by Sukeyuki Kawazu and Chio Okurado, published in 1870-71. However, *Saikoku Risshihen* (1871) (Self-Made Men of the West), Masano Nakamura's translation of Samuel Smiles' *Self-Help; with Illustrations of Character and Conduct* (New York, 1860), contains brief moralistic accounts of English and American men of letters, with "uplifting" quotations from their works. Here a sentence from Chapter XI of *Self-Help*—" 'The pious and just honouring of ourselves,' said Milton, 'may be thought the moisture and fountain-head from whence every laudable and worthy enterprise issues forth' "—takes on in Japanese an un-Miltonic veneration for magistrates: "Milton says, 'It is the fountain of all the virtues and all enterprise to honour the king and one's self.' "

Just when Milton was first read in English in Japan is difficult to determine. According to *The History of Tokyo Imperial University* (Tokyo, 1932), students were examined on Milton by James Summers in 1875, and were asked the following questions:

(1) What influence respectively had Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton on English literature?

(2) Give the characteristics of Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton.

The following year, 1876, Mr. Summers' questions were:

(1) Trace the progress of English Literature through the Stuart period and the Commonwealth.

(2) What is Channing's view of poetry? And what is his estimate of Milton? How does poetry act upon education and civilization?

(3) Give some account of Milton's "L'Allegro." What influence had Milton's writings upon the English Language? Give the meanings of the following: in spite of, blithe, ere glimpse of morn, towered cities, Euphrosyne, Hebe, Cimmerian, Hymen, Cerberus, Elysian.

(4) How does Milton describe Melancholy, Mirth, Liberty, the dawn, sunrise, spring, summer, the haytime, the village feast, the busy world and its pleasures, the theatre, poetry and music?

(5) What is the *Comus*, where and by whom was it written? What sentiment runs through it?

Summers' successor as a teacher of English literature at Tokyo Imperial University was Addison Houghton. A graduate of Phillips Andover (1869) and of Yale (1873), Houghton taught classics first at Olivet, Michigan, and then at Yale. After his sojourn in Japan (1877-82), he studied for a year in Berlin, was granted an M.A. from Yale in 1889, and became professor of Latin at Bowdoin. His wife Charlotte, who was with him in Tokyo, was the daughter of DeWitt Clinton.

At Tokyo, one of Houghton's students was Shoyo Tsubouchi, who became a professor at Waseda University, founded the drama library there, and translated into classical Japanese the complete works of Shakespeare. Tsubouchi recalls (in the preface to H. Hishinuma's translation of *Comus,* 1916) how he had first read *Comus* as a student under Houghton. And in his *Kaioku-Mandan* (1925) (Memoirs) Tsubouchi attributes his intellectual awakening to Houghton's lectures on Milton. In 1895-96, Tenrai Shigeno, Japan's first independent Miltonist, heard Tsubouchi lecture on Milton at Waseda University (preface to his *A Study of Milton's Paradise Lost,* Tokyo, 1932). Thus the torch for Milton studies in Japan was first lighted from America.

In the 1880s, Milton was read for his rhetoric. In *Shuji-oyobi-Kabun* (Rhetoric and Good Composition), translated in 1870 by Tairoku Kikuchi from *Chambers's Information for the People,*[2] is this passage: "Milton is said to be most gifted with strength in style. Whatever strength Shakespeare mastered in his style is practiced by the writer of *Paradise Lost.* Among other English poets admired for this gift are Barrow, Bacon, Dryden, and Pope." Milton and Shakespeare are often quoted in this book and eight lines describing Pandemonium (*Paradise Lost,* I, 722-30) are translated. In 1888, Taketaro Yamada ("Bimyo")[3] quoted "Lycidas" in his *Natsukodachi* (Summer Plantation, A Collection of Short Stories). Bimyo also translated some of Milton's shorter poems for the magazine *Iratsume* (Young Lady), and referred to Milton's rhyme in his essay "On Japanese Poetry," published in *Kokumin-no-Tomo* (The People's Companion) in 1890-91. In the same magazine (Nos. 48-49, 1889) Milton was mentioned as among the favorite authors of such prominent men of letters as Hajime Onishi, Masahisa Uemura, Bimyo, and Shinsaku Kozu.

The earliest biographical sketch of Milton appeared in the first issue of *Bungaku Zasshi* (Nov. 1885), the organ of the Chautauqua Lit-

[2] Ed. Williams and Robert Chambers, new ed., Philadelphia, 1874.

[3] Distinguished Japanese literary men often take poetic pseudonyms. It is as though we were to read articles on Milton by "Lake Breeze" (Hughes), "Pine Cottage" (Woodhouse), "Juniper-tree" (Bush), or "Old Hollyhock" (Hanford), etc.

erary Society established in Osaka in that year. "The Life of John Milton" (pp. 375-389) begins: "The poet John Milton was born at *Kojimachi* [Cheapside], London, Great Britain." There follows some account of his upbringing, education, great personal beauty and natural ability, the social and political background of his day, his marriages, and a little on his main works, all in a popular style.

Taking their cue from Macaulay's essay and Wordsworth's sonnet, many Japanese men of letters recommended Milton for his grandeur and simplicity. *On Milton: A Mirror of Criticism* (Tokyo, 1887) is a translation of Macaulay's essay on Milton by Naotaro Yoshida. Another translation of Macaulay, by Urakami Mannosuke, appeared in the second volume of *Kokumin Eigaku Shinshi* (A New National Magazine of English Literature). An editorial in the first number of *The People's Companion* (1887) concludes:

> The red bricks of the Medical School rise above the clouds while the door of Sohaku Asada is deserted. The Society for the romanization of our alphabet gains ground while there are too many who do not know the alphabet. A movement dedicates itself to improve our theatre and music, but Danshu still rules the stage at the Shintomiza, and Koshiji Dayu's vaudeville packs them in at Kayaba-cho. Such confusion of the old and the new was what Milton saw through in his *Paradise Lost*: [there follow in translation the lines (*P.L.*, II, 890-97) describing "Chaos" and "eldest Night" waging eternal anarchy].

In similar vein, an article in the February 14, 1890 issue of the *Koko Press*, which prided itself on its literary taste, complained:

> There are many men of letters—some interested in English, others in German, and still others in French. There are few romances which they have not read. But how many of them know Milton's *Paradise Lost*? How many have read Homer either through Bryant or Pope? Alas, not many. This shows the poverty of our cultural development.

Three issues later the same journal declared:

> True men of letters are those who have read Milton, Shakespeare, and Goethe; who see through things and write only when compelled. There are none yet. One should get a thorough training to become a true man of letters.

Byobo Koji's article on Milton in the same magazine (Nos. 11-14), obviously based on Macaulay, deplores the corruption of novelists who write only for money. Koji looks forward to the appearance of poets, critics, biographers, historians—but to no more novelists:

> *Paradise Lost* and Dante's *Divine Comedy* are great spectacles of literature. They are to the mind what a great cathedral is to the spirit. When one reads and appreciates the epic, that is, when one enters the cathedral, he will be amazed at the grace, accuracy, and grandeur of its construction. Its style has the ideal perfection of grandeur, and its imagery, of purity. This is not all. We find Milton's inde-

pendence in every line of the poem ... It begins with a conference of the fallen angels in Hell, how they should fight against God in Heaven. Satan makes up his mind to tempt God's newly created Man. He comes to visit Eden, where Adam and Eve are enjoying their innocence. Books V-VIII tell how Satan lost his war with God, and how the creation of the world followed. The last four books tell of the corruption of fallen man, the atonement of Christ, and man's banishment from Eden.

Histories and encyclopaedias in the 1890s frequently devoted about as many pages to Milton as to Shakespeare. Tamoto Shibue's *History of English Literature* (Tokyo, 1891) has 23 pages on Shakespeare and 22 on Milton. *Bankoku Jimmei Jisho* (Tokyo, 1893) (A Dictionary of World Famous Men), edited by Taketaro Yamada (Bimyo), reflects the cultural background of its editor through the large number of English poets mentioned. Bimyo gives nine lines to Keats, who was still scarcely known in Japan, but six pages for Milton's "L'Allegro," "Il Penseroso," *Comus,* and *Paradise Lost.* In Itateki Owada's *Eibei Bunjin-den* (On European and American Men of Letters), published in 1894, thirty-five literary figures are discussed; twelve pages are devoted to Milton, eight to Shakespeare.

The first book by a Japanese writer devoted entirely to Milton was *The Blind Poet* by Setsu Nagasawa (Tokyo, 1894). Under the title is quoted in English Dryden's "Three Poets in three distant Ages born." In "To the Reader," Nagasawa acknowledges material taken from biographies, histories, and collections of Milton's poems by English editors. The contents are divided into (1) A General Survey of England in Milton's Time, (2) Milton's Boyhood and Young Manhood, (3) Period of Political and Prose Activity, and (4) Old Age and the Great Poems. The tone, set by Dryden's epigraph, is broadly appreciative; but Nagasawa is specific on the source of *Paradise Lost:*

According to Voltaire, Milton saw an opera bouffe called *Adamo* at Florence, Italy. It treated of man's fall, angels, snakes, death, etc. Milton was so greatly moved by it that he decided to write the great epic with the comic elements changed. We cannot tell whether this is true or false.

Small though Nagasawa's *The Blind Poet* is (126 pages), it aided the serious study of Milton in Japan. In a review of it in *The People's Companion* (No. 227, May 1894), Goro Takahashi said:

This is a book worth reading. The great epic poet of the Puritan Age who made Carlyle cry out in grief that the people of his day had no mind to understand the spirit of the seventeenth century is here introduced in detail.

Professor Tenrai Shigeno was the first scholarly Miltonist in Japan. His initial study of *Paradise Lost* was a volume of 124 pages, the first

published in The Complete Works Series of Popular World Literature (Tokyo, 1903). Shigeno conveyed the sense of grandeur of *Paradise Lost,* and included examples of translation in the 5-7 Japanese metre—one of the best being Raphael's description of the War in Heaven from Book VI. Shigeno weighed the poetic quality, rather than the social meaning, of Milton for the Japanese. He dominated Milton studies in Japan for thirty years.

From 1903 to 1927 translations of *Paradise Lost* rarely got beyond Book I. In 1905 Tatsusaburo Uchimura published a translation of the first book, and followed it in 1908 with Book IV, entitled *The Book of Conjugal Felicity of Adam and Eve, the Progenitors of the Human Race.* In 1906 Professor Bansui Doi translated I, 1-330 for the *Taiyo* (The Sun). Tetsuzo Okada did Book I for the March, April, and May 1920 issues of *Kaitakusha* (The Pioneer). This version, said to be unusually clear in the Japanese, was reissued in 1932 in Okada's *Eishibun-no-Henei* (A Glimpse of English Verse). Parts of *Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained,* and *Comus,* translated by Professor Masaki Nakayama, the Dante scholar, were published in 1926. Each fairly extensive piece is accompanied by critical comment, and the whole divided into chapters such as "Milton and Dante," "An Eternal Resistance," "Paradise in Eden," "Before Temptation," etc.

Finally, in 1929, Book I was done again *in toto* by Kinji Yasutake, already well known for his translation of *Samson Agonistes* in 1923. Yasutake was a Christian, and contributed to Japanese knowledge of Milton a peculiarly Christian point of view. His book also contains notes taken largely from H. J. Todd, and a translation of the greater part of Addison's commentary. Yasutake had his own press in his home, and set up and printed various books of Christian religious experience—including translations of several volumes by that eloquent English broad churchman, F. W. Robertson. By the time his Book I came out, there were three poetic translations of the whole poem; but Yasutake says in his preface: "When I compared the other translations, I found some difference in the interpretation of the text, and some of their Japanese expressions are not to my taste. We do not mind how many translations of this poem there may be." Again, "Let us approach Milton through his great spirit. Be not particular about his phraseology and art . . . The best poem is one which elevates us; that is, one which does not intend to communicate with us as we are." Yasutake translated Milton with a sense of mission.

The complete *Paradise Lost* has been translated five times into Japanese. The first translation, in prose, was published in 1914. Four

poetic renderings appeared between 1926 and 1929. The prose *Paradise Lost* by Hakyo Imai (The World's Famous Stories Series, VIII, Tokyo) has a commentary by "Hogetsu" Shimamura, whose critical stance is illustrated by this sentence: "Milton's solemn view of life, his sincerity and virtue, cast over both his personality and poetry an aura that is moral, religious, and sublime." The four complete poetic translations are as follows:

(1) Riichiro Hoashi, *Shitsurakuen* (Tokyo: Shinseido Co.). Vol. I (Books I-V), March 1926; Vol. II (Books VI-XII), April 1927.

(2) Takeshi Fujii, *Rakuen-Soshitsu* (Tokyo: Iwanami Co.). Vol. I (Books I-II), June 1926; Vol. II (Books III-VIII), January 1927; Vol. III (Books IX-XII), September 1927.

(3) Togyo Kiuchi, *Shitsurakuen* (Tokyo: The World's Great Writers' Typical Works Publishing Co.). No. 5, September 1927.

(4) Tenrai Shigeno, *Shitsurakuen* (Tokyo: Shinchosha Co.). The World's Literature Series, No. 5, December 1929.

Of these, Nos. 1 and 3 are not very well known, though Hoashi's is said to be more poetic than Kiuchi's. Nos. 2 and 4 deserve special mention.

Fujii's translation and commentary are read by intellectuals in Japan who are sympathetic with Christianity. The author was an early disciple of Kanzo Uchimura, whom he met as a student at Sapporo University. Fujii graduated from the Law Department of Tokyo Imperial in 1911. When his wife was "miraculously" cured of typhoid, the couple became Christians. Resigning from a government post in Yamagata in 1915, Fujii dedicated his writing talents to spreading Christian doctrine; his books include *A New Birth, Luther's Life and Achievement*[4] and *Japan through the Bible*. Like Yasutake's translation of Book I, Fujii's translation is a work of piety, but with more intellectual fiber.

Fujii's master, Kanzo Uchimura (1861-1930), has been called by Heinrich Emil Brunner "a truly prophetic man." Today he is widely read as a Christian intellectual. After graduating from Amherst College in 1889, he became a lecturer at Tokyo's First Higher School, and startled the country by publicly refusing to bow before the new 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education. Uchimura says that it was President Julius H. Seelye of Amherst College who ". . . opened my eyes to the evangelical truth of Christianity. For forty years since then, I have

[4] Tr. from Thomas Murray Lindsay, *Luther and the German Reformation* (New York, 1900).

preached the faith taught me by that venerable teacher."[5] Uchimura's heroes were St. Paul, Luther, Cromwell, and Milton. "I am to be a consistent Protestant like John Milton or Oliver Cromwell," he wrote, "and that is why I sometimes choose my own way and not the ways of others who presume to be superior to me in wisdom and faith."[6] American missionaries, he insisted, cannot teach religion to the Japanese ". . . simply because the American nature is more of the earth, earthy, and clings more to dust than does the Japanese."[7] A patriot of samurai birth, he urged for Japan a Japanese rather than American Christianity. He fought the American missionaries under the banner of his "Mu-Kyo-Kai" (The No-Church Movement), which was influenced by the Quakers whom he had met in America—particularly Dr. Isaac N. Kerlin, superintendent of the Pennsylvania Institute for Feeble-Minded Children. Of Unitarianism, anathema to most of the Protestant missionaries in Japan, Uchimura wrote in 1924:

> Unitarianism as a system of doctrines is shallow and incomplete, I think; but as a movement to counteract the errors of official Protestantism, it has a perennial value of its own. Unitarianism stands for freedom of thought, honesty of faith, supremacy of love, and brotherhood of mankind. No wonder that John Milton was a Unitarian (Arian) in his last days, with all his reverence for the Divine Son of God. Unitarianism is not necessarily anti-Trinitarian. It is anti-dogmatic, anti-ecclesiastical and anti-theological [pp. 104-105].

It was daring in Japan at the turn of the century to be a Christian and not accept a single cent from American missions—and, in 1904-05, to take a Christian pacifist stand against the Russo-Japanese War. Uchimura was a prolific writer and often quoted Milton. He appears nowhere in Milton bibliography; but among today's Miltonists in Japan are several followers of Uchimura, who had assimilated the religious, the moral, and the political fervor of Milton.

The most scholarly translation of the complete *Paradise Lost* is that by Tenrai Shigeno (No. 4 above). A professor at Waseda University and the successor there of Tsubouchi, the Shakespeare scholar, Shigeno was a new-style Japanese poet as well as scholar. Some Japanese have told me that his translation brought a new majesty to the familiar Japanese 5-7 metre. His book is liberally sprinkled with notes from Verity, Browne, Masson, Percival, Collins, and others; he is responsible for introducing to Japan a wide variety of Western criticism of Milton, beyond Macaulay and Addison.

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[5] Kanzo Uchimura, *Cho Shaku Shu* (Selections from the Writings) (Tokyo, 1953), "Autobiography," pp. 334-338.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 278.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

Translations of "L'Allegro" and "Il Penseroso" by Tonosuke Masuda were published in 1893 (*Nippon Eigaku Shinshi,* Nos. 26-36), with such notes as "The reader must notice how Milton used a very long sentence, which he must have learned from Latin." "Lycidas" has been translated five times—first in 1902 by Bin Ueda and the last by Torao Taketomo ("Sofu") in 1939. Taketomo was a beloved Dante scholar, poet, and translator of *Pilgrim's Progress,* who went blind before he died. A Japanese translation of *Comus* by H. Hishinuma, was first published in 1916. The book includes a preface by Tsubouchi, Umenosuke Bessho's "Milton through *Comus,*" and a general introduction by the translator. *Comus* was done again in 1929 by Tenrai Shigeno. A translation of *Samson Agonistes* (the first 471 lines only) by Kinji Yasutake was published in 1923. Yasutake upholds his use of the traditional Japanese metre in these words: "I have tried the 5-7 syllable line, using old fashioned words where I can. Those who think the traditional verse form and diction lack present-day significance will call my experiment a failure. However, this form is 'poetic' to us Japanese, and it actually comes closest to Milton's blank verse." The most scholarly translation of *Samson* is by Shigeno, published in 1934. There are many translations of the sonnets, perhaps the best those done in 1924 by Professor Takeshi Saito. *Paradise Regained* was translated in part by Masaki Nakayama, the Dante scholar, in 1926; a complete and definitive translation by K. Azegami appeared in 1936. Well known for his work on Browning, Azegami provides generous notes from Blackeny, Martin, Jerram, and Browne; he confesses that he is most indebted to Jerram. As an experiment in translation, he did the first part of *Paradise Regained* in a literal word-for-word rendering and the last part in free-flowing "first-sight" prose. Finally, *Areopagitica,* the only prose work of Milton's translated into Japanese and the only translation since World War II, was published in 1948 by Professor Kenji Ishida, the Arnold scholar of Kyoto, Shungo Yoshida of Kyoto University, and Seichi Ueno, a prominent journalist with the Osaka *Asahi* newspaper. Its title is *Genron-to-Jiyu* (Speech and Freedom); its reissue in Iwanami World Classics has enhanced its significance in the new, tentatively democratic Japan.

In 1932 and 1933, stimulated perhaps by the publications of Tillyard and Darbyshire and of the first volume of the Columbia *Milton,* Japanese Milton scholars made their most significant strides forward.

Tenrai Shigeno's *A Study of Paradise Lost* was published in 1932. Shigeno remarks that his aim was to transplant Milton's sublime poetic taste into Japan. Since 1915 he had seen Western studies of Milton

becoming more and more scientific. The growing tendency of "source study" he found a threat to "an old Oriental student," and he prepared to "develop as directly as possible in his mind's eye the real beauty of the original work." Shigeno's chapter headings are "The Subject of *Paradise Lost*," "Its Thought," "Satan," "The Earthly Paradise," "The Sublimity of *Paradise Lost*," "The Sources of the Poem and How to Treat Them," "Miltonic Romanticism," "Miltonic Realism," "Milton as a Nature Poet," "The True Merits of the Poem," "Its Defects," "Its Style," "Its Verse," etc. A long bibliographical appendix divides criticism into six schools: pseudo-classical (Addison, Johnson); romantic (Macaulay); realistic (Pattison, Taine); classical (Arnold); artistic (Garnett, Raleigh, Abercrombie); and academic (Thompson, Saurat, Larson). As these headings suggest, Shigeno's book treats *Paradise Lost* from many angles; but it does not go very deep, and though it introduces the opinions of various scholars, it takes an impartial Oriental via media. On the whole it is well-balanced, sometimes intuitively judicious. Two excerpts will serve to illustrate the tone:

> Since *Paradise Lost* is Milton's life work, the fruit of long assiduous labor, its critics should not be careless in estimating it. What nonsense it is, then, to think that an author who had long insisted on the distinction between good and evil should make the symbol of evil the hero of his epic! But some critics will say: "Whatever the poet's intention may be, judging from the effect of the work upon its readers, Satan is doubtlessly the hero." What they should argue is that Satan is most adroitly described. And yet if by hero we mean the character most adroitly described, then Shylock and Brutus are the heroes of their respective plays [p. 4]. Though I do not, with some critics, praise "The Paradise of Fools," still I do not think it serious enough a matter to protest against its introduction into the poem. I think it is a humorous episode. Those critics who blame Milton for being humorless are usually the first to attack him for violating the dignity of his epic with this funny digression. I wonder whether these critics themselves really have a sense of humor [p. 123].

Shigeno's descriptive bibliography is the first of its kind in Japanese scholarship. Though we may object to his oversimplification of such terms as "romantic," "classical," "realistic," nevertheless he uses them with unmistakable personal conviction.

Takeo Iwahashi's *Poetic Metaphysics of Paradise Lost* appeared in October 1933. Becoming blind while a student at Waseda University, Iwahashi was encouraged by his mother to enter a school for the blind. As is the custom in the education of the blind in Japan, he acquired skill in massage. One day, while massaging a teacher, he was told that Milton wrote *Paradise Lost* after he became blind. The young scholar made up his mind to follow the blind poet's footsteps. Entering Kwan-

sei-Gakuin College, he read *Paradise Lost* and *Samson Agonistes* in English Braille, and wrote his graduation thesis on Milton's sonnets. Accompanied by his wife, he went to Edinburgh to specialize in Milton under the guidance of Professor Grierson and to study the philosophy of religion. "Equalled in fate with Milton," he wrote in the preface to *The Poetic Metaphysics of Paradise Lost,* "I worked hard to be equalled in renown." The philosophical and religious depth of the book, when compared with Shigeno's volume, is apparent even from the table of contents. In his introduction Iwahashi writes feelingly of the effect that Milton's blindness had on the poetry of *Paradise Lost.* The first section discusses time and space, astronomy, and anthropology in relation to the plot. The second part summarizes various critical opinions and Iwahashi's own evaluation of the poem, particularly its verse. The final part deals with theological topics: the relationship between *De Doctrina* and *Paradise Lost,* the relation to Rabbinical teaching, and, in the final chapter, "The Tragedy of Faith and its Triumph." A supplementary essay is entitled "On the Concluding Lines of *Paradise Lost.*" Critically, as Iwahashi recognizes, his opinions agree with Tillyard's to a great extent (p. 195). One whole chapter is a review of Fletcher on Milton's Rabbinical readings.

Insisting that *Paradise Lost* is a confession of faith (p. 360), Iwahashi proposes to discover the harmony between its literary appeal and its theological truth (p. 177), and to explore Milton's theological thought as the core of *Paradise Lost* (p. 277). Here he goes far beyond Tillyard. His main target is Shigeno, who, not being a Christian, thought Milton's theology an anachronism. "If the theology in *Paradise Lost* is out of date," Iwahashi argues, "then Christianity itself is out of date" (p. 126). Iwahashi began reading *Paradise Lost* as a cure of the soul and in the process discovered its poetry. To non-Christian Japanese scholars, Iwahashi's understanding of the poem is nonliterary and abstract; to Christians he seems extraordinarily sensitive.

Takeshi Saito's *Milton* also appeared in 1933 in the Kenkyusha English and American Men of Letters Series. A "tight" book of 150 pages, it abjures detailed examination and controversy and provides a judicious and beautifully written introduction to the man and his major works. In his preface Dr. Saito declares his impartial position. "My respect for Milton has lasted for more than a score of years. During these years my own view naturally has undergone more or less change; though I consider him a great English poet, next to Shakespeare, I am not blind to his faults." The bibliography with pithy annotations is a boon

to students of Milton in Japan; nothing else like it exists. For example:

Mark Pattison: *Milton* (English Men of Letters Series, 1879). This book is often called "the best short modern life of Milton," but not all of Pattison's judgments carry weight, as there are too many Puritanical prejudices.

Denis Saurat: *Milton, Man and Thinker* (Jonathan Cape, 1925; *La Pensée de Milton*, Paris, 1920). The author's main argument is to clarify "the unity of Milton's private and political and literary life," in other words to consider Milton as a sort of Kabbalist who sympathized with Jewish mystical thought as Blake did. M. Saurat seems to think that he has made a new epoch in Milton study, but the whole is rather eccentric.

Saito represents the urbane ethical response to Milton in Japan. He is one of the most influential scholars of English literature, a retired college president, author of more than thirty books, well versed in Chinese classics, and famous for a course in the literary interpretation of the Bible. In reply to T. S. Eliot's criticism, Saito defends Milton in these words:

Before we blame Milton for being distant from us, we should examine ourselves. If Milton seems unfamiliar because of his sublimity and severity, we must ask ourselves whether we are content with vulgarity and meanness. If we find him inaccessible to us because of his aloofness from our world, we should know that the minute observation of daily routine is certainly not the only and probably not the greatest element in the formulation of great literature.

The publication in 1932-33 of the studies of Shigeno, Iwahashi, and Saito marks an epoch in Milton studies in Japan. It may be noted, also, that Dr. Minoru Toyoda's history of Milton scholarship, to which I am greatly indebted, was first published in 1933 and was dedicated to Shigeno, who died that year.

After 1933 no books on Milton appeared in Japan for twenty years, but there were numerous articles. From Amano's "Bibliography" (1958), I have culled the most notable scholars who have published more than once:

Goto, Kazuo
"Milton Today," *Kobe University Kenkyu*, V (1954).
"L. P. Smith: Milton and his Modern Critics, and the Tendency of Recent Criticism," *Kobe University Modern Age*, VI (1954).
"Milton and the Future of English Poetry," *ibid.*, X-XII (1955).

Harashima, Yoshinori
"Milton as a Music Lover," *Oberon*, XIV (1936) (in English).
"Milton's Taste and Doctrine of Music," *Studies in English Literature*, XVIII (1938) (in English).

Kato, Mrs. Sada (the wife of the dean of the Literature Department at Nagoya University, Mrs. Kato studied at the University of Michigan many years ago;

though her appearance as a scholar is late, she is highly regarded by her peers)
"Miltonic Style and its Criticism," *Nanzan University Academia,* XVIII (1957).
"Milton and Temptation," *ibid.,* XXI (1958).

KATO, TAKEO
"Milton's Unitarian Religious Thought," *Osaka University Sozo* (1951).
"Milton's Democratic Idea in the English Commonwealth Period," *Osaka University Bungakubu Reports,* V (1957).

KUROTA, KENJIRO
"Milton's Juvenilia," *Ehime University Reports,* I (1952).
"The Early Reception of *P.L.*," *Ehime University Helicon,* III (1953).

MAMEMOTO, KAORU
"Milton's View of Civil Society and Natural Law," *Shiga University Teachers College Reports,* III (1954).
"Milton and the English Revolution," *ibid.,* V (1956).

MIYANISHI, MITSUO (an outstanding Miltonist at Kyoto University)
"The Problem of Evil in *P.L.*," *Albion,* V (1934).
"Milton's Evolutionary Ideas," *ibid.,* IV (1936).
"Milton as an Artist," *Kyoto University Eibungaku Hyoron,* I (1954).
"Charles Williams and the Structure of *P.L.*, *ibid.,* IV (1957).
"The Present-Day Re-estimate of Milton," *ibid.,* IV (1957).

NAKAGIRI, NOBUYA (a very promising Miltonist who, like Michael Krouse, died too young; assistant professor at Meiji Gakuin University in Tokyo, in 1951-52 he studied Milton at Wisconsin under Professor Hughes; a special issue of the *Meiji Gakuin Ronso,* XXXIV, 1954, pays tribute to the young scholar)
"Lycidas and the Change of Young Milton," *Meiji Gakuin Ronso,* XVII (1948).
"Present-day Milton Studies with Special Reference to T. S. Eliot," *ibid.,* XXI (1951).
"An Outline of Studies in Spenser, Donne, and Milton," *ibid.,* XXIX (1952).
"Phoebus Apollo and the Music of the Spheres," *ibid.,* XXIX (1953).
"Samson Agonistes: A Study in Milton" (in English), "Milton and Chastity" (in English), and "Recent Milton Critics" (incomplete) in the memorial volume, *ibid.,* XXXIV (1954).

OCHI, EIJI
"The So-Called Struggle between Good and Evil in Milton," *Hiroshima University Bungakubu Reports* (1954).
"Samson's Intellect and the Recognition of its Limitations," *Hiroshima University Eigo Eibungaku Kenkyu,* IV (1957).

OCHI, FUMIO (one of Japan's two leading Miltonists today, whose book is discussed below; he did his graduate work under Professor Kenji Ishida of Kyoto, and is chairman of the Department of English, Donshisha Women's College, Kyoto)
"Milton and Diodati," *Studies in English Literature,* XVIII (1958) (in English).
"Milton and Thomas Young," *Zeitschrift for Professor Funahashi* (Doshisha University, 1939).
Milton in his Early Days, Doshisha Literary Pamphlets, No. 3 (1939). 65 p.
"Milton in Florence," *Studies in English Literature,* XX (1940).

"Milton's View of Rome," *ibid.*, XXI (1942) (in English). This article was published after Pearl Harbor; twelve years pass before Ochi's next article.
"Some Notes on the Milton-Heimbach Correspondence," *ibid.*, V (1955).
"Milton's Satirical Spirit and 'The Paradise of Fools,'" *ibid.*, VII (1956).
"Milton and Herman Mylius," *ibid.*, VIII (1957).
"Recent Trends in Milton Scholarship in America," *The Main Current*, XXI (1958).

SAITO, TAKESHI
"The Character of Satan in *P.L.*," *Okakura-sensei Keinen Romnonshu* (1926) (Papers Collected in Honor of Professor Okakura).
"Milton's Christian Thought," *Tokyo Shingaku Daigaku, Shingaku*, No. 5 (1953).

SUNUMA, YOSHITARO
"A Study of *P.R.*," *Tokyo Bunrika University English Language and Literature Review*, VI (1939).
"Milton's Tractate on Education," *English Study and Teaching*, VIII (1940).

TAMAKI, ISHITARO
"Satan in *P.L.*," *Kwansai University Eigaku*, I (1954) (in English).
"A Commentary on Milton's *P.R.*," *Kwansai University Literary Review*, VI (1956) (in English).

UEKI, TOSHIICHI
"An Examination of Milton's Use of Myth and Legend," Hyogo Prefectural Normal School, *Education Research Institute Reports* (1948).
"Milton's View of Women," *Kobe University Educational Research Reports*, III (1951).

Two full-length books on Milton have been published in Japan since World War II.

The first is President Fumio Ochi's *Milton Studies* (Kyoto, 1953). Though he became an authority on Milton by virtue of three articles published in Tokyo Imperial University's *Studies in English Literature*, Ochi still felt ashamed that he could not grasp the meaning of Milton's Latin poems. Through the kindness of Dr. Hidenaka Tanaka of Kyoto, he was taught Greek and then Latin. Over a period of six years he read Homer, Sappho, Plato, Virgil, Horace, and Ovid. Under Dr. Tanaka's guidance he published a Japanese translation of Virgil's *Bucolics* and *Georgics* in 1947, and established himself as a classicist. His is the first work in Japanese which makes any attempt to assess Milton's knowledge of the ancient languages and his Latin poems. The chapter headings in the book include: "The Organic Relationship between Milton's Latin and English Poems," "Three Persons who Influenced Milton—a Friend (Diodati), a Teacher (Young), and his Father," "The Italian Trip," "Milton's Debt to Greece (Homer), Italy (Virgil), and England (Bacon)," "Three Dichotomies" (town versus country, tragedy versus comedy, experience versus imagination), "The

Technique of the Epic Catalogue," etc. Among a number of short articles in an appendix the most interesting are a comparison of "vein" and "ingenium" and "Philomela—nightingale."

There is an imaginative breadth in the way Ochi handles critical problems of biography. But he is also minute. For example, he discovered during his Greek and Latin days a similarity between Milton's "pondus inutile terrae" (*Elegia,* II, 19) and *Homer's ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης* (*Iliad,* XVIII, 104). Ochi confessed to me his delight at this discovery, and his later chagrin when he found that Professor Walter MacKellar had already noted it. So he kept "pondus inutile terrae" in the back of his memory until he came across such expressions as "a burden to the earth" in *Areopagitica* and "a burdenous drone" in *Samson.* On the basis of such minutiae of parallel expressions, he suggests in his appendix that Charles Diodati may have been a partial model of "L'Allegro," by comparing lines 25-36 of that poem with *Epitaphium Damonis,* lines 55-56, 83-86.

Five years after Ochi's book, there appeared in 1958 Masao Hirai's *Milton* in the new series of Kenkyusha English and American Men of Letters. Hirai, assistant professor of English at Tokyo University, was a student of Takeshi Saito, and today teaches a Milton course that he took from that wise and beloved master. He confesses in his preface that he wrote *Milton* as though in his "task-master's eye"; and his book is a modernized version of Dr. Saito's *Milton* of twenty-five years before. But Hirai is a Renaissance man; he made his reputation with a translation into Japanese of More's *Utopia* and with *Portraits of the Renaissance* (More, Spenser, Marlowe, Shakespeare, Webster, and Tourneur) in 1948. The 233 economical pages of his 1958 book, his only contribution to Milton studies, range over Milton's youth, the Horton period, and the trip to Italy; provide three chapters on Milton's prose divided into "Religion," "Ethics," and "Politics"; and close with a consideration of his later life and the three great poems.

Professor Hirai had made a trip through America to England, where Professor Tillyard asked him how far he, as an Oriental, understood Christianity. Hirai answered in effect: "I have only a scanty knowledge of English poetry, and know even less of Christian doctrine. But I have had a religious mind since my early days." Tillyard referred him to the Indian scholar, P. B. Rajan, as an Oriental with a high degree of understanding of Milton's Christian principles.

In his book Hirai asks himself where he can connect with Milton—separated by difference in time, space, and culture—and comes to see that he should "grasp Milton's mental agony with his poems as some-

thing internal, not merely logical and cultural: something vital to human existence itself" (pp. 8-9). His purpose is to trace as faithfully as he can the image of Milton reflected in his own Japanese twentieth-century subjective mirror. The tone throughout is sincere, contemplative, and skeptical.

Hirai is not afraid of problems. Concerning the date of composition of "Song on May Morning," "O Nightingale," and "Italian Sonnets" (pp. 50-61), he questions Tillyard's thesis that they were written after the "Nativity Ode" and the "Passion":

> If that hypothesis be admitted, a tremendous commotion must have happened in Milton's mind. Because the pattern of man's inner development flows rhythmically in a spiral form, I think it more natural to place these poems *before* rather than *after* the "Nativity Ode" and the "Passion."

Hirai's book is akin to Kenneth Muir's *Milton* (1955), which he includes in his selected bibliography. It has accurate documentation, but its real merit lies in lively speculation and keen perception.

In Japanese Milton scholarship two lines have emerged: one (taken by Shigeno, Saito, and Hirai) is urbane and skeptical; the other (Yasutake, Fujii, Iwahashi, Ochi) speaks more daringly out of personal conviction. The two "schools" flourish at opposite ends of Japan's cultural geography: the first is "Kwanto," the second, "Kwansai"; the first from "dry" Tokyo, the second from "wet" Kyoto-Osaka. Hirai's single book on Milton is everywhere admired; and Ochi's long record of publication on Milton is impressive for its range, fervor, exactitude of documentation, and unquestioned knowledge of Italian, Greek, and Latin.

Many younger scholars have just begun their publishing careers in Japan. Hundreds of advanced students in Japan's universities are making their first acquaintance with *Paradise Lost*. We may expect important contributions in the future. Yet Miltonic and literary scholarship in Japan presents a peculiar problem. Japanese Miltonists are innocent of the use of "modern criticism"; complete exploration of a biographical problem seems to be beyond them; few are aware of architectonics; the lines they draw between original thinking and plagiarism are often shadowy; their treatises do not advance with a logic like ours; they write articles for each other. Is there something more "Japanese" about a Japanese than there is "American" about an American? My colleagues in Japan are almost to a man extremely conscious of their national identity. The invariable question a student asks of a poem is: "What does this poem mean to me, a Japanese?" No one wants a Japanese to be un-Japanese; yet, surely, giving up a

little of one's peculiar identity is a price most Westerners consider well worth paying for wider perspectives. We should encourage these Japanese scholars to write in an internationally accepted medium; we should welcome them into the world's intellectual orbit. They need our criticism, and we their insight.

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Some Notes on the Aesthetics Of Dostoevsky

IN SPITE of the great quantity of critical literature on Dostoevsky, surprisingly little has been written concerning his artistic technique or his aesthetic principles. Most available criticism on Dostoevsky has limited itself either to a discussion of his "philosophy" of religion, morality, and government or to an analysis of his "psychology." A few critics have attempted to study the technique of Dostoevsky's creative work, but their efforts have been primarily limited to short articles.

In an essay comparing the content and method of two Dostoevsky novels, Clarence Manning has indicated a valid critical approach to the Russian writer's artistry.[1] George Gibian's "Traditional Symbolism in *Crime and Punishment*" deals comprehensively with two of the techniques used extensively in Dostoevsky's first major novel—oblique statement and functional symbolism.[2] Unlike Manning, Gibian does not attempt to show that Dostoevsky gradually achieved greater mas-

[1] Clarence A. Manning, "Alyosha Valkovsky and Prince Myshkin," *Modern Language Notes*, LVII (1942), 182-185. Manning's analysis corroborates his thesis: "Dostoyevsky in his greater novels uses again and again in the same way phrases, ideas, and situations which he has used before but each time he deepens them, renders them more tense and steps up the tempo of the movement, until he finally produces out of commonplace material unforgettable scenes of rare power and psychological depth" (pp. 184-185). In a later discussion of the unsuccessful form of Dostoevsky's "The Double" (*Modern Language Notes*, LIX, 1944, 317-321), Manning compares briefly the ineffective rendering of the double in the early short story to the more adequate treatment which Dostovesky devised for his mature work.

[2] George Gibian, "Traditional Symbolism in *Crime and Punishment*," *PMLA*, LXX (1955), 979-996. Gibian's article represents a careful and successful analysis of both form and content.

tery over these techniques; however, he frequently makes specific allusions to their presence in later novels. Zinovy Lvovsky's "Dans le laboratoire de Dostoievsky" makes use of Dostoevsky's notebooks and manuscripts for the observance of the rigorous revisions to which Dostoevsky submitted his work.[3] Nikolaj S. Trubeckoj's essay on the style of Dostoevsky's two earliest short stories also reveals the Russian novelist as a careful craftsman.[4] Because of their self-imposed limitations, the chief value of these studies lies in their critical method; a complete and systematic analysis of Dostovesky's artistic technique has yet to be undertaken.

Scarcely any attempt has been made to determine the aesthetic principles which guided Dostoevsky's work as a critic and artist.[5] Although Dostoevsky's attitude toward "realism" in art has been much discussed, his insistence on a broad definition of the term is usually introduced merely to explain the melodrama and the eccentricity of the characters and situations which are common in his creative works; his theory is thus subordinated to the accomplished fact of its practical application. However, Renato Poggioli, in an article which contrasts Dostoevsky and the Western realists, deals directly and primarily with the Russian writer's theory of realism. Poggioli quotes Dostoevsky's definition of "higher realism": "They call me a psychologist; it is not true. I am merely a realist in the higher sense of the word, that is, I depict all the depths of the human soul."[6] Another statement of

[3] *Mercure de France*, CCXXXV (Apr. 15, 1932), 319-332. Many of Dostoevsky's marginal comments, which Lvovsky cites in his article, suggest the novelist's interest in the artistic methods of other authors.

[4] Nikolaj S. Trubeckoj, "The Style of 'Poor Folk' and 'The Double,'" *American Slavic and East European Review*, VII (1948), 150-170. Trubeckoj not only reveals Dostoevsky's careful delineation of character by means of style but also places the two short stories in the context of their literary traditions.

[5] The two studies available in English which deal with Dostoevsky's aesthetic theory, as distinct from his application of its principles, are disappointing. Father Zenkovsky's article on Dostoevsky contains a short exposition of his aesthetics. V. V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, trans. George L. Kline (London, 1953), I, 428-429. The chapter, entitled "The '*Pochvenniki*,'" deals with Apollon Grigoryev, N. N. Strakhov, and Dostoevsky. Heinrich Stammler, in an essay which attempts to show the influence of Schelling's philosophy of art on Dostoevsky's aesthetic doctrine, relies almost exclusively on one of Dostoevsky's early articles which has not yet been translated in its entirety, and supports his conclusions solely with the misleading and incomplete excerpts of the article included in the English translation of Zenkovsky's work. Heinrich Stammler, "Dostoevsky's Aesthetics and Schelling's Philosophy of Art," *CL*, VII (1955), 313-323. See appendix below for a discussion of the emphasis Stammler places on this article, "Mr. ——bov and the Problem of Art," written while Dostoevsky was a member of the editorial staff of *Vremya*, and for a fuller translation of the relevant parts of the article.

[6] Renato Poggioli, "Dostoevsky and Western Realism," *Kenyon Review*, XIV (1952), 50.

Dostevsky's distinction between "realism" and "higher realism" occurs in his preface to three of Edgar Allan Poe's short stories, first published in Russian in an 1861 issue of *Vremya.* Dostoevsky compares Poe to E. T. A. Hoffman and finds the German romantic a better poet than Poe.

> For he possesses an ideal, however wrong sometimes, yet an ideal full of purity and of inherent human beauty ... true and ripe humor, powerful realism as well as malice, are welded with a strong craving for beauty and with the shining light of the ideal.[7]

But Dostoevsky's most frequently quoted comment on the subject of realism is actually a defense of his own artistic concern for "exceptional" characters and incidents.

> I have my own idea about art, and it is this: What most people regard as fantastic and lacking in universality, *I* hold to be the inmost essence of truth. Arid observation of everyday trivialities I have long ceased to regard as realism—it is quite the reverse. In any newspaper one takes up one comes across reports of wholly authentic facts, which nevertheless strike one as extraordinary. Our writers regard them as fantastic, and take no account of them; and yet they are the truth, for they are facts. But who troubles to observe, record, describe them? They happen every day and every moment, therefore they are not "exceptional."[8]

It is unfortunate, perhaps, that this statement has achieved a kind of notoriety as Dostoevsky's last word on artistic realism; for its negative and *ex post facto* point of view suggests that Dostoevsky failed to conceive a positive and informing theory of the nature of "realism" or "truth." Furthermore, although an examination of some of Dostoevsky's less well-publicized critical statements indicates that he had formulated just such a theory, these statements often appear contradictory or misleading because of the double burden he places on the words "realism" and "reality," using them to apply to both the "inmost essence of truth" and "arid observation of everyday trivialities." Nonetheless, his distinction between these two definitions of reality is central to his theory of art. Implied in Dostoevsky's comment on Hoffmann's literary achievement is his concept of "the ideal" as the determining spirit necessary to an art work which is to portray a higher reality. His insistence upon the reality of the ideal receives more explicit expression in an article written for an 1873 issue of *The Citizen,* ostensibly an appraisal of an art exhibit, but actually a discussion of art prin-

[7] Translated by Vladimir Astrov, "Dostoievsky on Edgar Allan Poe," *American Literature,* XIV (1942), 74.

[8] *Letters of Fyodor Michailovitch Dostoevsky to his Family and Friends,* trans. (from the German) by Ethel Colburn Mayne (London, 1914), pp. 166-167. The letter, written in 1869, is addressed to the critic, Nikolay Nikolayeveitch Strakhov.

ciples. To those artists who seem afraid of historical painting because its demand for idealization would necessitate a creative lie, to those who insist on the representation of reality "as it is," Dostoevsky replies:

> ... there is no such reality, never has been because, to man, the substance of things is inaccessible, while he apperceives nature as it reflects itself in his idea after having passed through his senses. This is why one should give more leeway to the idea without fearing the ideal.[9]

In defining genre painting as "an art of portraying contemporaneous, current reality which the artist has personally felt and seen with his own eyes,"[10] Dostoevsky reiterates this distinction between substance and idea.

> We say: "beheld with one's own eyes." But Dickens had never seen Pickwick with his own eyes, merely perceiving him in the diversity of the reality observed by him; he created a character and presented him as a result of his observations. Thus, this character is as real as an actually existing one, even though Dickens had merely taken an ideal of the reality.[11]

Thus, Dickens, whose work Dostoevsky called "genre, too, nothing but genre,"[12] exemplifies the artist who trusts "his idea (the ideal) more than the projected reality."[13]

In a later issue of *The Citizen,* those writers who belong to the class of the "author-pattern-drudge," who mistake the projected reality for the ideal, who deal "in terms of essences or patterns,"[14] are berated by Dostoevsky for their copybook technique.

> After that he embarks upon a novel, and the moment a merchant or a clergyman starts speaking, he begins to concoct his speech from the expressions recorded in the copybook. Readers laugh and praise it: it seems so authentic—copied directly from nature. Yet it proves to be worse than a lie precisely because the merchant or the soldier in the novel speaks in terms of *essences,* that is, as no merchant and no soldier ever speaks in real life.[15]

Artistic realism, then, does not consist of "essences," of typicalness, the result of merely recording the "phenomena of reality."[16] Neither is it to be achieved by

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[9] Dostoevsky, *The Diary of a Writer,* trans. Boris Brasol (New York, 1954), p. 83.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 83.
[11] *Ibid.,* p. 83.
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 82.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 83.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 97.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 97. The italics are Dostoevsky's.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 98.

> ...set[ting] forth correctly all given qualities of a person: one has resolutely to illumine him with one's own artistic vision. A genuine artist, under no circumstances, should remain on one level with the person portrayed by him, confining himself to mere realistic truth; the impression will carry no truth.[17]

In spite of what may at first appear to be a confusion of terms, Dostoevsky's meaning here cannot be mistaken: the "truth" that the genuine artist must strive for is the reality of the ideal, and this ideal reality is not to be found in the "realistic truth" of the "substance of things," but only in "nature as it reflects itself in his idea." The genuine artist is a "heart-reader" like Cervantes, a "realist in the higher sense of the word," a depictor of the "deepest and most mysterious traits of the human spirit."[18]

Dostoevsky's view of reality is the foundation for his contention that "pure art" cannot exist because creative inspiration is an integral part of ultimate reality; consequently, all artistic productions are "useful" because they present this reality in objectified form. In "Mr. —bov and the Problem of Art," an article devoted primarily to lengthy quotations from an essay published two years earlier by Dobrolyubov, one of the leaders of the utilitarian school of literary criticism, and to an explanation of the fallacies of Dobrolyubov's views, Dostoevsky writes: *"Art is always contemporary and functional; it never existed otherwise and, above all, would not be able to exist otherwise."*[19] The references Dostoevsky makes to beauty and art in the remainder of the article do little more than support this statement. Beauty is clearly differentiated from art: beauty "embodies for man and for humanity his ideals," while "the creative work . . . incarnates beauty."[20] According to Dostoevsky's system of aesthetics, beauty can therefore be assumed to have a real existence apart from the art work, but beauty cannot exist apart from the ideal. Beauty is not the physical objectification of the ideal, but the metaphysical ideal itself; the art work is the physical embodiment of beauty.[21] Dostoevsky never confused harmony of form, comprising external beauty, with the harmony and tranquility

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 836.

[19] Dostoevsky, "G. ——bov i Vopros ob Iskusstve," *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii* (Complete Works) (St. Petersburg, 1886), V, 42. The italics are Dostoevsky's. This article was originally published in the Feb. 1861 issue of *Vremya*.

[20] *Ibid.*, V, 39-40. Unfortunately, Stammler omits both these statements from his quotation (p. 314), although they occur as parts of sentences from which he quotes.

[21] On this point Dostoevsky's terminology comes into basic discord with that of Schelling, who uses the term "the beautiful" to mean the physical objectification of the ideal. Stammler assumes that Dostoevsky, like Schelling, uses the terms "beauty" and "art" interchangeably.

of ultimate moral and spiritual beauty. Even the sensualist Dmitri, whose famous statement on "the ideal of Sodom" (*The Brothers Karamazov,* Part I, Book III, Chapter 3) has been taken as representative of Dostoevsky's view, reveals a clear perception of the difference between external and ideal beauty.[22]

"Mr. —bov and the Problem of Art" does little toward clarifying Dostoevsky's concept of the ideal, to which beauty is inseparably bound; one must turn to his letters and to other journalistic articles for a definition. In a letter written to Apollon Nikolayevitch Maikov in 1867, Dostoevsky says:

> It is to Deism that we owe the Saviour—that is to say, the conception of a man so noble that one cannot grasp it without a sense of awe—a conception of which one cannot doubt that it represents the undying ideal of mankind.[23]

Early in the following year, he wrote to his niece Sofia Alexandrovna concerning his plan to represent a "truly perfect and noble man" in *The Idiot*:

> All writers, not ours alone but foreigners also, who have sought to represent Absolute Beauty, were unequal to the task, for it is an infinitely difficult one. The beautiful is the ideal; but ideals with us as in civilized Europe have long been wavering. There is in the world only one figure of absolute beauty: Christ. That infinitely lovely figure is, as a matter of course, an infinite marvel (the whole Gospel of St. John is full of this thought: John sees the wonder of the Incarnation, the visible apparition of the Beautiful).[24]

Clearly, if beauty is the figurative embodiment of man's ideal, it must be considered as synonymous with the moral and spiritual truth literally incarnated by the figure of Christ. Much later, in his Pushkin speech of 1881, Dostoevsky again refers to beauty as spiritual truth:

> He revealed and moulded it [the figure of the "annalist-monk" in *Boris Godunov*], forever placing it before us in its indisputable, humble and spiritually noble beauty as evidence of the potent spirit of Russian national life which is capable of producing characters of such incontestable truth.[25]

A few sentences earlier in his speech, Dostoevsky had said, "Their principal beauty [that of Pushkin's characters] lies in their incontestable and tangible truth, so that it is impossible to deny them, and they stand there as though sculptured."[26]

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[22] Both Zenkovsky and Stammler cite Dmitri's speech as evidence that Dostoevsky recognized the "moral ambiguity of beauty" (Zenkovsky, p. 429).

[23] Dostoevsky, *Letters,* p. 121.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 142.

[25] Dostoevsky, *The Diary of a Writer,* pp. 975-976.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 975.

Naturally enough, Dostoevsky insisted that there could be no "pure art." Inspired by God, that is, by the longing for the beautiful ideal of God, the artist incarnates this ideal beauty in his work. Thus art depicts ultimate reality by embodying the ideal; as a manifestation of the ideal reality, art must necessarily be useful to mankind. Dostoevsky never contradicts this fundamental philosophy of art; he reiterates it throughout his nonfictional writing. As early as 1840, he scolds his brother for confusing poetic form with beauty: "Racine no poet—Racine the ardent, the passionate, the idealist Racine, no poet! Do you dare to ask that?"[27] Two years earlier he had written to Mikhail: "Remark that the poet, in the moment of inspiration, comprehends God, and consequently does the philosopher's work."[28] In 1873, Dostoevsky formulated a definition for the aim of art: "The aim of art is not to portray these or those incidents in the ways of life, but their general idea, sharp-sightedly divined and correctly removed from the whole multiplicity of analogous living phenomena."[29] Indeed, Dostoevsky's basic concept of art as the embodiment of the ideal beauty of God, a concept which he first expressed at the age of seventeen, is reflected throughout all his practical criticism of art.

APPENDIX

In order to illustrate the similarities in the aesthetics of Schelling and of Dostoevsky and to make Schelling's influence plausible by tracing it through Apollon Grigoryev, one of Dostoevsky's collaborators on the *Vremya* staff, Heinrich Stammler, in an article in the Fall 1955 issue of *Comparative Literature*, represents Dostoevsky's "Mr. —bov and the Problems of Art" as an aesthetic treatise. Dostoevsky, he says,

"... never tired of affirming that art draws its main inspiration from reality, and that art, being an organic outgrowth of the human mind, remains faithful to man in his empirical existence. This he expressed with remarkable vigor in his substantial article, 'Mr.... bov and the Problem of Art,' an eloquent polemic against Dobrolyubov, one of the leaders of the radical and utilitarian school in Russian literary criticism."[30]

Aside from three quotations from Dostoevsky's creative works, Stammler quotes exclusively from the *Vremya* article. Dostoevsky's twenty-three page article is actually devoted almost entirely to an account of an essay which Dobrolyubov had published in 1859, and which Dostoevsky considered necessary to reprint in large part before attacking it.

All of Stammler's translations of Dostoevsky's text follow, together with my own literal translations of these same sections. Because the complete text of the

[27] Dostoevsky, *Letters*, p. 14.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[29] Dostoevsky, *The Diary of a Writer*, p. 90.
[30] Stammler, *loc. cit.*, p. 313.

article is not available in English, I have provided a context for each of Stammler's isolated quotations. I am much indebted to Mr. Joseph T. Shaw of the Slavic Studies Department of Indiana University for suggesting improvements in my original translation. Stammler's translations read:

"We believe that art has its own integral and organic life... Art is just as much a human need as eating and drinking. The need for beauty and creation is inseparable from man... Man thirsts for beauty and accepts it without condition, simply because it is beauty. Beauty inheres in everything healthy. It is harmony, and it contains a guarantee of tranquility."[31]

"The demand for the beautiful originates in man's conflict with external reality, in a lack of harmony, in the fact that he has to struggle, in the fateful intensity of his material existence."[32]

"The force of creation, the basis of all art, lives within man as a manifestation of one part of his organism."[33]

The first two of these quotations are taken from the following paragraph of Dostoevsky's text:

"... In one of your articles you say: 'Let the work be artistic, but it must be contemporary.' And in another article: 'If you want to function in a vital way for me, if you want to make me learn to love beauty, then you must know how to perceive in it the general meaning that is the breath of life. You must know how to show and to explain this meaning to me; only then will you achieve your goal.' Briefly and clearly: you do not reject aesthetic value, but you insist that the artist speak about the down-to-earth, that he serve the common welfare, that he be true to contemporary reality, to its demands, to its ideals. An excellent desire. But such a desire, *transformed into a demand*, in our opinion, is already a misunderstanding of the fundamental laws of art and its principal essence—freedom of inspiration. This means simply not to acknowledge art as an organic whole. In just this lies the whole mistake in this confused problem, a mistake which has led us to perplexities, to disagreements, and what is worst of all, to extremes. You seem to think that art has no norm whatever of its own, no laws of its own, that it is possible to submit it to an arbitrary rule, that anyone can have inspiration for the asking, and that inspiration is able to serve this purpose and that purpose and to take any road you please. But we believe that art has its own whole, organic life and, consequently, fundamental and immutable laws for that life. Art is just such a necessity for man as eating and drinking. The necessity for beauty and for the creative work which incarnates beauty is inseparable from man, and perhaps without it he would not wish to live in the world. Man thirsts for beauty; he discovers and accepts beauty *without any conditions*, just as it is, only because it is beauty, and he worships before it with awe, without questioning what it is useful for and what one can buy with it. And, perhaps, the greatest mystery of artistic creation consists in just this: that the image of beauty, created by the artistic work, becomes instantly an idol, *without any conditions*. And why does it become an idol? Because the need for beauty develops most when man is in discord with

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 314. Stammler's version of this passage coincides exactly, even in the matter of its ellipses, with the English version of Zenkovsky's citation.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 320.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 317.

reality, when he is out harmony, when he is struggling, i.e., *when he most lives*, because man most lives precisely at the time when he is seeking and striving for something; then the most natural desire for everything harmonious, for tranquility, arises in him, and beauty is just this harmony and tranquility. However, when he finds what he is striving for, life slows down for him for a time. And we have even seen examples in which a man, having achieved the ideal of his desires and not knowing what else to strive for, satiated up to the neck, sank into some sort of anguish, even intensifying this anguish in himself, and sought another ideal in his life. Out of increased satiety, he not only failed to appreciate that which he had been enjoying, but even deliberately turned from the straight path, stimulating in himself alien, unhealthy, stinging, discordant, and sometimes monstrous tastes, losing the rhythm and the aesthetic perception of wholesome beauty and demanding, instead of beauty, distortions. And that is why beauty is inherent in everything healthy, i.e., in the most vital, and is an indispensable necessity for the human organism. Beauty is harmony; in it is a guarantee of tranquility; it embodies for man and for humanity his ideals."[34]

Stammler's last quotation appears in the following paragraph of Dostoevsky's article:

"... The creative impulse, the foundation of all art, lives in man as a manifestation of a part of his organism, but it lives inseparable from man. Consequently, the creative work is not able to have another goal except that toward which the whole man aspires. If it were to take another path, it would travel in discord with man, dissociated from him; consequently, it would be false to the law of nature. But mankind is, for the present, strong, not dying out, and not false to the law of nature, generally speaking. Consequently, there is nothing to fear on behalf of art; it will not betray its own purpose. It will always live with man in its own real life; it is unable to do anything else. Consequently, it will remain forever true to reality."[35]

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[34] Dosteovsky, "G. ——bov i Vopros ob Iskusstve," *op. cit.*, V, 39-40. The italics are Dostoevsky's.

[35] *Ibid.*, V, 45.

EGON SCHWARZ

Manuel Tamayo y Baus And Schiller

FROM THE LIST of non-German literary figures influenced by Friedrich Schiller the name of the Spanish dramatist, Manuel Tamayo y Baus is too often omitted,[1] an omission all the more serious because of Tamayo's rank as a writer and the depth of his commitment to the German playwright.[2]

If any literary apprenticeship deserves the designation of *Urerlebnis,* Tamayo's fascination with Schiller exhibits the traits one is wont to connect with this term: encounter during the formative years, concrete fruits in the form of literary works, and an increased creative impulse resulting from the contact.

Little is known about Tamayo's earliest occupation with Schiller. In a different context but with words wholly applicable to this problem, Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo once complained: "Poco sabemos de la vida . . . de nuestros mayores ingenios, máxime de los dramáticos."[3] Manuel Tamayo y Baus did not begin his relationship with the theater as an imitator of Schiller. His first dramatic feat was a stage adaptation of *Genoveva de Brabante,* when he surprised his audience by appearing on stage after the premiere, a boy of ten, holding his mother's hand. But this attempt was merely a youthful response to the challenge of his environment (Tamayo was the son of actors). It was not until the end of his adolescence that he returned to the stage with

[1] See the excellent article by Kurt Wais, "Schillers Wirkungsgeschichte im Ausland," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift f. Literaturwiss u. Geistesgesch.,* XXIX (1955), 475-508, where Byron, Coleridge, Constant, Dumas *père,* Ibsen, Manzoni, Mérimée, and others are mentioned.

[2] Kurt Wais, *ibid.,* mentions neither Tamayo nor indeed any other Spaniard.

[3] In his "Estudio crítico" introducing Vol. I of *Teatro selecto de Calderón de la Barca* (Madrid, 1881), p. xx.

a significant production entitled *Juana de Arco,* a play which he himself labeled an "imitación de Schiller." Only a few years later he presented another work, entitled *Angela,* freer in its relationship toward its model but unmistakable in its dependence upon Schiller's *Kabale und Liebe.* It has been said that Tamayo's *5 de Agosto,* a kind of *Schicksalstragödie,* was his first original work.[4] This play was written during the years between the author's two Schillerian attempts. Another of his critics asserts that his literary career does not really start until the writing of his Virginia tragedy.[5] At any rate, Schiller must be regarded as the liberator of Tamayo's creative impulses. After *Angela*[6] the stream of Tamayo's production flows abundantly to the full fruition of his genius. A few dates will illustrate and reinforce this point: 1847, *Juana de Arco;* 1848, *5 de Agosto;* 1852, *Angela;* 1853, *Virginia*—then in steady procession the masterpieces from *La Ricahembra* (1854) and *Locura de amor* (1855) to *Un drama nuevo* (1867) and *Los hombres de bien* (1870).

It would be rewarding to trace Schillerian echoes through all of Tamayo's later plays, upon which his reputation as a dramatist rests. But the scope of this paper must be restricted to a consideration of the two early plays admittedly written in the fashion of Schiller, through which the Spaniard acquired, gropingly at first and then with greater self-assurance, the skills and the theatrical verve that characterize his mature works.

The first impression conveyed by Tamayo's *Juana de Arco,* with which the apprentice author ambitiously ventured into the realm of verse drama, is one of closeness to the original. As one skims over the pages they seem to be little more than translation. One finds the same characters and much the same sequence of scenes. As in Schiller, the play begins with a prologue containing Joan's famous farewell speech and ends with the hopeful assertion of the transitoriness of pain and the eternity of joy while the banners are lowered over the heroine's dead body.

A second, more discriminating glance, however, reveals that much has been changed. Moreover, one notices with some bewilderment that this transformation, which has affected almost every significant feature of the play, has been consistently achieved through omissions rather

[4] "La primera obra original de Tamayo es *El 5 de Agosto.*" Isidoro Fernández Flórez, *Tamayo* (Madrid, n.d.), p. 7.

[5] "... sa carrière littéraire ne commence en realité qu'en 1853 avec sa tragédie de *Virginie.*" Boris de Tannenberg, *Un Dramaturge espagnol: M. Tamayo y Baus* (Paris, 1898), p. 1.

[6] It is possible that Tamayo took this name and title from Victor Hugo's drama, *Angelo,* which is also indebted to Schiller.

than additions. Schiller's five acts, apart from the prologue, have been reduced to four; the number of characters has been cut down considerably, there are fewer scenes, familiar motifs have been dropped, and even the verses have become shorter.

Seeking a common denominator for at least some of these abbreviations, one makes a first significant discovery. Consistently all that relates to the miraculous, which plays such a prominent role in the German tragedy, and almost everything that Schiller understood by the term "romantic," which he deliberately included in the subtitle, has been carefully eliminated. At the very beginning of the prologue the reader is fascinated by the experience of seeing something utterly familiar and seemingly immutable undergo a strange transformation. The helmet, symbol of Joan's transition from an innocuous shepherdess to a bellicose leader of armies, was not acquired in Tamayo's drama, from a "braun Bohemerweib" in an atmosphere of gipsy witchcraft nor left in the peasant's hand. It was regularly and legally sold by a "doncella," bought by Joan's father out of mercy and a feeling of social as well as national consciousness. It is a helmet with a very definite history; it used to belong to the seller's father, who had worn it honorably and bravely for thirty years. Since the owner is now dying in destitution, his daughter is selling it, under severe pressure, to be sure, but still selling it for gain. It is a much more real but infinitely less symbolic helmet.

This helmet turned historical and realistic is only a forerunner of things to come. In Tamayo's version, the heroine still receives her inspiration and even her instructions during celestial visions, but they are much less specific and restricted to the subjective sphere of her emotional life. They do not appear to be corroborated by any outward portents and are by no means contingent upon the uncanny tree that so perturbs her father in Schiller's *Jungfrau von Orleans*. Tamayo has severed her connection with a transcendental order, whether evil or divine. He has eliminated the "test" by which, in Schiller's drama, she recognizes the king and demonstrates that she is possessed of supersensory intuitions. As a consequence, she cannot possibly be accused of witchcraft after the coronation at Reims, but must be charged with a much more worldly offense. And finally, her fetters do not fall without physical touch as a token of divine reconciliation but are removed by her father who, shrewdly disguised, has gained access to his captive daughter.

Some of the eliminated characters can be accounted for by similar observations. An author who wishes to reduce his dramatic happenings

to purely terrestrial dimensions has no use for a mysterious, invulnerable black knight gifted with prophetic foresight, whether he is the embodiment of Talbot's departed soul or not. His absence does not find us totally unprepared. But there is a sense of shock at the discovery that Talbot himself has also been eliminated. One of Tamayo's apologists has insisted that his suppressions have merely eliminated characters "unnecessary and detrimental to the logical development of the plot."[7] But we are not reconciled so easily to the loss of Joan's worthiest opponent and of the grandiose scene of his death. We feel that, by sparing us his courageous demise, Tamayo has reduced Joan's own stature as well. We find that we have grown deeply attached to his ill-humored lines, so full of intellectual dignity in the midst of defeat:

> Unsinn, du siegst, and ich muß untergehn!
> Mit der Dummheit kämpfen Götter selbst vergebens.[8]

The figure of Talbot adds another dimension to Schiller's play, and provides an important contrast to Joan's world, whether he be regarded as a mere representative of atheism and materialism or as a spokesman for Schiller's own mental reservations to Joan's miracle-loving mind.[9]

Similarly, the cancellation of Montgomery from the cast deprives the central character of a potent contrast and makes it all the more difficult for the reader or spectator to view properly the sparing of Lionel—quite apart from the loss of the beautiful speech "Stirb, Freund! Warum so zaghaft zittern vor dem Tod . . . ,"[10] a masterpiece in contrasts and condensations of the very linguistic tensions that give life to the whole drama.[11]

Yet the suppression of both Talbot and Montgomery reinforces the basic tendency of Tamayo's drama. In their absence the heroine appears more directly involved in the play of historical forces and her connections with the supernatural world are muted and minimized.

Other suppressions seem to result simply from a desire to economize without ulterior purpose, and still others may be termed substitutions rather than omissions. Thus Bertrand's report on the state

[7] "Así observamos que en *Juana de Arco* se han modificado algunos personajes, y suprimido otros por innecesarios y perjudiciales para el desarrollo lógico de la acción . . . " Narciso Sicars y Salvado, *Tamayo* (Barcelona, 1906), p. 132.

[8] The edition cited in this paper is Schiller's *Sämtliche Werke* (Stuttgart, 1893), 16 vols. For the two lines quoted, see V, 284, lines 2318-19.

[9] For this interesting interpretation, see Dolf Sternberger, "Talbot, der einzig Nüchterne," in *Figuren der Fabel* (Berlin and Frankfurt, 1950).

[10] Schiller, V, 255-256.

[11] See K. Reinhardt, "Sprachliches zu Schillers Jungfrau," *Akzente*, II (1955), 206-222.

of public affairs, the war, and politics is entrusted in Tamayo's adaptation to father Thibaut himself. His arrival with the helmet from Vaucouleurs at the very beginning sets the action in motion before the pastoral tableau has a chance to unfold. While there may not be any specific dramatic function for Bertrand, his intrusion from a world in strife and turmoil into an idyllic family scene provides in Schiller's play a sharp contrast to the patriarchal timelessness of the betrothals and sets the atmosphere of the entire prologue. The combination of the patriarch and the bearer of war news in one person not only diminishes the clash between the two worlds to the vanishing point, but also obliterates the bucolic setting to such an extent that Joan's farewell monologue acquires a somewhat hollow ring. The purpose of the whole prologue becomes doubtful. Yet the change in key is wholly consistent with the tenor of a play whose basic tendency it is to relax tensions and avoid extremes.

The substitution of a worldly Gran Canciller for Schiller's Archbishop of Reims may be an early indication of Tamayo's lifelong reverence for the clergy. While there is nothing particularly objectionable in the conduct of Schiller's character, the mere fact that the archbishop commits the same mistake of judgment as the others and becomes guilty of ingratitude toward Joan may have sufficed to prompt a change to avoid clashes of still another sort, with the powers of society and public opinion. On the other hand, it is difficult to discover a plausible reason for the exchange of certain functions between Dunois and La Hire which Tamayo makes.

Thus, while exhibiting a certain consistency of purpose, most of the alterations are of a more or less negative nature—reductions in size and scope, elisions, concentrations, or substitutions. At one point, however, driven no doubt by the logic of his own economies, Tamayo has invented a new motivation. This occurs in the great scene of recrimination in Act III (Schiller, Act IV, Scene II). Since Tamayo has not permitted Joan to have any dealings with the beyond or to perform any scandalous miracles, there can be no question in his version of misinterpretation of her intercourse with the metaphysical world or of accusation of the protagonist's father of entertaining connections with the wrong side *d'outre-vie*. So the spectacle of a father publicly ruining his daughter's reputation is eliminated.

But the dramatist must still provide a cause for the heroine's downfall if he is to prevent the play from collapsing at this juncture. Tamayo attempted to solve this problem but what he invented for the purpose—it must be said *sine ira et studio*—is far more unrealistic than the sight

of a father, troubled by superstitions, trying to save his daughter's soul even at the expense of her temporal glory. In Tamayo's drama it is Lionel, the English military leader and the recipient of Joan's affection, who, risking capture and death, appears in the market square of Reims and reveals Joan's treasonable passion to the horrified French. By means of a sword he has taken from her he proves her to be "impúdica y traidora," indeed a "serpiente engañadora . . . del infierno."[12] Even if one disregards the improbability of this confrontation, even if one desists from asking why Lionel, though fully recognized in his identity and threatened with captivity, is allowed to return to his army at the end of the scene, it must be recognized that Tamayo defeated his own purpose. He managed to substitute a terrestrial for a metaphysical offense, thereby removing the tension between reproach and expiation; but he was unable to get rid of the thunder and the supernatural intervention, and thus jeopardized the naturalistic conception of his play. In any event, Lionel's intervention has the same effect on Joan's followers as Thibaut's diatribe. Joan is expelled from the French ranks, and the tragedy can now take its "natural" course to the end.

The two Joans, though far from being identical, nevertheless exhibit many traits of kinship. Tamayo's is the homelier, Schiller's the more glamorous cousin. With the exception of the scene of accusation just described, Tamayo's play shows a marked inclination toward simplicity, logical motivation, economy, and realism. The Spanish playwright presents a secularized heroine who is closer to the historical Joan of Arc than Schiller's protagonist. Tamayo's heroine influences the course of history through the strength of her devotion rather than because she is in league with supernatural powers. The main lines of Schiller's plot have been preserved, but stark contrasts, tensions, and sources of friction have either been mitigated or removed. If Schiller's play has remained attractive thanks to its formal complexity and sophistication—so much so that it has been called an exercise in pure form[13]—Tamayo's adaptation merits attention for its down-to-earth quality and singleness of purpose. His Joan is neither idyllic nor saintly. Her radiance has been greatly dimmed. Not only does she fail to make the sentimental impression on Lionel envisaged by Schiller; but even on the French side there is no sign of the fascination the German dramatist made her exercise upon the men surrounding her. The demands on her person

[12] *Obras de D. Manuel Tamayo y Baus* (Madrid, 1898), I, 73. All citations in this paper are from this edition.

[13] "... es geht hier nicht um Einkleidung eines Inhaltes, sondern um Form und Formen schlechthin." Gerhard Storz, *Jeanne d'Arc und Schiller* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1947).

of both her pastoral background and the heavenly kingdom are almost nonexistent, and her tragic flaw, if it is felt as a conflict of *Pflicht* and *Neigung* at all, stands in contrast with her patriotic mission rather than with her otherworldliness.

In Tamayo's version patriotism has been greatly emphasized by a peculiar linguistic device. Of the innumerable occurrences of the words "France" and "French" in Schiller's original, only a few have remained in the Spanish imitation, most of them having been replaced by less specific references such as "patria" and "país." If by this Tamayo intended to make it easier for his Spanish audiences to identify themselves with Joan's cause, he also magnified the patriotic intensity of his lines *in abstracto* for any reader or spectator. His emphasis on the two fundamental principles, realism and nationalism, although to a degree already present in Schiller, is in keeping with the mid-century climate in which the work originated.

Like most Spaniards interested in German literature, Tamayo was probably unable to read Schiller's works in the original, and it is safe to assume that he received his model through French mediation. More specifically, there is evidence that he worked with M. X. Marmier's prose translations of Schiller's plays.[14] The chronology as well as certain striking congruities make this relationship more than probable. A few examples must suffice.

Schiller spells the name of the courageous defender of besieged Orleans "Saintrailles." Marmier's translation and Tamayo have the spelling "Xaintrailles."

In the farewell monologue at the end of the play's prologue Schiller's Johanna refers to her childhood playgrounds as "Ihr Plätze aller meiner stillen Freuden,"[15] which Marmier renders as "Doux théâtre des mes joies paisibles."[16] The word "théâtre" in this line is acceptable and even elegant, but by no means the only possible or the most plausible translation of "Plätze." (Against it could be objected that the metaphor "théâtre" for "lieux" is slightly out of keeping with the diction of a shepherdess.) Tamayo has "Teatro de apacibles alegrías,"[17] where "lugares," a more immediate equivalent of "Plätze," would be equally suited from a rhythmical point of view.

In the last line of the same speech Schiller writes, "Das Schlachtroß steigt . . . ,"[18] conveying an image of bellicosity, power, and im-

[14] *Théâtre de Schiller* (Paris, 1841).
[15] Schiller, V, 201, line 393.
[16] Marmier, II, 232.
[17] Tamayo, I, 22.
[18] Schiller, V, 203, line 432.

patience which forms a whole with the other elements of the last lines:

> Es treibt mich fort mit Sturmes Ungestüm,
> Den Feldruf hör ich mächtig zu mir dringen ...[19]

Marmier's rendering of this image, "Le cheval de bataille frappe du pied la terre ...,"[20] though in keeping with the purport of the gesture, represents a shift in the imagery; thus Tamayo's retention of this inaccuracy is all the more revealing: "La tierra pisotea el guerrero bridón."[21]

On November 13, 1852, Tamayo's drama *Angela* was performed for the first time in the Teatro de Variedades in Madrid. The day before, probably in response to press criticism, he had written a prologue acknowledging his indebtedness to his dramatic forbear. "El presente drama es hijo legítimo del titulado Intriga y amor, de Schiller: se parece a este como un hijo a su padre: tiene el aire de familia ..." He calls Schiller his "insigne" and "admirable maestro," and adds:

> De nobles corazones es confesar deudas de gratitud, y villano fuera el mío si procurase desconocer lo que debe al gran poeta, honra y prez de la Alemania de nuestros tiempos. No he tratado, pues, no trato de ocultar una circunstancia que juzgo honrosa: antes bien le proclamo con orgullo, porque, en literatura como en religión, imitar lo bueno es seguir el camino de la virtud.

But interwoven with these humble words are others that have a new ring of pride and self-assurance:

> Es [Angela], sin embargo, un ser esencialmente diverso, con otra forma, otro corazón, alma distinta ... Doy el nombre de *original* a esta obra, porque imagino que no le peudo aplicar otro más conveniente ... Todos los elementos aprovechados de esta obra [*Kabale und Liebe*] han mudado de naturaleza y modificádose capitalmente ... Inútil me parece añadir a estas ligeras apuntaciones hechas para descargo de mi conciencia, que el ejemplo de todos los grandes maestros autoriza sobradamente la imitación de las bellezas ajenas ... Si pues la imitación de las grandes obras es lícita, conveniente y necesaria; si los mas dignos maestros de todas las escuelas han imitado a otros, y la originalidad absoluta es una quimera irrealizable, harta disculpa merece el que yo, joven y obscuro, haya seguido, con más o menos felicidad, la pauta de ejemplos tan fructuosos.[22]

In spite of the many humble provisos and modest withdrawals, this is a declaration of independence. One would be entitled to suspect that *Angela* would be Tamayo's last attempt to model a dramatic production concisely after a Schiller play. Consequently, one turns with interest to *Kabale und Liebe* and *Angela* for a last confrontation.

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[19] Schiller, V, 203, lines 430-431.
[20] Marmier, II, 233.
[21] Tamayo, I, 23.
[22] "Prólogo del Autor," I, 189, 190, 192.

A summary of the plot common to both dramas shows that Tamayo was not quite correct in claiming that in his *Angela* ". . . hay tres situaciones o cinco pensamientos semejantes a otros tantos del drama alemán."[23] The action takes place in an independent principality governed by an autocratic ruler who is surrounded by a libertine and corrupt court. (The prince himself does not appear personally.) The background includes a society sharply divided along class lines, in which the aristocracy enjoys all the prerogatives while the lower classes are little more than serfs. The center of interest is a young couple united in their passionate devotion to each other but separated by the most formidable barrier existing in this social environment; the girl is of working-class origin while the young man is a noble officer, son of one of the most powerful men in the country. Aided by an accomplice, the father has reached his position of influence by means of a crime which he must jealously conceal. In order to fortify his power, he has conceived a plan to marry his son to the most influential woman at court, a lady of ill repute. He is assisted in his scheme by the lady's secret passion for the young officer.

When the young man refuses to become a pawn in his father's game of power, the father resorts to violence. In a scene full of infamous insults and gallant gestures, he arrests the fiancée's parents (in Tamayo's play the mother) in order to be able to exert greater pressure on the recalcitrant lovers. In both plays, there is an encounter between the two rival women, during which the aristocratic lady tries to intimidate her opponent. But, when she discovers the virture and nobility of the humble girl's heart, she undergoes a conversion, relinquishes her claims, and decides to expiate her immorality by leaving the country.

Meanwhile, by using the imprisonment of the girl's parents as a threat and appealing to her filial loyalty, the father is able to extort a fictitious letter from her which is later placed in her lover's hands. In spite of the obvious contemptibility of the assumed rival, the young man is so jealous that he believes his fiancée guilty and precipitates the catastrophe.

The catastrophe is different in the two dramas—in Schiller, the lover poisons his beloved and himself; in Tamayo, the venomous potion is inadvertently drunk by the scheming father. The similarities however, extend to the basic scaffolding of the plays, although Tamayo introduces numerous innovations in addition to the final solution. In his version, the hero is not really the son of the tyrannical, power-mad courtier whose crime consists precisely in having usurped his titles and

[23] Tamayo, I, 189.

wealth by means of this supposititious child—which gives the dramatist an opportunity to introduce the figure of the real father, makes possible the demasking of the impostor, and prepares for the happy ending. In his play, the heroine suffers a fit of mental disturbance under the pressure of mounting strain. The critical point is reached in a very effective scene at court where the rich and privileged are celebrating a sumptuous and gay feast, which the harried girl interrupts with accusations and clamor for justice. These and many other inventions greatly alter the outward appearance of the play but leave, beneath the remodeled surface, a basic identity of dramatic structure.

More important than the modifications of the plot are, as Tamayo himself points out, the changes affecting the climate or atmosphere of the play—in particular Tamayo's consistent tendency to attenuate, mitigate, and mute the Storm and Stress exaltation that sets the mood of Schiller's work.

Kurt Wais complains that Schiller's disciples and imitators abroad for the most part exaggerated the rebellious note present in his earlier works.[24] This criticism cannot be applied to Tamayo. Reformatory zeal is all but absent in *Angela*. Class differences play a part; but they are not allowed to interfere fundamentally with the development of the play. Ultimately young Conrado discovers his bourgeois origin, and ostentatiously, in the presence of the assembled nobility, tears off decorations and officer's insignia from his uniform and hands over his sword. This could perhaps be construed as a protest against prevailing social conditions. But it serves primarily to remove the major obstacle from the path of the lovers; nothing will now prevent their happy union. The glass with poison stands ominously and alluringly on Angela's desk for the better part of Act V, but its presence merely serves to create greater suspense; it has long been destined by the author for the instigator of the crime, who will thus expiate his evil designs, past and present.

It should be noted that the evil father, the Gran Chambelán, is also of lower-class ancestry, having inherited fortune as well as titles from his deceased wife; hence almost the entire action occurs among commoners and the references to class barriers are largely irrelevant to the central theme. All the injustices and oppressive acts are really attributable to the selfish character of mankind rather than to a faulty social organization.

It is true that not all social accusations have been suppressed. Magdalena, Angela's mother, utters a few rather bitter words in a moment

[24] *Loc. cit.*, p. 479. "Hier ist er . . . wohl am gröblichsten mißverstanden worden."

of anguish: "Comprendo: el Duque, ocupado en sus placeres y olvidado de su pueblo se burlaría de li viuda y huérfana de un soldado que murió en el campo de batalla, y aplaudirá la hazaña del cortesano adulador."[25] And, when Angela appears at court, maddened by the blows of a cruel fate, she airs not only personal grievances but also social indignation before the derelict nobles: "¡Cuánte gente! Este es Palacio. Aquí es donde moran los que debían saberlo todo y no saben más que lo que les quieren decir . . . Aquí es donde muchos parecen ser . . . lo que no son."[26] But how feeble and conciliatory is all this, compared to the bitterness of the valet's report in *Kabale und Liebe* describing the departure of the soldiers who were sold to England to defray the cost of Lady Milford's jewelry. The valet, who speaks of "gellende Trommeln," of "heulende Waisen," of a "wütende Mutter" who runs "ihr saugendes Kind an Bajonetten zu spießen," of "verzweiflungsvolle Graubärte," etc.,[27] has been dropped from *Angela's* cast. In the passages from *Angela* quoted above, the key words are "olvidado" and "no saben," suggesting that the sins of the nobles are more of omission than of commission. There is mention of soldiers leaving the country, but there is no suggestion of coercion or traffic in human souls.

Whatever is left of social pathos after these eliminations and attenuations is further muted by the removal of the whole scene to an indeterminate Italian duchy, away from the social environment familiar to the audience. It is well to remember that part of the electrifying effect of Schiller's revolutionary plays was achieved by placing the happenings in an unmistakably German milieu and by deliberately portraying German conditions.

Similar muffling of brutal facts occurs elsewhere in Tamayo's drama. Countess Adelaida, Lady Milford's equivalent, is not the mistress of the ruling duke but of his deceased predecessor. And even this past relationship is not reported as a fact but discreetly hinted at by rumor, hearsay, and circumstantial evidence. The mother, unlike Frau Millerin, is not a coffee-drinking social climber and matchmaker but a humble, righteous, and pious woman, who for all these virtues is of less psychological interest. And the serpentine, diabolic Wurm has been replaced by a colorless, middle-aged physician who is an almost respectable figure most of the time.

What seems to be the central concern of Schiller's play, the test of absolute love, is not carried to such an extreme by Tamayo. Angela herself, as a matter of fact, is never put to a real test at all. She is forced

[25] Tamayo, I, 251.
[26] Tamayo, I, 305.
[27] Schiller, II, 318.

to write the compromising letter and is brought to the verge of renouncing her love for the sake of saving her mother. But the conflict is not crystallized, as in Schiller's play, between the limitations of class and upbringing concentrated in the single impulse of filial duty, on one hand, and the almost metaphysical flight of absolute feeling, on the other. Angela is not offered the symbolic alternative of escape from her oppressive circumstances, and is never brought to task for her failures and vacillations. Nothing that happens morally, philosophically, or psychologically in the course of the drama is an impediment to the blissful union of the couple.

Conrado undergoes the same critical scrutiny by his author as his Schillerian counterpart Ferdinand. Indeed, his trial is if anything more rigorous. He not only comes into the possession of a letter from Angela's hand granting an intimate rendezvous to the Marqués de Pompiliani, but his jealously is given the very tangible nourishment of twice encountering his assumed rival under the most compromising circumstances. And yet he responds more moderately to this outrage than Ferdinand to a lesser provocation. Although he suspects Angela of infidelity, he never thinks of vengeance, but merely decides to seek his death in battle, and quickly gives up this plan when he is called to Angela's aid. But one gets the decided impression that his conduct is not the result of greater firmness of character or trust in love but is due rather to the lower temperature of his whole being. In the crucial conversation with his father, one of the scenes directly imitative of Schiller, he reveals his pacific character through a few seemingly innocuous replies:

Príncipe: Prueba de ternura es en el padre el engrandecimiento del hijo.
Conrado: No soy ambicioso.
Príncipe: Lo sé: necesitas una mano que te eleve.
Conrado: Más bien una mano que me acaricie...
Príncipe: En los palacios, hijo mio, no dar un paso adelante equivale a darlo hacia atrás.
Conrado: Nada me importa retroceder.
Príncipe: ¿Cual es, pues, el objeto de tu vida?
Conrado: No envidiar, no ser envidiado.[28]

Although Ferdinand expresses not altogether dissimilar feelings in the same situation, there is nevertheless a great difference between his ebullient exaltation and the self-effacing meekness of Conrado's ideal of life.

As one would expect, Tamayo's muted tones are reflected in his diction. Compared to Tamayo's measured, controlled lines, Schiller's dia-

[28] Tamayo, I, 222.

logues and monologues are shrill and racy. Goethe's "himmelhoch jauchzend, zu Tode betrübt" seems applicable to the enormous Schillerian outbursts. In Tamayo's Spanish, a language which so often has a marked predilection for grandiloquence and rhetoric, there is almost a quality of reticence. The differences may be illustrated by the following passages from the dialogue in the two plays at the moment when the father informs his son that he is planning to marry him to the powerful courtesan:

Ferd.: Der Milford, mein Vater?
Präs.: Wenn sie dir bekannt ist!
Ferd.: (außer Fassung): Welcher Schandsäule im Herzogtum ist sie das nicht! Aber ich bin wohl lächerlich, lieber Vater, daß ich Ihre Laune für ernst aufnehme? Würden Sie Vater zu dem Schurken sein wollen, der eine privilegierte Buhlerin heiratete?...
Präs.: (schlägt ein Gelächter auf)
Ferd.: Sie können lachen—und ich will über das hinweggehen, Vater. Mit welchem Gesicht soll ich vor den schlechtesten Handwerker treten, der mit seiner Frau wenigstens doch einen ganzen Körper zur Mitgift bekommt? mit welchem Gesicht vor die Welt? vor den Fürsten? mit welchem vor die Buhlerin selbst, die den Brandflecken ihrer Ehre in meiner Schande auswaschen würde?[29]

Conrado. ¡Cómo!... ¡La Condesa mi esposa! ¿Y sois vos quien me lo propone? ...No; no puede ser.
Príncipe. ¿Por qué razón?
Conrado. ¡Qué! ¿pretendeis acaso que vuestro hijo se llame esposo de esa mujer? Recordad que en vida de nuestro anterior soberano fue condenada por el irrecusable fallo del mundo. Recordad... Pero me exalto sin razón ...No, no es posible, lo repito. Habeis querido burlaros de mí.
Príncipe. ¿Y te atreves a dar crédito a tan infundadas hablillas? Esa es una fábula inventada por el vulgo.
Conrado. Hay ocasiones en que la deshonra aparente es también deshonra.[30]

This last from Conrado is more than bourgeois in character; it is almost philistine. But most revealing is Conrado, expressing his fear of being "exalted." The only sign of inner agitation is the repetition of the word "no."

It seems uncertain whether Tamayo attained his aim of "pintar la maldad atormentada por las furias que ella misma engendra, conspirando a su propia ruina, cegada por la invisible mano de Dios para que se castigue por la suya propia, y encontrando al morir, en el arrepentimiento la paz de que no había disfrutado, la dicha de justificar a la inocencia . . ."[31] He himself doubted it. [32] But it is certain that he

[29] Schiller, II, 311.
[30] Tamayo, I, 223-224.
[31] "Prólogo del Autor," I, 194.
[32] *Ibid.*, "Sé que no he podido llevar a cabo dignamente tan arduo empeño."

succeeded in changing a drama written in the aggressive and provocative tone of Storm and Stress to a tame *Biedermeier Lebensgefühl* with idyllic as well as philistine overtones. His artistic accomplishment is twofold: the consistency with which this change of key is effected throughout and the fact that, from the point of view of stagecraft, the new drama is often as effective as the old.

After *Angela* Tamayo's dependence on Schiller is no longer detectable, so to speak, to the naked eye. Tamayo has been credited with having, like Schiller, an "habilidad en trazar grandes tipos, en dar terribles golpes escénicos, en los contrastes sorprendentes, harmoniosos, y disonantes a veces."[33] In view of the present analysis, such claims seem exaggerated, not for lack of ability on the part of Tamayo, but because of his avoidance of the grandiloquence of great types and the harshness of surprising contrasts. And yet echoes of Schiller persist in his plots. I shall restrict myself to a single example. In *Locura de Amor,* one of Tamayo's best plays, the whole action is kept moving by the following device: A young lady attached to the queen's service is pursued by the amorous king, for whom she feels nothing but aversion since she is in love with a Spanish officer. This nobleman, however, disdains her love because he is passionately devoted to the queen herself. When the maid of honor discovers the true reason for the young man's refusal, she writes the king giving him hopes for fulfillment of his desires. This letter falls into the hands of the adversaries and thus maintains the flames of intrigue. This sequence of events is almost identical with one of the important dramatic motives in *Don Carlos,* where exactly the same constellation is represented by King Phillip II, Queen Elisabeth, the Princess of Eboli, and the crown prince himself.

But more significant than such plot borrowings is Tamayo's profession of artistic faith and declaration of dramatic purpose:

> En el estado en que la sociedad se encuentra es preciso llamarla al camino de la regeneración, despertando en élla el germen de los sentimientos generosos; es indispensable luchar con el egoísmo para vencerlo con el eficaz auxilio de la compasión, virtud la más noble y santa de las virtudes. Cuando sentimos interés hacia dolores imaginarios, cerca estamos de proporcionar consuelos a padecimientos reales. El teatro puede coadyuvar a esta laudabilísima empresa con medios no despreciables, y el conato de los autores dramáticos debe encaminarse a tan altos fines.[34]

These tenets, though vaguer and less sophisticated than those expressed by Schiller, nevertheless breathe the same spirit as Schiller's essay, "Die Schaubühne als eine moralische Anstalt betrachtet." The kinship

[33] Sicars, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
[34] "Prólogo del Autor," I, 193-194.

of the two pronouncements becomes particularly evident when one considers that both authors establish a connection between religion and the theater as parallel forces working upon the human heart. It is clear that such precepts, if followed, must have a considerable influence upon the type of play a dramatist produces.

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Two Courtiers: Castiglione and Rodrigues Lôbo

THE NAME of Francisco Rodrigues Lôbo (1580-1621) figures prominently in Portuguese literary history, but his actual fame, which was considerable in the seventeeth century, hardly survived the vogue of the literary genres most cultivated by him, the eclogue, the pastoral novel, and the pseudoclassic national epic. Ricardo Jorge, professor in the Faculty of Medicine at Coimbra, has written a detailed monograph on the life and works of Rodrigues Lôbo, invaluable for its abundant biographical and bibliographical information, but dithyrambic rather than critical or analytical in its tone.[1] In comparing Roiz Lôbo's final prose work, *Côrte na Aldeia e Noites de Inverno* (1619) with the chief European model for treatises on court life, Baldesar Castiglione's *Libro del Cortigiano,* Jorge states that the Portuguese book treats fewer themes, assigns a less important rôle to women, and is less influenced by class prejudice. The profound difference in the general nature of these two works, however, merits a more detailed study.

Castiglione is nowhere directly quoted or even named in *Côrte na Aldeia,* but the fame of his book was so great that its influence on subsequent treatments of the same topic is undeniable; the popularity of Juan Boscán's Castilian version (1534) is attested by the appearance of no less than nine editions in the sixteenth century alone. Together with the original, Boscán's version inspired numerous other books on the same subject, both in Spain and in Portugal; these epigons either idealized courtly living after the manner of Castiglione or viewed it adversely,

[1] Ricardo Jorge, *Francisco Rodrigues Lôbo* (Coimbra, 1918).

as in the *Menosprecio de corte y alabanza de aldea* of Antonio Guevara. With the popularity of the theme, one must also consider the predilection for the dialogue form in the treatment of the most diverse subjects —an evidence of the prevailing Ciceronianism of the era.[2]

Baldesar Castiglione and Francisco Rodrigues Lôbo led almost totally contrasting lives, in which there were still, however, two common elements: both were courtiers and each experienced the humiliation of his own country—Castiglione witnessed the conquest of Italy by foreign powers, and Roiz Lôbo lived his entire life during the period when Portugal's independence had been lost to Spain. Castiglione, in close association with the celebrities of his day, occupied for many years positions of influence and prominence. In 1506 he represented Guidubaldo da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino, at the court of Henry VII of England; from 1519 he was ambassador of Federico Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua, at the papal court in Rome; and in 1524 he was sent to Spain by Clement VII as nuncio to the court of Emperor Charles V—an important mission this, so much so that Castiglione was blamed directly for failing to prevent the pillage of Rome in 1527. This was also his final mission; he died suddenly in Toledo on February 2, 1529.

Francisco Rodrigues Lôbo, on the other hand, lived a life so far removed from positions of public trust that, despite the contemporary fame of his books, certain biographical details have been difficult for posterity to determine. Some information about his family has finally been gleaned from the recently published record of a trial brought by the Inquisition in 1626 against his brother, Miguel Lôbo.[3] Francisco Rodrigues Lôbo was born around 1580 in Leiria, of a well-to-do family, Jewish on his father's side (the father, André Luis Lôbo, appears in the record as *cristão-novo* and *escudeiro fidalgo*). When Roiz Lôbo received his degree of *bacharel* at Coimbra in 1602, his first two books, a collection of *Romances* in the Spanish tradition (1596) and a pastoral novel, *A Primavera* (1601), had already appeared. In his native city he frequented the palace of the Marquis of Vila-Real; this family, ranking second to the dukes of Bragança among the Portuguese aristocracy, was soon to come to an ignominious end with the execution of the last Marquis of Vila-Real on August 29, 1641, shortly after the Portuguese restoration. Tradition pictures the young poet Lôbo as the victim of

[2] For an account of the Spanish and Portuguese predecessors of Francisco Rodrigues Lôbo, a listing of their works on the subject of the courtier, and an analysis of their possible influence on Lôbo, see Jorge, pp. 307-351.

[3] Published by Carlos Alberto Ferreira in 1943. See the preface to Francisco Rodrigues Lôbo, *Corte na Aldeia e Noites de Inverno*, ed Alfonso Lopes Vieira (Lisbon, 1945), p. xxvi.

a hopeless passion for his social superior, the Marquis' daughter, but the story is supported solely by references in his juvenilia, poems of such conventional content that no source of documentation could be less reliable.

In subsequent years he published a volume of *Eglogas* (1605), two sequels to his pastoral novel, *O Pastor Peregrino* (1608) and *O Desenganado* (1614), an epic poem dealing with the life of D. Nun'Alvares Pereira, *O Condestabre de Portugal* (1610), and his final major work, *Côrte na Aldeia e Noites de Inverno* (1619). The eclogues, to which a certain historical importance is attributed, are ten in number (in keeping with the Virgilian tradition) and of satiric content. The three pastoral novels were so favorably received that the first was published three times during the author's lifetime; in 1629 they were translated into Spanish by Juan Baptista Morales. From the name of the hero of *A Primavera*, the author was to be known among his contemporaries by the sobriquet "Lereno."

Lôbo had meanwhile become associated with the court of the dukes of Bragança at Vila Viçosa. Here, in the absence of a national court in Lisbon, flourished a remnant of intellectual and literary life, and here Roiz Lôbo enjoyed not only the friendship of scholars and writers but also the protection of the duke, D. Teodósio, and his brother D. Duarte. The former (father of the future Portuguese monarch D. João IV) obtained for Roiz Lôbo a minor ecclesiastical benefice, and it is to D. Teodósio that Lôbo dedicated his epic poem, *O Condestabre de Portugal*. Dom Duarte had established residence at Evora but had left it for the court of Madrid; to him Lôbo dedicated his sixteen dialogues, *Côrte na Aldeia e Noites de Inverno*, which was to be his most lasting contribution to letters, although the judgment of Baltasar Gracián, "Este sí que será eterno!,"[4] is probably much too optimistic. Except for occasional visits to Vila Viçosa and Lisbon, the remainder of Lôbo's life was evidently spent in his native city of Leiria. He was drowned in the Tajo in November 1621, a storm having wrecked the vessel on which he was traveling to Lisbon.

The title of *Côrte na Aldeia e Noites de Inverno* may have been suggested jointly by Antonio Guevara's *Menosprecio de corte y alabanza de aldea* and Antonio Eslava's *Noches de invierno* (1609), but the resemblance does not extend to the content of the works. Guevara offers a moralizing contrast between the corruption of court life and the virtues of a simple rustic existence (idealized, to be sure, in a conventionally bucolic fashion). Roiz Lôbo lays the scene of his dialogue in a

[4] In *El Criticón*, Parte Tercera, Crisis XII.

village for an entirely different reason, as stated in the first sentence of the dedication to D. Duarte:

> Depois que faltou a Portugal a Côrte dos Sereníssimos Reis, ascendentes de Vossa Excelência (da qual as nações estrangeiras tinham tão grande satisfação e as vezinhas tão igual inveja), retirados os títulos polas vilas e lugares do Reino e os fidalgos e cortesãos por sus quintãs e casaís, vieram a fazer Côrte, nas Aldeias, renovando as saudades da passada com lembranças devidas àquela dourada idade dos Portugueses [p. 1].

With the nation in captivity, as it must have seemed to most patriots, with the court at Lisbon extinct and the monarch in Madrid apparently not interested in his Portuguese subjects (after the initial visit of Philip II, some thirty-nine years were to pass until a Spanish sovereign deigned to visit his new domains), the memories of the past and the courtly accomplishments could be cultivated only in small groups that gathered in remote rural localities. This "court" depicted by Lôbo is

> composta dos riscos e sômbras que ficaram dos cortesãos e tradições suas, para que V. Excelência a ampare como protector da língua e nação Portuguesa, honre como reliquia do sangue Real dêste Reino e a acredite como esphelho e exemplo das virtudes e partes soberanas does Principes passados [pp. 1-2].

He confesses that he may well be considered presumptuous "em tratar de cousas de Côrte nascendo em idade em que já a de Portugal era acabada" (p. 2).

Since he could hardly dare to express openly the hope for eventual independence, Lôbo's nationalism must find its expression in references to the past—hence the frequent mention of Portuguese kings in the course of the work. One of the interlocutors, D. Júlio, is presented as an expert in Portuguese history. In drawing his specific illustrations and his general inspiration from the past, the writer fails to follow Castiglione, who, for all his classical background, refuses to be a *laudator temporis acti* and devotes the preface to Book II of *Il Cortegiano* to refuting the widespread notion that everything was better in the past.

The courtier as portrayed by Castiglione is an extremely idealized figure, but by no means an abstraction. Castiglione was writing about the world he knew, speaking in the name of his own acquaintances, and expressing the ideals that inspired his own career, both as humanist and as diplomat. In fact, as Vittorio Cian emphasized in his last book on Castiglione, it is fallacious to see in the *Libro del Cortegiano* a mere collection of precepts and to ignore the intense personal meaning that the book had for its author.[5] The purpose of the work is clearly stated in the opening chapter of Book I:

[5] See Vittorio Cian, *Un illustre nunzio pontificio del Rinascimento, Baldassar Castiglione* (Città del Vaticano, 1951), pp. 227-230.

Voi adunque mi richiedete ch'io scriva, qual sia al parer mio la forma di Cortegiania più conveniente a gentilomo che viva in corte de' principi, per la qual egli possa e sappia perfettamente loro servir in ogni cosa ragionevole, acquistandone da essi grazia e dagli altri laude: in somma, di che sorte debba esser colui, che meriti chiamarsi perfetto Cortegiano, tanto che cosa alcuna non gli manchi.[6]

That the ideal is impossible of realization is admitted expressly by the author, both in the dedicatory epistle, where he justifies his practice by the example of Plato (the *Republic*), Xenophon (*Cyropaedia*), and Cicero, his chief model, whose *De Oratore* contributed more than any other single writing to the structure and content of this work, and also in the latter part of Book I:

Anzi troppo, rispose il signor Ludovico Pio, perchè credo che al mondo non sia possibile retrovar un vaso tanto grande, che fosse capace di tutte le cose che volete che stiano in questo cortegiano. Allor il Conte, Aspettate un poco, disse, che molte altre ve ne hanno da essere [Book I, Chapter XLCI, p. 115].

Castiglione provides for his dialogues a specific historical setting, the ducal palace in Urbino, on the four evenings from the fifth to the eighth of March, 1507, immediately following the departure of Julius II for Rome. The militant pope had just conducted a punitive expedition against the rebellious city of Bologna and had stopped at Urbino for a few days on his return to Rome. Castiglione had in fact already returned from his diplomatic mission in England, but, through the fiction of his continued absence, he eliminates his own person from the narrative. The speakers are not merely real persons, but also prominent figures, familiar to the contemporary reader. The discourses are invented by the author and assimilate a vast wealth of detail from the prevailing classical tradition, but the characters speak as they might well have been expected to speak in real life. One of the best known, Pietro Bembo, helped revise the manuscript for publication, evidently without feeling that he was being misrepresented. The theme is first announced in the twelfth chapter of Book I and then developed directly, despite the numerous interpolations. The addition of a fourth book was to supply the most important detail—the ultimate justification for the formation and imitation of the perfect courtier.

In Lôbo's book, on the other hand, the courtier is always taken for granted as the central figure, but at no time is an ideal courtier presented as a recognizable central figure. The continuity of the sixteen dialogues depends on the topics of discussion, rather than on the portrayal of a person. Dialogues II-X deal with questions of language and

[6] Baldesar Castiglione, *Il Libro del Cortegiano*, ed. Vittorio Cian (Florence, 1929), pp. 12-13.

style, X-XI with the techniques of narration, XII-XIV with courtesy and courtly training, and the last two with military and university education, respectively. The setting is not specified by name, but the description of the "village" seems applicable to Sintra.

The interlocutors represent social categories, and no one is identified by his full name. The host, Leonardo, is a former resident of the royal court. Doctor Lívio, a former judge, appears as an erudite humanist, "lido nas histórias da humanidade" (p. 6). The third figure is a young aristocrat, D. Júlio, fond of the hunt and well versed in Portuguese history, "bem visto nas histórias pátrias." The fourth is a student, addicted to writing poetry, as his name (Píndaro) suggests; his colleague Feliciano later joins the company. The type of the *engraçado* is represented by Solino, an old man who had once served one of the grandees at court; at times he figures as devil's advocate and deliberately opposes the prevailing trend of ideas. The group is completed by an ecclesiastic, never identified by name, but known simply as *o Prior*, and his brother Alberto, spokesman for the military caste.

The absence of women from this village coterie immediately distinguishes it from the court of Urbino, where the Duchess Elisabetta Gonzaga presides over the discussions, with Emilia Pia at her side. The Duchess' own private apartment is the scene of the gatherings, and the discourses themselves often deal with women, most notably in the third book, the first nine chapters of which portray the *donna di palazzo*, feminine counterpart of the ideal courtier. This leads to a lengthy debate between Giuliano dei Medici, champion of the feminist viewpoint, and Gaspar Pallavicino (antifeminist for the occasion at least) on the role of women in history and society. The debate is in turn followed by a treatise on courtly love, in the Renaissance manner.[7] As for Pietro Bembo's Neoplatonic discourse on love near the end of the fourth book, that goes far beyond the realm of human relations into a sphere of pure mysticism; and yet this love begins on the level of human experience—witness Bembo's concessions to worldly love during the courtier's younger years.[8] Further evidence that Castiglione does not limit himself to an abstract concept of love can be seen in Book III, where Federico Fregoso advocates divorce and is not refuted by any of the others.[9]

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 379-405 (Bk. III, Ch. LIII-LXXVII).

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 473-475 (Bk. IV, Ch. LIII).

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 383-384 (Bk. III, Ch. LVI). See also Cian's note on p. 384, where attention is called to the curious oversight on the part of Ciccarelli, the Counter-Reformation theologian who prepared an expurgated version of the work, but failed to amend this passage.

In contrast with the prominent feminine element in Castiglione's book, the role of women in *Côrte na Aldeia* is indeed modest, and Ricardo Jorge has ample reason to cite this as one of the obvious differences between the two treatises. In *Côrte na Aldeia* love is mentioned in Dialogue VI, to be sure, but the concept of love is abstract, and the author's chief concern is in comparing the moral effects of love with those of *cobiça*—greed! Women do not participate in the discussions, though they figure prominently in the interpolated stories. The typically Byzantine tale of the abandoned young lady, encountered by Dom Júlio in a forest, leads to nothing more than a discussion of narrative style and the proper use of *encarecimentos* (Dialogue V).

In Dialogue XIV, Leonardo qualifies the service of ladies as essential to the development of the courtier; in such service the courtier learns the refined graces and acquires the virtues of patience and perseverance; yet even this theme is not developed in detail—the passage, amounting to little more than one page of the text, ends abruptly with the customary lament over the absence of a court in Portugal: "E porque falta a Portugal há tantos anos esta criação têm tão pouca muitos filhos dos ilustres do Reino, que, livres dêste aprazível e honrado senhorio, ficaram no de sua vontade" (pp. 285-286).

The position of women is nonetheless honorable, and the fair sex is to be treated with respect, particularly in matters of language. Doctor Lívio legislates that the word *perna* may be used in the presence of women, provided that the reference be to a man's leg, "... porque, nomeando estas partes das mulheres diante delas, não é cortesia." The reason? "... porque nas mulheres é parte oculta e nos homens manifesta, e o traho de cada um insina esta cortesia" (p. 183). The Portuguese of the seventeenth century may have respected women, but were apparently unwilling to treat them as intellectual equals; one of the arguments adduced by Lôbo against the use of foreign and exotic terms is that they would not be understood by women (*ibid.*). Not until 1746, when Verney published his *Verdadeiro Método de Estudar*, do we find the formal education of women openly advocated in Portugal. A similar attitude on the part of the Spanish can be inferred from the *Epístolas familiares* of Guevara (II, 28).

Who and what is this village courtier, appearing at a time when the Portuguese had no court, apart from the modest gatherings under the aegis of the dukes of Bragança? The author declares at the very beginning and confirms repeatedly that he has a Portuguese courtier in mind. Lôbo's biographer, Ricardo Jorge, and his editor, Afonso Lopes Vieira, noting that only one of the interlocutors is a real nobleman and that

other strata of society are represented in the discussions, have pointed with pride to this document as a more modern and less aristocratic presentation of the social ideal than can be found in Castiglione.

Concerning Castiglione's aristocratic prejudices there can be little doubt. When Count Ludovico Canossa first sets out to describe the courtier, the first announced prerequisite is nobility of birth: "Voglio adunque che questo nostro Cortegiano sia nato nobile, e di generosa famiglia" (Book I, Chapter XIV, p. 38), and the objections raised by Gaspar Pallavicino are quickly passed over. In Book II, Chapters IX and X, the courtier is instructed not to waste his talents in the presence of the ignoble and plebeian masses (pp. 151-153)—indeed a crass statement of the Horatian *odi profanum vulgus et arceo*. In *Côrte na Aldeia*, however, there is a real difficulty in defining the term *cortesão*. Even if the definition of the perfect courtier is not the announced theme of the book, his presence is felt, and the various topics, whether they belong to the field of rhetoric, education, manners, or morals, are discussed with reference to this omnipresent figure.

Supporting the contention that Lôbo values personal merit above hereditary aristocracy is an eloquent passage in Dialogue XV, in the words of the soldier Alberto:

> ...a honra se apura e sustenta mais na guerra que na Côrte e nas Escolas... porque, o ser, o preço e a riqueza de um soldado não consiste no apelido de sua família, na herança de seus avós, na riqueza e morgado de seu pai, nem outros juros, tenças e rendas de que tenha esperança, senão na opinião em que está tido entre os amigos e contrários, segundo seu valor e merecimentos [pp. 296-297].

Here the reference is to military life, as expressly contrasted with the court; hence this statement has only limited application. There are other places, however, where *cortesão* is linked more with the moral virtue of *cortesia* than with the specific human institution of the court; e.g., "E quanto a dissimulação e sofrimento, só nos esforçados costuma a achar confiança para meterem em cortesania o que puderam entrenhar com arrogância" (p. 87). In Dialogue IX, Leonardo begins his exposition by modestly disclaiming all competence: "... digo que não posso fazer escola de falar bem, mòrmente entre cortesãos tão discretos que cada um me poderá dar preceitos para o ser" (p. 174), which would seem to be attributing the qualification *cortesão* to all the members of this heterogeneous group. When the Prior temporarily absents himself, the others miss the company of "tão discreto e douto cortesão" (p. 157), but Leonardo explains that the Prior had worn the garments of the court before entering holy orders. D. Júlio, the one aristocrat present, attributes the impression of *cortesania* in part to "o falar bem ... que leva

tudo após si" (p. 157). Elsewhere it is said of the Prior: "... a quem está melhor que a todos o cargo de nos fazer cortesãos por doutrina, assim como o pode insinar a todos com o exemplo" (p. 233). The quality of the *cortesão* can therefore be taught.

In addition to the occurrence of *cortesão* as the mere substantive equivalent of *cortês* ("... antes quero um discortês liberal que um cortesão miserável," p. 268), there are other passages where the word seems even further disassociated from its original meaning. In Dialogue XI, which is of all sixteen the most strongly reminiscent of Castiglione, thanks to the common source, the *De Oratore* (fountainhead of so much Renaissance dialogue literature), the topic is the use of jokes, anecdotes, and other witticisms in conversation; in the course of the illustrative examples the word *cortesão* occurs in undignified and unflattering context: a "cortesão que aqui vivia" (i.e., in the village) is involved in a ridiculous situation; another *cortesão*, qualified as *engraçado* is summoned before a judge and confesses to being hopelessly in debt;[10] of another it is expressly stated that he is of humble birth.[11] The anecdotes themselves, however, do not describe court life, and the word *cortesão* could be substituted by *homem* without any loss to the meaning of the respective passages. The term here seems to be subjected to a kind of semantic kenosis, caused perhaps by the constant recurrence of the word throughout the text.[12]

Yet this devaluation of the term by no means excludes the literal meaning of *cortesão* (e.g., "... o ser cortesão lhe importa muito, pois a sua principal assistência é no Paço e junto à pessoa do Príncipe, com comunicação dos principais senhores do Reino," p. 62).[13] This is obvious in Dialogue XIV, the theme of which is life at the court. Even more significant is the use of the words *gentilhomem* and *bem-nascido* in connection with the courtly virtues.[14] Whereas Castiglione, in Book IV, finds the ultimate justification for his courtier's accomplishments in the measure of the influence that the courtier can exert on the Prince, Roiz Lôbo concedes importance of office only to ambassadors (apart from a brief reference in Dialogue XIV to *privados*); ambassadors, however, can come only from the highest strata of society: "... devem ser escolhidos para êste cargo de Embaixador os homens das famílias mais ilustres do Reino" (p. 81). In Dialogue XIV Leonardo attributes moral

[10] *Côrte na Aldeia*, p. 224.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

[12] With all due caution that must be exercised in suggesting analogies, one may well be reminded of the Italian use of the word *cristiano* to mean human being, without any particular religious significance.

[13] This same idea is also found on p. 266.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 259, 278, 286.

superiority to princes: "... os Príncipes por criação e natureza são mais beninos, liberais, magnânimos, justos, animosos e verdadeiros que os outros homens, e dotados pola maior parte daquelas virtudes a que por excelência chamamos Reais" (p. 278). These virtues of the prince are reflected on the courtier, since "é próprio dos homens de bom nascimento e inclinação aspirarem às cousas mais altas e desejarem ventagens a melhoria dos outros" (*ibid.*).

Such inconsistencies in the use of the term *cortesão* can be easily explained if one considers that the speakers in these dialogues are abstract representations of various callings and that the author is not describing a court or courtier from his personal experience. The courtly virtues, unquestionably aristocratic in their origin, are exemplified in situations and anecdotes drawn from a wider range of sources and events than could fit into a royal "court" that the author never witnessed. It is true that Lôbo does not reveal class prejudice so clearly as Castiglione, and the fact that the speakers come from various walks of life is significant; but the very fact that they remain abstractions and fail to assume personality, with the possible exception of Solino (who remains nonetheless the typical *engraçado*), shows that it would be anachronistic to see much of a "democratizing" tendency in the *Côrte na Aldeia*.

Castiglione and Lôbo are both preoccupied with the question of language, but for different reasons and under different circumstances. In Italy, where political unity was delayed until the nineteenth century and where the vernaculars were divergent beyond the limit of mutual intelligibility, the *questione della lingua* persisted for centuries and involved no less an issue than the formation and identification of the national language. The position of the Lombard Castiglione, generally said to be anti-Tuscan, was in reality more opposed to the archaizers than to the *toscaneggianti*.[15] In the dedicatory epistle, as well as in Chapters XXIX-XXXIX of Book I, Castiglione rejects the imitation of Boccaccio as the basis of Italian prose, since the lapse of centuries has made certain locutions unintelligible even in Tuscany.[16] To the canon of literary imitation Castiglione opposes usage as the criterion of language, in this respect anticipating the modern point of view. Castiglione, who otherwise resents foreign influence on Italian dress and customs, is not a purist in language, but on the contrary favors the adoption of Gallicisms and Hispanisms into the speech of his courtier.

With Roiz Lôbo there is no problem of identifying or constituting the Portuguese language; he is concerned with glorifying it and protecting

[15] See V. Cian, *La lingua di Baldassare Castiglione* (Florence, 1942), pp. 5-31.
[16] *Il Cortegiano*, pp. 5-7; also pp. 70-99.

it against its detractors, to such an extent that his book merits the subtitle "Defense et illustration de la langue portugaise." This concern results from the ascendancy of Castilian, which was felt to be the Hispanic literary medium *par excellence*, just as Tuscan had prevailed throughout an otherwise divided Italy. From the fifteenth century, long before Philip II had assumed the Portuguese crown, until well into the seventeenth century, some Portuguese writers had chosen to express themselves in Castilian, notably Gil Vicente in certain of his works and Jorge de Montemór, author of the renowned *Diana*. Preference for Castilian stemmed from practical considerations and was originally devoid of political implications. The annexation of 1580 strengthened both the practical value of Castilian (used by Roiz Lôbo himself in at least two of his works) and the nationalist reaction in favor of Portuguese.

The practical example of a relatively clear and direct style, contrasting favorably with the prevalent Gongorism of the age, is Lôbo's greatest service to the Portuguese language. His theoretical defense of the language is meaningless, typical of prescientific utterances about language.[17] When the vacuous rhetoric is subtracted from his statements, there is nothing left. Most foreigners will be startled by his assertion that the Portuguese pronounce their words more distinctly than the French, Italians, or Spaniards, who "mastigam as palavras entre os dentes e as pronunciam ne ponta da língua" (p. 161).

Nevertheless, just as Castiglione upholds the modern emphasis on usage as the ultimate standard of language, so Roiz Lôbo pleads in favor of a literary style as close as possible to the spoken language:

> Além disto, eu tenho para mim que aquela é melhor escritura que, com mais perfeição e viveza, imita a prática e conversação dos homens; porque assim como a melhor pintura é a que mais se parece com a obra da natureza, a que quere contrafazer, assim a melhor escritura é a que retrata com mais semelhança o falar e conversação dentre os amigos [p. 22].

He is opposed to prolixity of style,[18] to preciosity, such as the use of

[17] E.g., "E verdadeiramente que não tenho a nossa língua por grosseira, nem por bons os argumentos com que alguns querem provar que é essa; antes é branda para deleitar, grave para engrandecer, eficaz para mover, doce para pronunciar, breve para resolver e acomodada às matérias mais importantes da prática e escritura. Para falar é engraçada com um modo senhoril; para cantar é suave com um certo sentimento que favorece a música; para prègar é sustanciosa, com uma gravidade que autoriza as razões e as sentenças; para escrever cartas nem tem infinita cópia que dane, nem brevidade estéril que a limite; para histórias nem é tão florida que se derrame, nem tão sêca que busque o favor das alheias. A pronunciação não obriga a ferir o ceu da bôca com aspereza nem a arrancar as palavras com veemência do gargado. Escreve-se da maneira que se lê, e assim se fala" (pp. 25-26).

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

sustinentes or *andadeiras* in lieu of the allegedly vulgar term *pernas*, and to excessive Latinization of vocabulary. In matters of diction he is a purist, opposed to neologisms (to which he maintains that the Portuguese are less inclined than other peoples) and to the excessive use of foreign words.[19]

Considerations of rhetoric, or of form in oral and written expression, occupy a much more central position in *Côrte na Aldeia* than in the *Cortegiano*. The entire second dialogue is devoted to the proper composition and style in the addressing of letters, thus provoking Solino's complaint that they have the letter closed, sealed, and addressed without knowing anything of its contents.[20] The courtier, to the extent that Lôbo is visualizing an individual, is fundamentally a rhetorical creature. According to Castiglione, the perfect courtier must be a man of noble birth, whose primary vocation is military, and who must yet possess the highest moral qualities, as well as an adequate knowledge of letters, music, and the figurative arts, along with sufficient skill in jousting, dancing, conversation, etc.—and all this with *sprezzatura*, the apparent absence of effort and strain in the performance of his numerous skills. Roiz Lôbo requires of his *cortesão* that he be familiar with the *vocabulary* of the arts and sciences, that he know the *names* of the various pieces of a knight's armor, that he be able to *talk* about military and naval operations, and that he must never be at a loss for *words* to show that he has knowledge of all usual topics of conversation:

> Fica além disto que advertir ao discreto a mecânica geral dos têrmos e nomes dos principais instrumentos com que se exercitam as artes mais nobres, como a pintura, escultura, arquitectura, aritmética, astrologia e música; saber as peças e os nomes delas, com que se arma um cavaleiro, as que pertencem ao jaez e arreio de um cavalo; os lugares, ordens e disposição de um esquadrão formado; o maneio militar de uma galé bogante; os nomes de um edificio bem fabricado e de uma fortaleza bem guarnecida; saber a côr e o nome a todas as pedras de valia, os quilates do ouro, o pêso dos metais, a melhoria dêles e outras cousas semelhantes a estas, que, como andam sempre na praça ordinária da conversação, não é justo que faltem ao discreto palavras com que mostre que tém conhecimento de tôdas [p. 188].

Expression, oral or written, is the topic of Dialogues II-IX, always with reference to the *cortesão*, as in XI, where the witticisms subject to analysis occur in the conversation of the *cortesão*. Here, as already mentioned, is the closest resemblance to Castiglione's treatise, particularly to the fifty chapters of Book II in which, always following closely the classification adopted in Book II of Cicero's *De Oratore*, the author indulges freely in all kinds of anecdotes. Neither the Italian nor the

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 179; also p. 175.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

Portuguese writer relies solely on classical sources for his examples, both drawing freely on recent or contemporary events, but Lôbo follows a much simpler scheme of classification.

In emphasizing the moral virtues and the practical achievements of his courtier, Castiglione deliberately refrains from laying down specific rules of etiquette, such as were codified in the famous *Galateo* of Giovanni della Casa (1558), a book also destined to find many imitators. When Gracián condemns the superficiality of such rules, he is probably attacking the *Galateo español* of Lucas Gracián Dantisco.[21] The *Côrte na Aldeia*, particularly in the treatise on courtesy in Dialogue XII, offers specific rules of conduct much more strongly reminiscent of the *Galateo* than of the *Cortegiano*.

The exposition of courtesy is entrusted to the Prior, who extols courtesy as the secular equivalent of the religious virtue of humility. Courtesy is an eminently Portuguese virtue, he asserts, since the Portuguese are more modest than many other peoples. He contrasts courtesy, literally courtliness, with the Latin *urbanitas*, which alludes to the refinement of city dwellers, by contrast with the coarseness of rustics. In the course of time *cortesia* has assumed a wider sense than that of *urbanitas*. There were originally three degrees of *cortesia*: (1) ceremony, defined as the veneration due to sacred things and the sacerdotal caste; (2) courtesy in its literal sense, the veneration due to kings and the other dignitaries of human society; (3) *bom ensino* (good breeding), which is revealed among equals and between equals and inferiors. Since the first two, as well as military and naval courtesy, already have a fixed code, the Prior confines his exposition to *bom ensino*, which he defines as the behavior of men well trained either by personal experience at court or by teachers who have lived there. Whether the individual's training be first- or secondhand, the court remains the final standard. From this it is evident that Lôbo's concept of courtesy is not really democratic, as some Portuguese critics would represent it.

Bom ensino is then analyzed in great detail, with a profusion of rules of etiquette: it manifests itself in two ways, which are *inclinação* (bowing one's head, removing one's hat, bending the knees, yielding way to others, etc.) and *moderação* (performing the appropriate act of deference first). The latter consists also "para melhor dizer, em tomar de tudo menos do que nos cabia" (p. 236)—when one party humbles himself, he obligates the other to do likewise. Acts of *bom ensino* also fall into four spheres or *escolas*: (1) encounters, (2) visiting, (3) the

[21] In *El Criticón*, ed. Romera-Navarro (Philadelphia, 1938), I, 333 note.

table, and (4) conversation. It is here that the most detailed instructions are offered; but even so the Prior limits himself to the *cantochão* (plainsong) of courtesy, leaving aside its counterpoint, with all the thousands of galantries that cannot be fitted into so few rules.

The description of court life offered by Leonardo in Dialogue XV portrays the absolute monarch whose virtues are reflected upon his retinue. The *cortesão* (in this context really the court dweller) benefits from this association in four ways: (1) from the acquaintance of rulers; (2) from the service of ladies; (3) from contact with foreigners; (4) from dealing with *pretendentes*, the designation employed by Leonardo to describe those who are trying to make a career for themselves. The mention of the hypocrisy and insincerity employed to this end is the only unfavorable reference to court life in the entire work; the tone is reminiscent of Guevara and seems to anticipate the tirades of Baltasar Gracián.[22] In fact, the *Aviso de privados* of Antonio Guevara is directly quoted. The evils of intrigue and the many falsities attendant upon cultivating the favor of the mighty are not attacked very effectively, however, since the passage is inconsistent with the rest of the dialogue. The author also hastens to add that this attack is not aimed at the court as an institution, but merely at its unworthy representatives.[23]

The central patriotic inspiration in *Côrte na Aldeia*, evident despite the mass of frivolous detail, is far different from the patriotism and the political thinking of Castiglione, for whom Italy is a well-defined cultural concept, but without any anachronistic notions of unitarian Italian nationalism. He is well aware of the disastrous moral and economic effects of French and Spanish domination:

così l'aver noi mutati gli abiti italiani negli stranieri parmi che significasse, tutti quegli negli abiti dei quali nostri erano trasformati, dover venire a subiugarci: il che è stato troppo più che vero, chè ormai non resta nazione che di noi non abbia fatto preda: tanto che poco più resta che predare, e pur ancor di predar non si resta [Book II, Chapter XXVII, p. 177].

His anguished outcry in Book IV, Chapter XXXIII: "... perchè molte volte le eccessive ricchezze son causa di gran ruina; come nella povera Italia, la quale è stata e tuttavia è preda esposta a genti strane, sì per lo mal governo, come per le molte ricchezze di che è piena" (p. 445), reveals that he was well aware of the contrast between reality and his ideal, for the speakers in the sheltered chambers of Elisabetta Gonzaga were, after all, contemporaries of the Borgias.

In Book IV, Castiglione is concerned with the moral justification for the courtier's existence, until the Neoplatonic fancies of Pietro Bembo

[22] *Criticón*, Parte Primera, Crisis XI.
[23] *Côrte na Aldeia*, p. 284.

carry the whole company into a realm which, as Jakob Burckhardt has remarked, has no real connection with the theme of the book.[24] Much more important than the lengthy (and not very original) discourse on political theory is the justification of the courtier by his service to the Prince, and hence ultimately to the good of the state. In such service the courtier's moral obligations stand higher than mere loyalty to his lord; even opposition to the sovereign is possible: "Però io estimo che come la musica, le feste, i giochi e l'altre condizioni piacevoli son quasi il fiore, così lo indurre o aiutare il suo principe al bene, e spaventarlo dal male, sia il vero frutto della Cortegiania" (Book IV, Chapter V, p. 412). The horrors of tyranny stem from unenlightened and misguided rulers; the courtier, on the other hand, cultivates his many faculties in order to maintain and extend his influence over the Prince; they are the flowers that precede the true fruit.

From here the notion of courtier is easily extended to include even the names of Plato and Aristotle: "Nè penso che Aristotele e Platone si fussero sdegnati del nome di Perfetto Cortegiano, perchè si vede che fecero l'opera della cortegiania, ed attesero a questo fine, l'un con Alessandro Magno, l'altro coi re di Sicilia" (Book IV, Chapter XLVII, p. 466). To this Gaspar Pallavicino replies that he is impressed by the mention of such great names, but has difficulty in associating them with singing, dancing, and similar court pastimes. It is difficult, however, to take at face value the assertion that the refinements of court life were conceived from the very beginning by Castiglione as a means to a profoundly moral end. As a true son of the Renaissance, Castiglione pursued the ideal of the *uomo universale* for its own sake, and there is a large element of rationalization in the contention that the courtier's achievements increase his moral authority over the Prince. Without being literally biographical, this work does portray the author's own ideal, and the moral tone of the final book removes the perfect courtier from the probabilities of daily living even more than the multiplicity of accomplishments demanded in the earlier books. It is easy to imagine a group of extremely versatile men, but it is less easy to visualize very many of them actually in a position to exercise the kind of influence here expected of them.

A large body of material derived from Cicero and other various sources is here remolded into a new form; what might easily have remained an amorphous mass has found a new unity in the personality of the writer. With remarkable eloquence he voiced the objectives of his own society and the ideals of his own career; the book is in large measure a tribute to Castiglione's friends and associates of former years,

[24] In *Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (Bern, 1943), p. 402.

and it remains essentially biographical despite the fictional nature of the speeches and the extreme idealization of the central figure. The inspiration of personal memories, joined with the intensity of feeling that enters into the portrayal of the author's ideal, can lift him to great heights of eloquence, whether it be in describing Urbino,[25] in lamenting his departed friends,[26] or in the final chapter, with its magnificent description of the returning day and the abrupt end of the Platonic revery.[27]

In *Côrte na Aldeia* there is none of this. There is constant reference to the courtier, but this village courtier, always taken for granted, seems to lack substance and reality. Far from embodying an exaggerated ideal, he remains a shadowy figure, always projected on the background of the past. He is the courtier without a court; and, since the courtier is by definition a satellite figure, the absence of the real Prince (who in Castiglione may not be a single person but at least represents actual personal experience) has much the same effect that the extinction of the sun would have on the light of the moon. The only note of pathos is the author's lament over bygone grandeur, and the one genuine affirmation is Portugal—the virtues of its people, the autonomy of its culture, and the glories of a not-too-distant past.[28]

Francisco Rodrigues Lôbo offers a systematized code of behavior and expression, a small encyclopaedia of things to do and say, with chief emphasis on the manner of utterance. Without ever attaining the heights reached by its predecessor, the *Côrte na Aldeia* is by no means devoid of significance. Written in an age when prose style was prevalently turgid and obscure, the narrative succeeds in leaving the reader with a sense of actual contact with this remote little world. The *Rahmenerzählung* serves to impart to the dialogues a sense of vividness which is not lost to the intentional anonymity of the setting and the purely rhetorical nature of certain of the topics. The reader familiar with the placidity of later Portuguese rural narratives (those of Júlio Diniz, for instance) feels a foreshadowing of a similar atmosphere. In this calm, occasionally humorous, and still plaintive glimpse of the world as an unheroic man of letters viewed it, where wounded patriotism is the only element of pathos, one is as far removed from the idealized musings and melancholy recollections of a Castiglione as from the strained emotions of epic or tragic literature; but we are also reminded that the heroic virtues are not the only virtues, either in life or in letters.

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[25] *Il Cortegiano*, pp. 14-17.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 406-409.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 500-501.
[28] Note the phrase: "ainda em tempos que éramos Troianos" (p. 272).

RUBY COHN

Watt in the Light Of *The Castle*

"I'VE ONLY READ Kafka in German—serious reading—except for a few things in French and English—only 'The Castle' in German. I must say it was difficult to get to the end. The Kafka hero has a coherence of purpose. He's lost but he's not spiritually precarious, he's not falling to bits. My people seem to be falling to bits. Another difference. You notice how Kafka's form is classic, it goes on like a steam-roller—almost serene. It *seems* to be threatened the whole time—but the consternation is in the form. In my work there is consternation behind the form, not in the form" (Samuel Beckett, quoted in *The New York Times,* May 6, 1956).

Irritation at glib clichés that assimilate him to Kafka may have provoked Beckett's cogently remarked contrasts. Nevertheless, the clichés have, as clichés tend to have, a certain stubborn validity; for Beckett's fiction does invite comparison with that of Kafka. Too easily, both authors have been linked in pessimism, that shibboleth of the popular reviewer; their comparability lies rather in their creation of absurd universes which ironically reflect the absurdity of ours.

Absurdity today is an overworked catchall; its use for the description of the worlds of Kafka and Beckett needs justification by specific, sustained examination of their work. Such justification has been facilitated by the republication of Beckett's *Watt* (written 1942, first published 1953), which, of all his works, may be most instructively juxtaposed to Kafka's *The Castle* (written about 1922, first published 1926; Kafka died in 1924).

Composed during World War II, while Beckett was in the Vaucluse hiding from the Germans, *Watt* is Beckett's first work to exhibit his full remarkable control of prose; significantly, it is also his last im-

portant work to be written directly in English. Beckett has intimated that the switch from English to French was prompted by a desire to abandon stylistic elegance; " . . . en français c'est plus facile d'écrire sans style," as he is quoted by Niklaus Gessner.[1] Although the subsequent French prose is even more masterful in many respects, it is characterized by an apparent stripping of style. *Watt* is Beckett's swan song to his own linguistic versatility; perhaps he intended that song to be followed by the burial of the swan, as his negligence about publication and translation of *Watt* suggests. Just as readers everywhere owe Max Brod an inestimable debt of gratitude for not heeding Kafka's instructions to destroy his novels, so they should be thankful to Beckett's American friends who undertook the publication of *Watt,* which is, in spite of what its author may think of it, a brilliant literary achievement.

Distinct as *Watt* is from *The Castle,* it may be doubted whether the final substance and atmosphere of *Watt* could have materialized without the example of *The Castle.* Quickly rehearsing the obvious similarities, we find the heroes of both novels moving through an unpredictable, seemingly indifferent, but ultimately malevolent cosmos. Like the mediaeval hero, these moderns bring all their resources to their quests. Plodding rather than dashing, cleaving with their minds rather than with swords, both K. and Watt fail, finally, to reach their goals—and never understand the cause of their failure, or even the nature of their compulsive quests. The quest theme is, of course, as old as civilization. These two contemporary quests are cast as novels, a relative newcomer among literary forms.

If Kafka's form now seems "classic" to Beckett, it was nevertheless so disquieting, so *un*serene, to its author that he was unable to complete the work. Beckett's form incorporates *within it* hiatuses, footnotes, question marks, addenda, and an apparent lack of conclusion. On the one hand, then, we have an actually unfinished novel, and, on the other, a novel whose surface lack of finish is a subtly controlled formal device.

Both novels are ostensibly third-person narratives, which may vary from a single angle of vision, to shifting viewpoints, to complete omniscience. *The Castle,* however, was begun as a first-person narrative; while working, Kafka went back and changed all the I's to K.'s, but, with one notable and several minor exceptions, he retained the single angle of vision—that of K. In the notable exception, Bürgel's monologue is quoted although "K. was asleep, impervious to all that was happening." The Bürgel chapter, unpublished until the second edition of *The Castle,* is not as smooth as the material in the first edition, but

[1] *Die Unzulänglichkeit der Sprache* (Zürich, 1957).

the tone still never clashes with that of K.'s thoughts, and the information rarely carries us far beyond those thoughts.

> . . . he [K.], who with all his powers strove to get a glimpse of Klamm, valued very little, for example, the post of a Momus who was permitted to live in Klamm's eyes; for it was not Klamm's environment in itself that seemed to him worth striving for, but rather that he, K., he only and no one else, should attain to Klamm, and should attain to him not to rest with him, but to go on beyond him, farther yet, into the Castle [p. 142].[2]

It is immediately evident that Kafka's omniscient, impersonal narrator thinks and speaks like K., and, for that reason perhaps, seems incapable of viewing him from an ironic distance. Or, if irony is present, it is referred back to K.

> At the mere thought of those facts, K. was often *in danger of considering his situation hopeful;* nevertheless, after such fits of easy confidence, he would hasten to tell himself that just there lay his danger [p. 77, my italics].

If the sentence had ended with the italicized passage, impersonal irony would have been patent, but the following clause situates the paradox (which is weaker in German) in K.'s mind.

Beckett's narrator, in contrast, uses irony through various dextrous stylistic guises, so that the entire tale has a veneer of callousness. Named Sam like Beckett (K. is Kafka's *hero*), the narrator makes no first-person announcement of his presence until midway through *Watt,* but various editorial comments and devices indicate his ambiguous personality from the start. For example, when Watt is discharged from the tram, the narrator comments about another character, "He made use, with reference to Watt, of an expression that we shall not record." This puritanical forbearance is particularly ironic when we consider the expressions which are subsequently recorded in *Watt.* What is, moreover, extremely difficult to ascertain is whether Beckett means Sam's irony to be conscious or whether Beckett as author is wielding *his* irony through an ingenuous Sam (as either Sam or Beckett certainly wields irony through an ingenuous Watt).

Even before Part III, when he comes into his own as Sam, the narrator confesses:

> . . . all that I know on the subject of Mr Knott, and of all that touched Mr Knott, and on the subject of Watt, and of all that touched Watt, came from Watt, and from Watt alone [p. 125].

Yet, at the beginning and end of the novel, we are witness to dialogues which neither Sam nor Watt could have heard. More significant is

[2] Quotations, unless otherwise noted, are from the Grove Press American edition of *Watt* and the Secker and Warburg definitive English edition of *The Castle.*

Sam's awareness of the possibility of error in Watt's memory and/or recital, and in Sam's memory and/or recording, even though Sam "was most careful to note down all at that time." And indeed, Sam continues,

> . . . one is sometimes tempted to wonder with reference to two or even three incidents related by Watt as separate and distinct, if they were not in reality the same incident variously interpreted [p. 78].

Thus, "behind the form" of third-person narration, Beckett suggests "consternation" by imputing fallibility to focus and communication.

In the form of *Watt* as well, through various adroit, usually comic reminders, there is insistence upon the ambiguous nature of experience. Long before we grow suspicious of the narrative method, even before Watt himself tumbles on scene, we are abruptly plunged into doubt about the habitual focus. In the opening paragraph, "This seat . . . was of course not his, but he thought of it as his." On page 3, "Officer, he cried, as God is my witness, he had his hand upon it. God is a witness that cannot be sworn." A few pages later, in Watt's initial appearance, his sex is uncertain; or he might be "a parcel, a carpet for example, or a roll of tarpaulin, wrapped in dark paper and tied about the middle with a cord."

This uncertainty of witness is of course a basic theme in *Watt* and *The Castle,* but it is conveyed differently in each. Beckett's narrator, who becomes the character Sam, is his prime instrument for sowing doubt in everything we read. Kafka's narrator, invisible by the convention of the form, establishes a seemingly objective, credible view of events, which is gradually vitiated as these events are reviewed by the various characters. At first, K. does not even seem to know there is a Castle. We wonder mildly why, as Land Surveyor, he does not assert his rights before the Castellan's impudent son. Slowly, we begin to realize that K. has his own doubts about his position and rights. The French of the schoolteacher, the winding main street that never leads to the Castle, the townspeople's familiarity with K.'s title and their hostility to his presence—all lead up to the first shocking absurdity on K.'s part, his failure to recognize his old assistants if they *are* his old assistants, or to denounce them if they are not.

By the time K. has his first interview with an official, we are prepared for the insight it gives us into the inscrutable nature of the Castle.

> ". . . Only a total stranger could ask a question like yours. Is there a Control Authority? There are only control authorities. Frankly it isn't their function to hunt out errors in the vulgar sense, for errors don't happen, and even when once in a while an error does happen, as in your case, who can say finally that it's an error?"
>
> "This is news indeed!" cried K.
>
> "It's very old news to me," said the Superintendent [p. 86].

In this remarkably condensed passage, our sympathy for K.'s plight is deepened by the shifting focus, the paradox, the flat contradiction, the open questioning, and the esotericism ironically embedded in the form. For Kafka's almost incredible feat has been to base our compassion on our doubt. To twist the famous "Cogito": we doubt, therefore K. is. Even while position, person, and relationship are altered in K.'s eyes, even when the reader can no longer trust K.'s viewpoint (which frequently contradicts itself) or the narrator's omniscience (which penetrates so little), the reader becomes all the more profoundly involved in K.'s dilemma. Examining each incident through the successive refractions of different minds, the reader no longer knows what he should see, think, or feel. He grows aware of an absurd astigmatism—with which Beckett's narrator begins. In both cases, the astigmatism reflects the character of the cosmos.

But if K. and Watt, Sam and Kafka, are all victims of the uncertainty of witness, the first two at least never know when they are defeated; in their different idiosyncratic ways, they continue to ruminate about their plight, right up to their separate, bitter ends. Because of the rumination of both his hero and his secondary characters, Kafka has been called "the supreme master of obsessional hairsplitting." He is so difficult to translate

> . . . because particles such as ja, doch, veilleicht, etwa, sogar, allerdings, schon, oder besser, zwar—aber, freilich—jedoch, wenn nicht—so doch, and all the other aids to logical refinement with which the German language is so richly supplied; are the words he most constantly uses.[3]

And so do his invisible narrator, his hero, and his secondary characters.

Watt's text abounds in explicit expansion of mental seesaws, in rhetorical questions with and without answers, in permutations and combinations. Such phrases as "one of the reasons for that was perhaps this," "Not that—but," "Not that—for," "Add to this," "To mention only"—are hammered out until the reader no longer knows whether to laugh or scream at Watt or Sam, or both. If Kafka's particles split hairs, Beckett's devices pound rocks. Each method is precisely suited to its hero; but the crucial distinctions between the two heroes will be more evident if we first examine the method of the quests, and the method in which they are related to us.

Although the impression in *The Castle* is of infinite seeking, Kafka actually follows conventional chronology. K. spends only six days (albeit a lifetime) in the village, and each of the twenty chapters temporally

[3] F. D. Luke, "The Metamorphosis," in *Franz Kafka Today*, ed. Angel Flores and Homer Swander (Madison, 1958), p. 36.

follows the preceding one, much as each paragraph leads causally to the next.[4] Individual actions may be incongruous, interpretations preposterous and self-contradictory; yet all are linked into coherence by Kafka's impersonal narrator, partly by means of temporal sequence. Even in chapter openings, where *non sequitur* is permitted by convention, Kafka uses temporal words:

II ... K. *recognized* that they were near the inn ...
III ... they looked *different from* those in K.'s inn.
VII ... The room was *improved* almost beyond recognition ...
XI ... led by the assistants, who *already* knew their way ...
XII *Next morning* ...
XIII *Hardly* was everybody gone *when* ...
XIV *At long last* ...
XVI *When* he reached the street ...
XVIIIa *Then* ...
XVIIIb *Only now* ...
XX *When* K. woke up ... [My italics]

In *Watt,* there are only four main divisions, but not according to any simple chronology, for Sam warns us:

> As Watt told the beginning if his story, not first, but second, so not fourth, but third, now he told its end. Two, one, four, three, that was the order in which Watt told his story [p. 215].

To place these scattered numbers in our own understanding, we may think of Parts II and III of the text as the core of Watt's story, with narrator Sam providing Parts I and IV as framework, so as to situate Watt's quest in, and oppose it to, his society.

Watt also contains numerous paragraphic and sentence *non sequiturs* —probably more than in any previous novel. Although Sam does not account for these disjunctions as he does for the four-part order-disorder, or as Kafka's narrator does for a rare abruptness in *The Castle* ("Without a word of explanation, K. left the taproom at once"), they are easily explicable within Beckett's narrative scheme. Watt, after all, tells his tale to Sam in an asylum that houses them both; the lacunae and sudden leaps in the text may reflect those of a mind alienated—or emancipated—from the causal sequence of our world.

The first response of the logically prejudiced reader is laughter, and Beckett mercilessly exploits the comic possibilities of *non sequitur*. But his comedy is not gratuitous. Within the context of the novel, this disjunction of dialogue and incident epitomizes Watt's world, character-

[4] Brod notes in the first edition of *The Castle* that most of the chapter breaks were designated by Kafka, but a few by himself. In spite of the fashion of Kafka critics to denigrate Brod, I can find no difference in the various chapter divisions. Each of them, Kafka's or Brod's, circumscribes one or, at most, two incidents.

izes Mr Knott's establishment, which remains impenetrable to all Watt's beating his poor brains against it. Near the end of his stay at Mr Knott's house, Watt's narration (and therefore Sam's?) becomes, in our conventional conception, increasingly incoherent. So vividly do the short, disjunctive paragraphs convey the final disintegration of Watt's mind that one might suspect the absurdity of the cosmos to be no more than a reflection of the disjunctions in Watt's mind—a condition that is known as solipsism.

> Watt suffered neither from the presence of Mr Knott, nor from his absence . . .
>
> This ataraxy covered the entire house-room, the pleasure-garden, the vegetable-garden and of course Arthur.
>
> So that when the time came for Watt to depart, he walked to the gate with the utmost serenity.
>
> But he was no sooner in the public road when he burst into tears. He stood there, he remembered, with bowed head, and a bag in each hand, and his tears fell, a slow minute rain, to the ground, which had recently been repaired. He would not have believed such a thing possible, if he had not been there himself. The humidity thus lent to the road surface must, he reckoned, have survived his departure by as long as two minutes at least, if not three. Fortunately the weather was fine.
>
> Watt's room contained no information. It was a small, dingy, and, though Watt was a man of some bodily cleanliness, fetid compartment. Its one window commanded a very fine view of a race-course. The painting, or coloured reproduction, yielded nothing further. On the contrary, as time passed, its significance diminished.
>
> From Mr Knott's voice nothing was to be learnt. Between Mr Knott and Watt no conversation passed. From time to time, for no apparent reason, Mr Knott opened his mouth in song [pp. 207-208].

It is not only Mr Knott's song, however, which has "no apparent reason," but almost all the details in these few abrupt paragraphs. The rare dipping into Watt's feelings or lack of feelings is a preposterous prelude to his bursting into tears. And, if that is an understandable response to the failure of his life's quest, the states of repair of the road and the states of the weather are wildly irrelevant, the climate in particular heralding further irrelevant insistence on Watt's persistent luck with the weather. The ambiguity of the "thing" Watt would not have believed possible; his unconquerable calculation; the reference to the cleanliness of a man we have seen vomiting and picking his nose; the jump to Watt's room never described before or after (unless Watt replaces Erskine, his predecessor, in *his* room, which does yield information of sorts); *a* race-course which was noted on Watt's trip to Mr Knott's house; *the* painting or colored reproduction not elsewhere mentioned (although Erskine's painting was the occasion of a similar outburst of tears on Watt's part, and Watt, it must be stressed, is a sin-

gularly undemonstrative man)—all are subsidiary to the central point, that Watt and Mr Knott do not communicate, and that Watt learns nothing about Mr Knott. But then, some ten pages earlier we have already been initiated—in passing—to Watt's tragedy: "Of the nature of Mr Knott himself Watt remained in particular ignorance" (p. 199).

Possessing this all-important conclusion, we are then compelled to backtrack, via Sam's narration, via Watt's narration, to the tedious surface detail of Mr Knott's existence—sometimes incongruous, sometimes contradictory, never penetrating to the essence. In Watt's last conversation with Sam, the absurd and agonizing description of Mr Knott donning a single boot, shoe, or slipper brings us in a full solipsistic circle back to Watt, who was first introduced as having borrowed money to buy a single boot. But, if the line of narration is circular, it is a far cry from Browning's "In heaven, a perfect round." Rather, this circumference is riddled with gaps, and it is little short of a miracle if the circle closes at all.

But it is short of a miracle, for miracle is rigorously excluded from *Watt,* and in that exclusion lies a very basic difference from *The Castle,* as well as from earlier quests. Miracle, grace, supernatural intervention—however we may choose to designate it—has always been necessary for the hero to accomplish his quest. K. and Watt, these modern heroes, have special need of such aid, for in both quests the goal is superhuman; there is an aura of divinity about both the Castle and Mr Knott's establishment. In neither case does a miracle occur—but with a difference.[5] Watt leaves Mr Knott because, "Of the nature of Mr Knott himself [he] remained in particular ignorance." In *The Castle,* on the other hand, Secretary Bürgel dwells at tantalizing length upon the possibility of "opportunities that are, in a manner of speaking, too great to be made use of, there are things that are wrecked on nothing but themselves." K. may have wrecked his own miracle by sleeping through the possibility of its fulfillment.

In his propensity to sleep, there is a subtle similarity between K. and Klamm, the closest approximation to a deity figure in *The Castle.* But this single detail, immeasurably more plausible and therefore less conspicuous than the single-bootedness of Watt and Mr Knott, cannot be interpreted to merge them. For all K.'s efforts, Klamm always keeps his distance. During a major portion of the novel, Klamm is as stable as a conventional deity, but then Olga suggests to K. that Klamm too undergoes avatars.

[5] By my interpretation. For a view of a "miraculous" *Castle,* see Ronald Gray, *Kafka's Castle* (Cambridge, 1956).

"Olga," said K., "you surely must be joking; how can there be any doubt about Klamm's appearance, everybody knows what he looks like, even I have seen him" [p. 215].

But Olga is not joking, and she proceeds to convey all the skepticism of her messenger brother, Barnabas. Not unlike Watt, Barnabas can trust neither his own senses (he fails to recognize Klamm at different times) nor the report of others ("In detail it [Klamm's image] fluctuates, and yet perhaps not so much as Klamm's real appearance").

Olga's enumeration of Klamm's fluctuations and contradictions might almost be a first approximation of the outrageously paradoxical particularization of Mr Knott. Each of these deity figures retains an ironic and lowly constant in this merry-go-round of protean appearances: Klamm his black morning coat with long tails, and Mr Knott his nightdress. It is just possible that the thornier aspects of Mr Knott's name and person owe something besides assonance to the unapproachable Klamm.

Although Klamm seems to thrive on cigars, alcohol, and women, his most distinguishing feature is his "sleepy and dreamy style." This too is not without relevance to Mr Knott, whose most characteristic gesture

. . . consisted in the simultaneous obturation of the facial cavities, the thumbs in the mouth, the forefingers in the ears, the little fingers in the nostrils, the third fingers in the eyes and the second fingers, free in a crisis to promote intellection, laid along the temples [p. 212]

Like Klamm's perpetual sleepiness, Mr Knott's gesture mocks both the senses and the activities of the "purely mental faculties." But all the conflicting reports about Klamm insist upon an imposing presence, while Mr Knott's gesture is typical of the street urchin. Moreover, august as is the position of Klamm, he is only one of the many Castle officials, and it is the Castle, mysterious and multifaceted, that is the long-range goal of K. Mr Knott's house, on the other hand, is subsidiary to his person. Although there is an apparent difference in the two quests—Watt reaches his physical destination while K. does not—Watt, like K., ultimately fails. In spite of familiarity with Mr Knott's house, grounds, and habits, Watt remains in ignorance "of the nature of Mr Knott."

In this sense, *The Castle* is the richer novel; for, despite stylistic virtuosity, *Watt* is fiction of startling bareness, and Watt's quest is more limited and rigorous than K.'s The Castle has been interpreted religiously, philosophically, racially, politically, psychologically, but Mr Knott's establishment is a bastion primarily against rational assault. The very texture of *Watt* involves the painstaking and painful workings of its hero's mind—whatever that might mean.[6]

[6] For more detailed discussion of Watt's mind, see Jacqueline Hoefer, "Watt," *Perspective* (Autumn 1959).

K's plausible, relevant reasoning about his situation depends upon his adventures, and alternates with his emotions. *The Castle* opens with K.'s inability to see the Castle; in his first speech, K. asks, "Is there a castle here?" For a short while after looking at the unimposing structure, he imagines he can reach it easily; when the approach proves difficult, he evolves various schemes. As K. meets villagers, applies to officials, aligns friend and foe, he becomes absorbed in each successive experience, and is prey to various emotions—passion, anger, pride, sympathy. So responsive is he to the life around him that he seems at times to forget his quest. When he rededicates himself to it, new resonances have been supplied by each incident and by each character's commentary.

It may be noted in passing that the social setting of the two quests is similar—in some undesignated country, a village replete with class hierarchy. In *The Castle,* K.'s first lone appearance is rapidly followed by his arrival at the hotel; during the remainder of the novel he is almost constantly surrounded by people; and yet, because of failure of communication, he is finally lonelier than when the book began. *Watt* opens and closes in society; but the hero is always a lone, incongruous figure. Already divorced from other men by virtue of his journey to Mr Knott, he is unable to fraternize even with Mr Knott's servants. He learns nothing from Arsene's pertinent monologue; Erskine is noncommunicative, Arthur noninformative; at the last he does not even bid Micks good-bye. Always alone—even during the apparent digressions from his story, which, however, only he could have recounted to Sam—he is incapable of deviation from his quest, the pitting of his logical mind against the mystery of Mr Knott.

Deliberately, both heroes focus their lives on their quests, but Watt's path is straighter. Traveling to Mr Knott's house, he enters without knowing how. There, with senses, language, and logic—the only informational tools of the rational man—he makes a direct analytical attack on the world of Mr Knott. In that establishment, however, he fails to find "semantic succour"; his senses fade; events cannot be explained, and, without explanation, how can they be exorcized? So complete is his resultant breakdown that even Sam's unsparing narration, through an anomalous *un*ironic paragraph strategically located at the end of Part III, admits compassion. In his last view of Watt, stumbling backwards to his habitation, falling and bruising himself but getting up and continuing, we have the symbol of the entire quest—except that Watt never reaches home.[7]

[7] In Beckett's unpublished French novel, *Mercier et Camier,* Watt appears briefly to try to reunite mind-Mercier with body-Camier, after their post-Cartesian separation—as I interpret the novel.

Since romantic love transcendent is the time-honored companion of the quest theme, we may, in glancing at the relation of each hero to his lady love, gain further insight into differences between Beckett and Kafka. Frieda of *The Castle* is introduced some five pages before she and K. sleep together on the barroom floor, but her position as Klamm's mistress is established at once. Her conduct towards K., during the course of the novel, partakes of dream- or nightmarelike absurdity, and the unmotivated spontaneity of the start of their relationship seems to presage as unexpected a turn.

> . . . in the course of looking around for K. [Frieda] went behind the counter, so that he [K.] was able to touch her foot. From that moment he felt safe. Since Frieda made no reference to K., however, the landlord was compelled to do it . . .
> . . . "Perhaps he's hidden somewhere . . . From the impression I had of him he's capable of a good deal." "He would hardly have the cheek to do that," said Frieda, pressing her foot down on K. There was a certain mirth and freedom about her which K. had not previously remarked, and quite unexpectedly it took the upper hand, for suddenly laughing she bent down to K. with the words: "Perhaps he's hidden underneath here," kissed him lightly and sprang up again saying with a troubled air: "No, he's not there" [p. 58].

Frieda's game is as unpredictable as their ensuing night of love; and yet, by having happened, the events acquire causal coherence, and become part of the pattern of the novel.

In *Watt,* the entire love affair is episodic and seemingly irrelevant to the hero's quest. After Watt ponders about Mr Knott and meanders off into a memory of frogs' croaking at different mathematical intervals, this abrupt information is thrust upon us: "The fishwoman pleased Watt greatly." For a page Sam (and probably Watt) dwells upon the coincidence that Watt and the fishwoman, Mrs Gorman, please each other. In meticulous and comically repulsive detail, the courtship is described for some three pages, and then Sam (and probably Watt) returns to the question of the coincidence of the mutual attraction:

> And were they not perhaps rather drawn, Mrs Gorman to Watt, Watt to Mrs Gorman, she by the bottle of stout, he by the smell of fish? This was the view towards which, in later years, when Mrs Gorman was no more than a fading memory, than a dying perfume, Watt inclined [p. 142].

This "dying perfume" is the last we hear of Mrs Gorman, although the novel closes upon a Mr Gorman, who may or may not be related to the fishwife.

Both affairs contain implicit ironies about pure romantic love, but Kafka's is more central to the story, more valid and modern in all its Freudian complexity. Beckett's episodic fishwife merely provides another opportunity for Watt to exercise his "purely mental faculties." Frieda in German is "peace," and this is what K. hopes to attain through

using her as a steppingstone to Klamm and the Castle, although events, as always, turn against him. As is evident from the quoted passage, Frieda is first seen throughK.'s eyes; but K. and the reader both become audience for Gardena's, Olga's, Jeremiah's, Pepi's portraits of Frieda, so that the collective and cumulative image is even more ambiguous than that of Klamm, of whom she was, perhaps, the mistress.

In *Watt* the accent on Mrs Gorman's fishiness links her mockingly to Christ and only indirectly to Mr Knott, the deity figure (who is also linked mockingly to Christ: "Knott, Christ, Gomorrha, Cork"). Momentarily pleasing as Mrs Gorman is to Watt, she arouses his mental more than his sexual prowess; she becomes another event to exorcize by explanation, in the way Watt cannot exorcise Mr Knott, and so he is finally compelled to leave the establishment, more ignorant than when he came, precisely by all he does *not* learn "of the nature Mr Knott."

Although Kafka's novel is unfinished, we know that on his deathbed K. was to receive permission to live in the village as a kind of second-class citizen. In the novel as printed, however (at least in one of the two versions of this fragment), K's last action is to laugh as he takes a villager by the arm. Having been driven lower and lower in the social scale, with decreasing hopes not only of reaching the Castle but even of remaining in the village, K. is subject to a final irony extraneous to the novel—a last view of him laughing last. A curiously relevant remark may be extracted from *Watt;* for Arsene, one of Watt's predecessors in Mr Knott's service, has distinguished three types of laughter: bitter, hollow, and mirthless. K.'s laughter is all of these.

The last words of Watt, who lacks the force to laugh outright, or even to smile properly, are "Three and one," an inversion of the "one and three" requested for his train ticket, and a last ironic trinitarian allusion to the deity figure left behind. That final linguistic inversion is a mild echo (or a temporal forecast) of the systematically garbled fragments with which Sam confronts us earlier in the text:

> Dis yb dis, nem owt. Yad la, tin fo trap. Skin, skin, skin. Od su did ned taw? On. Taw ot klat tonk? On. Tonk ot klat taw? On. Tonk ta kool taw? On. Taw ta kool tonk? Nilb, mun, mud. Tin fo trap, yad la. Nem owt, dis yb dis [p. 168].

Even when this is converted to our language, Watt is "falling to bits."

> Side by side, two men. All day, part of night. Dumb, numb, blind. Knott look at Watt? No. Watt look at Knott? No. Watt talk to Knott? No. Knott talk to Watt? No. What then did us do? Nix, nix, nix. Part of night, all day. Two men, side by side.

For there has been no communication between Watt and Knott, reduced now to "two men."

In both novels, the failure of the quest results from the human limitation of the hero. In both novels, mystic forces prove impregnable to weak human siege; even more, the forces are unaware that they are under siege, and indifferently continue to *be*. In *The Castle,* the quest has so many overtones, so many layers of meaning, that its failure implies the fundamental frustration of the entire human situation. The tireless reasoning of the hero, his vulnerability to the reasoning of each and every character, serves, finally, to disparage reason as an instrument of salvation. The German for castle *(Schloß)* puns on lock. The Castle remains locked; reason is not its key.

In *Watt,* where much is made of simple and complex locks and keys, the disintegration of the hero is pushed more pointedly. Unlike K., who presumably reasons even on his deathbed, Watt's mind breaks down. His senses also fail, and his language as well. And with language, all thought, even the most irrational and irrelevant. Having undertaken to serve Mr Knott, *homo sapiens* finds that the tools of this world do not render him sapient. In face of an inscrutable presence, his old questions are shattered at their epistemological base. Not only: How can Watt know Mr. Knott?—but: How does Watt know what he knows? And the answer, of course, comes to be that Watt knows not Mr Knott, and he knows not Watt. He knows not.

K. stakes his future, and finally loses his life on his quest. Watt reduces his life to the logical mind that breaks down on his quest. In their poignancy, both failures are considerable literary creations—among the most considerable of our time. Each creator has formed a world, each with its own tragicomic absurdity. In Watt and K., their authors have given contemporary relevance to the myth of the questing hero. Both these failures are, as Beckett describes a later creation, paradigmatic of the human species. As such, they have a unique appeal for that species, in all the urgency of its helplessness.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE ALLEGORICAL TEMPER. VISION AND REALITY IN BOOK II OF SPENSER'S FAERIE QUEENE. By Harry Berger, Jr. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. 248 p.

Mr. Berger suggests that the difficulty of judging Spenser lies principally in the fact that critics and scholars have mistaken the kind of allegory he was writing. According to Mr. Berger, Spenser's allegory is not didactic, is not that of the fourfold meanings of Biblical exegesis, and is not mere static personification; it is rather, he suggests, "dramatic." He sees Book II as combining all the elements of poetic texture in a dialectic of gradually enlarging "vision." What the plot presents is not necessarily the whole truth, for the events are seen *as the characters conceive them.* But the apparently irrelevant episodes, images, and ornaments gradually suggest more and more qualifications of that view; and, as the vision of the characters is enlarged, the plot itself becomes inclusive of wider and wider areas of moral experience. The interest thus lies to a much greater degree than critics have so far recognized in the psychological complexity of the major characters. Thus, says Mr. Berger, the rigid and highly balanced picture of Medina's control of Elissa and Perissa reflects Guyon's own view of morality, one which in Spenser's view is essentially incomplete and of which Spenser's style implies a judgment: "It is as if the poet wished to remind us, through action and language, that real life resists such clarities, that the quasi-Aristotelian symmetry is a too rational solution . . ." (p. 153).

Now this approach clearly runs the risk of importing into the poem a peculiarly modern sensibility; for, to refer again to the Medina episode, we need to have adequate grounds for supposing that Spenser and other Elizabethans disliked elaborate balances and antitheses. Mr. Berger seems aware of the danger. He does not fall victim to such notorious errors—some of them unfortunately still vigorous—as considering Spenser to be unconsciously of Acrasia's party or to be an idle dreamer singing in the void. Indeed, his discussion of the Bower of Bliss is in some respects one of the best that have been written, and supplies some needed corrections of C. S. Lewis' interpretation. Equally good in some respects are his discussions of Maleger and Belphoebe. Yet his view of Spenser is ultimately quite unsatisfactory. I shall discuss first Mr. Berger's reading of Book II and then, briefly, the broader question of his theory of "dramatic allegory."

Mr. Berger sees Book II as sharply divided by the appearance of the angel in Canto 8:

"The first six cantos are dominated by a hero whose temperance is Aristotelian—a natural, aristocratic virtue rendering its possessor immune to inner struggle and temptation. This certainty of instinct is needful for the knight who must withstand the Acrasian sorceries of the flesh, but it is not sufficient for other kinds of sorcery. Canto vii dramatizes the insufficiency of Aristotelian temperance, the innocence and limited wisdom resulting from reflexes so easy, so assured. Cantos viii-ix disclose the workings of a different kind of temperance: the Christian vir-

tue, supernaturally infused, accessible to all, but gained and retained by each with difficulty. Canto xii . . . recapitulates the contrast" (pp. 62-63).

Since in the first six cantos, according to Mr. Berger, Guyon conceives of the world in classical, Aristotelian terms, the cosmology the poet presents is classical; the appearance of the angel, however, brings "a shift of viewpoint . . . to Christian cosmology" (p. 44). That is, although in the first half of the book the characters and the narrator view events as "engendered by . . . chance (*tyche*) and spontaneity (*ta automata*)," in the last five cantos Providence replaces Fortune as the power governing the world (pp. 45-45).

Arthur, then, is an exemplar of Christianity, and Mr. Berger seems to regard his rescue of Guyon as an example of the providential ordering of events; the House of Alma presents a more comprehensive picture of the human *krasis* than Guyon had conceived, and suggests, in Arthur's victory over Maleger, the realities of Original Sin and Grace; the Bower of Bliss analyzes diabolic temptation as a malicious parody of creation.

According to Mr. Berger, however, Guyon never partakes of Christian temperance within the limits of the book; indeed, to Mr. Berger he is an essentially negative figure whose pretensions Spenser deliberately sets out to demolish. His virtue, "pre-moral" and "pre-rational," is merely the result of a happy physical constitution and an irrational fear of disgrace. In the first part of the poem he has the delusion of self-sufficiency, and considers himself superior to the rest of mankind—he chronically evades the knowledge of the essential feebleness of nature in himself. In the Cave of Mammon, however, Guyon learns that he is not self-sufficient; when he meets Shamefastness in the House of Alma, he comes face to face with the notion that his virtue is less than perfect; in the Bower of Bliss he awakens to the possibility of his feeling lust—thus of partaking in "weake fleshliness." At the end of the book, then, we leave Guyon at the real beginning of his moral development.

This view of Guyon attempts to meet one of the common criticisms of Book II by asserting that Spenser intended Guyon to seem a prig and was in fact attacking priggishness. Unfortunately, Mr. Berger fails to establish this. First, he fails to explain such evidently important matters as Guyon's loss of his horse and his separation from the Palmer. Second, there is no adequate evidence in the text that the three "key" events do in fact produce the changes in Guyon Mr. Berger sees or that Spenser thought they should have. Third, there is a fundamental confusion in Mr. Berger's conception of Guyon's excellence. Throughout the book he wavers between the view that all Elfes (and thus Guyon) are in a state of "Original Excellence" (p. 108)—that is, exempt from Original Sin—and the view that Guyon is subject to Original Sin (on p. 88 Original Sin "ages [Guyon's] body"). Although Mr. Berger's view of Guyon's evolution would seem to suggest the latter, he regularly describes Guyon's excellence in such terms as the following:

"Guyon's activity is premoral in the sense of being prerational. We see him as a patron of Aristotelian sophrosyne but not yet in possession of Thomistic temperantia" (p. 198).

"Guyon's excellence . . . is the virtue of an aristocrat, an Aristotelian sophrosyne which renders his disposition immune to the frailties most of us feel—an instinctive and premoral, and therefore assured, excellence" (p. 10).

Now, is or is not Guyon's virtue evidence that he is following reason? Although his entire view of Guyon's evolution depends on the answer, Mr. Berger is unsure. While he usually claims that Guyon's virtue is prerational, he sometimes main-

tains that Spenser is criticizing Guyon for believing reason to be an adequate guide to the moral life (as on pp. 62-63, 158-159). His view also involves another contradiction. Either Guyon is in a state of Original Excellence, in which case the moral evolution Mr. Berger outlines leaves Guyon thinking he is concupiscent when he is not (indeed, what may have been Spenser's view of Adam's original justice is a question Mr. Berger does not raise); or Guyon is an example of fallen humanity, in which case, in his belief that he is exempt from Original Sin, he is one of the most sinful figures in the poem, and it is difficult to see why his chastening is not considerably more thorough and unambiguous. Mr. Berger's view of Guyon creates problems more serious than those it is meant to resolve.

All this becomes much clearer when we turn to the text, for the fact is that Mr. Berger misreads it. Here is one of Spenser's more important comments on Guyon:

> "A harder lesson, to learne Continence
> In joyous pleasure, then in grievous paine:
> For sweetnesse doth allure the weaker sence
> So strongly, that uneathes it can refraine
> From that, which feeble nature covets faine;
> But grief an dwrath, that be her enemies,
> And foes of life, she better can restraine;
> Yet vertue vauntes in both their victories,
> And Guyon in them all shewes goodly maisteries."

To the unprejudiced reader, the last two lines would seem clearly to mean that Guyon's virtue is equal to the hardest test, the restraining of "the weaker sence" and "feeble nature." Mr. Berger comments:

"The first two lines apply directly to Cymochles, who in Canto v has been waylaid from pursuit of honor by Acrasia's women and who will be deterred by Phaedria in Canto vi. But the first two lines also constitute a general statement explained by the next five: 'Insofar as all of us have feeble nature and weaker sence we yield more easily to the temptations of sweetness than to the overt discomfort of grief and wrath.'"

Now, the first two lines do not quite say that "we yield more easily to the temptations of sweetness"; they say that "it is harder to learn to be continent with regard to pleasure," implying that we ordinary human beings are capable of learning continence, and not excluding the possibility that we already have. This is not so minor a shift in emphasis as might appear, because on it and others like it Mr. Berger rests his contention that Guyon is "immune to the frailties most of us feel": "Guyon differs from us in this respect; he has mastered wrath in Cantos iv and v, and here he is about to master sweetness produced by Acrasia." Thus, though the text clearly says that, although men's *sense* can hardly refrain from pleasure, yet when they are virtuous they succeed in resisting both pleasure and grief and wrath, Mr. Berger makes a sharp distinction between "us" and Guyon, which suggests that men succumb and Guyon does not:

"The term Continence here bears its Nichomachean definition: it refers to the struggle which the ordinary seeker after virtue would undergo in such a situation . . . ; it does not refer to Guyon's mastery, which is achieved without great effort, tested by no unruly desires; it does refer to Cymochles, suggesting that Continence is too hard a lesson for *him* to learn in the presence of Phaedria's sweetness.

"The poet is at pains to show us, therefore, that *a marked difference* exists between what we expect from so well coordinated a hero and what we expect from ourselves" (pp. 12-13; italics in second paragraph added).

The reader, then, is expected to identify himself with Cymochles rather than with Guyon! But what is Spenser's view of the matter?

> "But he the rightfull owner of that steed,
> Who well could menage and subdew his pride,
> The whiles on foot was forced for to yeed,
> With that blacke Palmer, his most trusty guide;
> Who suffred not his wandring feet to slide.
> *But when strong passion, or weake fleshlinesse*
> *Would from the right way seeke to draw him wide,*
> He would through temperance and stedfastnesse,
> Teach him the weake to strengthen, and the strong suppresse."
> (4.2, italics added.)

Spenser could hardly have stated more unambiguously that Guyon was subject to strong passion and weak fleshliness (cf. II, 1.34 and III, 1.9-11). Whether we read the Palmer as a projection of Guyon's reason or prudence or see the two figures as distinct human beings, it is clear that Guyon undergoes moral struggles.

When Spenser portrays Guyon as subject to lust in the Bower of Bliss, he shows him as kept on the path of virtue by the same process as in the stanzas quoted above: "His race with reason and with words his will, From foule intemperance he oft did stay." The Palmer is still doing just that in III, 1. It is therefore impossible to accept Mr. Berger's view that the sight of the bathing girls is the beginning of a revolution in Guyon's soul. It is hard to understand why Mr. Berger did not see how little sense all this makes—that the hero best suited to overcome sensuality—that last stronghold of sin—should be, as Mr. Berger makes him out to be, one who does not understand the nature of the bower, who evades the knowledge of original sin in himself, and whose development is so arrested that his virtue is merely instinctive.

But what of Mr. Berger's notion of instinctive virtue? According to him, in Aristotle's view temperance is an "instinctive and premoral, and therefore assured, excellence"; it is "aristocratic," "prerational," "predetermined," and "received at birth." To be sure, Aristotle noted that "all men think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for self-control or have the other moral qualities" (*Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross, 1144b). But Aristotle sharply distinguished between this "natural virtue" and moral virtue "in the strict sense."

The passage from the *Ethics* continues, " . . . but yet we seek something else as that which is good in the strict sense—we seek for the presence of such qualities in a different way. For both children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without reason they are evidently hurtful . . . if a man once acquires reason, that makes a difference in action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense . . . For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state which implies the *presence* of the right rule, that is virtue . . . It is clear then . . . that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom" (1144b).

Thus, in the strict sense, "none of the moral virtues arise in us by nature . . . rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit"

(1103a) and by the acquisition of reason. Thus evaporates the principal distinction Mr. Berger sees between Aristotle and Aquinas; for such a notion is *not* an instance of Aquinas' "additions" (p. 199) to Aristotle. Furthermore, as the passage above suggests, Aristotle did not think that natural excellence led to a "predetermined," an "assured" virtue.

Mr. Berger's confusion about Aristotle leads to confusion about Aquinas. He asserts, for instance, that one difference between the two is that Aristotle's conception omits "the idea that temperance can be perfected into a natural inclination of being" (p. 62). To be dissatisfied with Guyon because his moral reflexes are "so easy, so assured" is to object to both the Aristotelian and the Thomistic conception of a spontaneously virtuous act.

Mr. Berger further distinguishes between Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue by asserting that the latter, unlike the former, is both "supernaturally infused" (p. 63) and "the result of a course of action on the part of the human will" (p. 67). "Christian temperance prepares a man to attain more important habits and to attain more important gifts [than self-sufficiency]. Only the fourth in the hierarchy of cardinal virtues, its end is behavior according to *human* reason" (p. 63). Now Aquinas sharply distinguishes between two kinds of temperance, and much of the confusion of Mr. Berger's theory results from his apparent conflation of them. The first is naturally acquired through discipline and habit from the natural "seeds of virtue"; it is substantially identical with Aristotle's. The second, supernaturally infused temperance, is of course not "acquired by a course of action on the part of the human will." It is quite distinct from the natural virtue; it does not prepare a man for higher gifts but is the concomitant of them; and its end is not behavior according to human reason (as is that of the natural virtue) but according to faith, hope, and charity (*S. T.*, I-II, Q. 63, A. 3-4 and Q. 110, A. 3). In addition to the possibilities of man's naturally acquiring moral virtue consistent with reason and of God's infusing moral virtue consistent with the theological virtues, there is of course the possibility that God may miraculously produce the former virtue. Which or how many of these three possibilities Mr. Berger is referring to, he never tells us.

Understandably, Mr. Berger never unambiguously states whether he sees any character in the poem as possessing "Christian temperance." Spenser's treatment of "Christian temperance," he seems to imply, is limited to an outline of its possibility in the Castle of Alma, which refers primarily to the flesh and the lower soul. It is "the temperate human Archetype" (p. 71), "an example of the flesh 'good in its own kind and degree'" (p. 69). Mr. Berger seems to conceive of the overcoming of Maleger as a temporary victory over mortality (pp. 87, 103, 169), that is, over the weakness of the flesh; but in at least one place he seems to refer to it as saving Guyon "from eternal death" (p. 88). According to Mr. Berger, Acrasia is one of "the enemies of human excellence"; Maleger, on the other hand, is an enemy of "human existence" (p. 111), "a demon whose assaults spring from the natural dangers of the human predicament" (p. 222). Arthur's struggle with Maleger is "the Christian struggle for existence," and it is "won by reason" (p. 222).

Mr. Berger's vagueness makes his drift hard to follow. Is Maleger Original Sin or only one or several of its physical effects, such as death or disease? If he is either, how can he be overcome by reason, except as the body can be treated by medicine? Finally, if, as Mr. Berger plainly states, Spenser in the first half of the poem sets up as a straw man the view that matter is the origin of evil, why is

the principal enemy of the archetype of "Christian temperance" conceived primarily in physical terms? Mr. Berger answers none of these questions, but it is clear that, once the idea is discarded that the two halves of the poem are sharply divided, many of them will become less crucial. For, if the source of evil has from the first been shown to be the will rather than Fortune or matter, if Guyon is truly virtuous or at least successfully continent, there is no need to show how the truly virtuous soul as such resists spirtual evil as such. It then becomes easy, rather than difficult, to explain why Spenser may have meant Maleger to be representative of bodily weakness and mortality.

Since Mr. Berger believes that Spenser replaces a classical by a Christian view of morality in the second part of the poem, it is difficult to understand why he omits discussion of the cure of vice. For on this subject all Christian thought differs radically from Aristotelian ethics, and this is precisely where we might expect to find Spenser making the sharpest distinction. For Aristotle, the longer a man is subject to a vice, the less likely he is to be able to overcome it. It is, indeed, a moot point whether Aristotle thought vice in the strict sense could ever be cured (*Ethics,* 1114a, 1150b). Therefore Aristotle's attention is focused on how vice may be prevented; the *Ethics* and the *Politics* culminate in a consideration of education.

For the Christian, however, the regeneration of the wicked is always possible, with the aid of grace—the regeneration not only of those Aristotle saw as voluntarily wicked but of many he saw as involuntarily wicked. One would suppose that a Christian interpretation of Book II would offer some explanation, for example, of the freeing of the captives in Canto 12, but Mr. Berger has nothing to say about it. He mentions only that the event occurs (p. 240). His consideration of the bower deals only with its supposed effects on Guyon. He diverts our attention from the beasts and Verdant, who undergo changes explicitly referred to by the poet, to supposed changes in Guyon which are admittedly described indirectly, if at all.

In order to make the poem interesting to the "modern reader," then, Mr. Berger seems to me to have systematically removed it from any conceivable sixteenth-century reader. What of his theory of Spenser's "dramatic allegory"? Is it entirely discredited by his obfuscation of Spenser's text? The most regrettable aspect of this book is perhaps that its wild excesses may prevent many readers from taking seriously some of Mr. Berger's genuine insights. The core of Mr. Berger's theory of dramatic allegory, as I understand it, is the notion that the poetic texture of Spenser's allegory reflects the dialectic of the characters' (and ultimately the poet's and the reader's) growth in vision. This needs to be taken seriously. It is true, of course, that Mr. Berger pushes it to absurd lengths, as in supposing that the later parts of Book II *contradict* the narrative and the authorial commentary of the earlier part (as on pp. 164-165). His Aristotelianism and Thomism are a most unconvincing pair of dialectric opposites. The theory certainly does not apply to Book II, at least, as Mr. Berger tries to make it do. That is because there is not structurally central *anagnorisis* in Book II. But the theory, stated in these terms, obviously does apply to any allegory in which *anagnorisis* is the central event. For how can any poet narrate an *anagnorisis* without dramatizing in the poetic texture the change in his character's knowledge?

The most prominent example of the allegory of *anagnorisis* is, of course, the *Divine Comedy,* and one wonders why Mr. Berger did not recognize it and identify it as such. For the theme of the *Divine Comedy* is an ascent in modes of vision, in the account of which the poet rather strictly maintains the point of view

of his protagonist. The poetic texture, therefore, does indeed reflect the relative inadequacy of the vision of the character, rather than, until the very end, the full knowledge of the narrator. Of course, if the narrator tried to speak from his full knowledge, the reader would simply not understand him. The reader must live through the experience of the poem before he can share the narrator's full knowledge. This is the crucial point, for Dante's allegory is not about doctrine, in the sense of propositions, at all. It is about the *Erlebnis* of truth. The allegory of the *Divine Comedy* is thus in line with the central tradition of Christian apologetics, which aserted that the content of the faith could only be understood by those who had participated in the Christian experience. A great gulf separates the knowledge that "puffeth up" and the knowledge of truth. Of the latter St. Bernard, for instance, says, "Non enim hanc lectio docet, sed unctio; non littera, sed spiritus; non eruditio, sed exercitatio in mandatis Domini" (*Ep.*, 108). The goal of Christian experience is the contemplation and the love of truth, not assent to propositions.

One of the most prevalent misunderstandings of allegory as a literary mode has been the notion that in its cognitive aspect allegory is primarily an exposition of propositions. Mr. Berger rightly attacks this notion, but he himself sometimes assumes it when he says, for instance, that "the image of Furor clearly leads us to the concept, furor." No doubt there are allegories that are fundamentally organized in this manner, and no doubt most allegories use the method occasionally; but this is not the basic principle of Christian allegory. The governing principle of such works as the *Divine Comedy* and the *Faerie Queene* is not the exposition of concepts or propositions; it is rather the provision of something like the *Erlebnis* of truth. The replacement of the letter by the spirit—that is, the filling out of schemata with experience, the revelation of the significance of the past, the continual qualification of poetic formulations by their evolving context, in short the dialectical ascent in poetic vision—this is the fundamental pattern of Christian literary allegory, and it is obviously of a piece with Biblical exegesis, the fundamental patterns of which concern the prefiguration of the new covenant by the old, the replacement of the old by the new law, the reading in the spirit of what was written in the letter. No doubt the four senses of Biblical exegesis could be, and often were, mechanically and dully discussed and applied. The notion of the four senses springs, however, from the most centrally dynamic aspect of the Christian theory of truth. Their possible concomitancy in a text expresses the essential continuity of Christian experience, not only in the intricate analogies of existence but also in the possible ascent to greater and greater insight, to that fullest possible experience of truth of which the anagogical sense serves always to remind us. One of the most disappointing parts of Mr. Berger's book is the passage (pp. 178-181) in which, after verging on many of these notions, he denies the explicatory and theoretical usefulness of Biblical exegesis.

But the tradition of Biblical exegesis was well known to Spenser. The allegory of Book I, which Mr. Berger, curiously enough, never discusses, is a very clear example of this kind of Christian allegory, as has long been recognized. For instance, Red Cross' (and the reader's) vision of Una is incomplete until he sees her at the wedding feast in her full glory. It is important to notice, of course, that Una is still Una; her identity has never been in doubt for the poet and the reader. Just so, in the Earthly Paradise Dante sees Christ Himself, but only partially. Christ appears as the Griffin, an only partially intelligible being who remains opaque. The important thing is not to make a simple identification of the Griffin

as Christ; it is to experience, imaginatively, a certain mode of knowledge. In the last canto of the poem, Dante's vision penetrates deeper and deeper into the infinite transparency of God until he sees Christ—Truth—in His nature. Here again, Christ is still Christ; in both cases the differences lie in the capacity for vision of the protagonists and the mode of appearance of the seen. In both poems the outright rejection of evil has taken place long before this, and it has been absolutely unmistakable. In both poems, as in Christian thought in general, conversion is a *mise au point* of the choice between good and evil.

Mr. Berger's reading of Book II, of course, attributes to Spenser an absolutely implausible degree of indirection in the description of a conversion. But one hopes the imperfections of this book will not prevent what is valuable in it from being seen and taking effect. Mr. Berger utterly misapplies a theory of allegory which, if it can be rid of confusion and anachronism, is potentially a very important one. His chapters on "The Poem as Vision" are challenging and fecund, in spite of their obvious faults. The theory will need the help of such recent work as Charles Singleton's *Dante Studies II*, and it will need to be developed and applied with greater historical sense and with greater respect for the plain sense of texts than is evidenced in this book.

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JAMES JOYCE. By Richard Ellmann. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 842 p., 16 plates.

This book is the new, definitive biography of James Joyce and is therefore indispensable for the specialist's study or for any library concerned with twentieth-century literature. Twelve years in the writing, the biography exploits materials assembled from world-wide sources, from little-known private collections, and from interviews with Joyce's friends (and his enemies). For example, the author, through the cooperation of a Canadian professor of literature, obtained an interview with Eileen Vance—a childhood sweetheart of Joyce's—who is now a Mrs. Harris and teaches school at an Indian reservation near Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Some eight pages of acknowledgements suggest the author's ability to obtain cooperation, his singleness of purpose, his tact, and the executive control which was necessary to complete a project that became international in scope and almost infinite in detail.

The organization of *James Joyce* is at once chronological and "geographical." The early pages are devoted to "The Family Before Joyce"; we then move through the crucial boyhood years to young manhood, and on to the last, bad years in Paris when a literary age was breaking up under the iron tracks of Hitler's tanks. Geographically, *James Joyce* is written in terms of the cities where the man lived: Dublin, and then the familiar odyssy through Pola, Trieste, Zürich, Paris, and finally the return to Zürich, and surgery for a perforated duodenal ulcer, in January 1941. The sixty pages of notes, the footnotes, and the page-end comments are well managed. In fact, this study is an excellent example of the quality of a kind of American scholarship which is possible when long-range aircraft, tape recorders, and Guggenheim grants can be diverted to worthy, official intellectual pursuits.

In comparison to popular biographers who are merely dull, this book escapes, by and large, both kinds of error. On the other hand, if this book escapes dullness, the escape is not through the agency of the methodology employed, or the author's style, but rather because of the eccentricity of Joyce's personality. It would be difficult to reduce the life of James Joyce to something bland or colorless.

While this book may be a model of its kind, the method is not very different from that of other present-day biography, scholarly or popular. In *James Joyce* the concept of the literary instrument of biography is neither revolutionary nor very interesting. Given the chronological and "geographical" commitment, had Joyce lived another ten years, this book would be correspondingly longer. Doubtless there is an attempt to modify this chronological method, but from chapter to chapter there is too little manipulation of pace and tone. This is especially true of the Paris years, when Joyce's most significant work was already completed. Thus the strength of this biography is not in the selection and interpretation of detail, but in the accumulation of detail.

There is implied justification for exhaustive detail, for Professor Ellmann's estimate of Joyce is lofty, "To be narrow, peculiar, and irresponsible, and at the same time all-encompassing, relentless, and grand, is Joyce's style of greatness, a style as difficult, but ultimately as rewarding, as that of *Finnegans Wake*." And for Professor Ellmann Joyce is "One of the more rarified minds of the century." One kind of dissenting opinion, however, holds that Joyce's mind was verbal, playful, and often merely arbitrary. Given this second initial estimate, it then appears that the methodology of this book artificially inflates the subject matter at hand.

Very possibly this initial limited concept of biography legislates for the monolithic kind of information which can be relevant to the project. Names, addresses, examination grades, favorite restaurants, and illuminating anecdotes are much in evidence; it is, of course, better to know these things than to know them not. The biography points out landmarks, people, and events, and then cites the place where these items "appear" in Joyce's fictions. But mere identification is not a significant way to relate a man's life to his works.

As another example of limitation inherent in the method, the most fascinating section of the biography is the details of Joyce's "discovery." The names of his first official discoverers are cited: Pound, quick, enthusiastic, able, quickly bored; Eliot, reserved, smiling, suspicious; Harriet Weaver, a woman of wealth; Valery Larbaud, a kind of admirable, easy tool. And yet there is very little generalization, or speculation, about what might be called "The Sociology of Joyce's Literary Reputation: the Paris Years."

The author is unobtrusive, but a high price must be paid for this comfort. The overwhelming impression which this book gives about Joyce's artistic works is something like this: the artist melodramatically triumphed over adversity, brought on largely by his own actions, and in the end produced *the* masterpiece, of the final phase, *Finnegans Wake*. There is little support for the more flexible, perhaps more sophisticated judgment, that Joyce's greatest artistic successes were with *Dubliners* (now becoming rapidly dated, in the light of subsequent short-story practice) and with *Portrait Of the Artist*, which may be Joyce's most viable contribution to our literature. Although it is certain that Ellmann does not intend it, the impression remains that Joyce's physical moves, his domestic life, his public concern for his family, and his charming self-promotion, are to be equated with artistic talent; the complexity of the life is equivalent, someway, to the extraordinary development of his verbal techniques. Of course this is neither true nor

believed by the author, but such are the hazards of the chronological-geographical method.

One conclusion is clear. This monumental biography—a book which will certainly continue to claim the highest distinctions—will by no means give check to Joycean studies, as is often the implication when a new standard work of scholarship appears. Instead, the limitations of this book, doubtless intended as such by the author, will become the new basis for further imaginative and speculative enterprise. As the elder John Joyce gravely remarked in Dublin, when he saw the curleycue Brancusi sketch of his son, "The boy seems to have changed a good deal."

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VOLTAIRE AND CANDIDE. By Ira O. Wade. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. xvi, 369 p.

It was inevitable that Mr. Wade, the most faithful and perhaps the most productive of that distinguished band of American devotees of Voltaire which began its activities in the 1920s, should crown his work to date with a book on *Candide*. That he should be able to publish it in the "*Candide* year" 1959 was a happy circumstance; that its immediate cause was his discovery, announced in 1956, of the only known manuscript of the work, was even happier.[1]

The book is, of course, as its title suggests, much more than a study of *Candide*. The year 1759 is, in Mr. Wade's view, the point of crisis and crystallization for both Voltaire and his age. Hence a study of *Candide* becomes for him the supreme opportunity to come to grips with its author and, to a lesser extent, with his time and place. Indeed as one reads this book, much of Mr. Wade's previous contribution, in particular his *Voltaire and Mme du Châtelet*, seems like a mere preparation for it.

That he does not entirely succeed in the larger effort is perhaps due in part to the fact that *Candide*, however great a role it may have played in the history of ideas, is still exemplary of a minor genre.[2] In any case, the focus on one book, no matter how central to Voltaire's life and thought, and more especially the focus on technical aspects of it (Part III, "The Composition and Publication"), distracts attention somewhat from more general and, except to the specialist, more interesting matters. The portrait of Voltaire and his age also gets out of focus through the necessary attention paid to optimism in Part I ("The Philosophical Background"), to the exclusion of other elements. Thus Mr. Wade gives a very good sketch of the moral and metaphysical dilemma presented by a mechanical view of the universe (pp. 3 ff.), but at this point, while citing Descartes, makes no mention of the Epicurean tradition in French thought, which played so important a role in the eclecticism of Voltaire and the age. In his summing up, however, (pp. 318-319) he finds himself necessarily citing this tradition: "Voltaire's skepticism, which is as positive as Montaigne's, is no proof against his cynicism... Having rejected Christianity, dogma and all, he could find no solace in an attitude leading to consequences that he could not accept, and having long since adopted libertine

[1] See I. O. Wade, "The Vallière MS. of Candide," *FR*, XXX (1956), 3-4.

[2] As a critique of the age, *Les Liaisons dangereuses* is both morally and aesthetically more satisfying; it contains less perhaps, but probes more deeply.

Epicureanism, he saw no sense in any form of stoicism, Christian or pagan." Nothing indeed, could be more Epicurean or libertine than the conclusion of *Candide*, and more might have been done, in the earlier sections of this book, to prepare us for the positive as well as for the destructive elements of Voltaire's work.

What Mr. Wade does superbly well is to present the deepening moral confusion of both Voltaire and his age, when faced by their "new" universe, and the way in which personal crises (the "betrayal" and death of Mme du Châtelet, the disillusionment of Berlin) and external catastrophes (the Lisbon earthquake, the Seven Years' War) forced first emotional ("Poème sur le Désastre de Lisbonne") and then rational (*Candide*) recognition by Voltaire of the ontological and moral dilemma.

There is, of course, nothing very new in this view. That the years 1758-59 are critical years in French thought forces itself on one's attention by reason of the Rousseau quarrel alone, to say nothing of the *Encyclopaedia's* troubles or the apearance of *Candide* itself. But nowhere previously, perhaps, has the brief and uneasy optimistic calm in the 1740s and its explosive shattering in the 1750s been so ably presented.

In his critique of the work itself (Part IX, "The Meaning of *Candide*"), Mr. Wade gathers up more recent critical views and points forward to a subtler and more critically rewarding attitude to Voltaire the creative artist. The "logique secrète" of Voltaire's work, in which supreme control of style and form is used to make emotional and intellectual chaos comprehensible, the crystalline "clandestinity" of *Candide*, as Mr. Wade presents it, should inspire some future critic to a comparable study of an equally attractive and infuriating book, *L'Ingénu*. Mr. Wade has wisely not gone further, while setting up a signpost for himself or his successors: "Indeed, it is *Candide* which puts form into that unformed mass of thoughts and opens up the way first for coherent organic thinking and later [i.e., after *Candide*] for coherent, organic action" (p. 256).

As has been said above, Mr. Wade's book breaks off in the middle for a technical discussion, based in part on the new light thrown on this problem by the discovery of the La Vallière manuscript. This series of four chapters presents a very complete picture of one of the most complex problems in the always exasperating bibliography of Voltaire and offers a very persuasive set of solutions. Mr. Wade believes Wagnière[3] as against Formey, along with Messrs. Havens and Torrey, but goes further than these latter, in that he believes, largely from evidence drawn from the correspondence, not only that some form of *Candide* was presented to the Elector Palatine by August 1758, but that it was being worked on for at least six months before that: "... all the evidence at our disposal would indicate that he began *Candide* and worked on it with concentrated energy around January 15, 1758. He then laid it aside for a two-month period. Between March 15 and April 15, work on it progressed to the point of its being more than half finished. By July 15, it was practically complete and a copy was made by Wagnière and presented to Charles-Théodore, possibly before Voltaire left Schwetzingen in August, though probably not until August 23, 1758" (p. 155). The La Vallière manuscript, which by reason both of omissions and commissions in the text must for

[3] Note first published by Mr. Norman Torrey in 1929, quoted by Mr. Wade, p. 145: "Candide fut imprimé en 1759, composé en 1758. La première copie que j'en fis fut en juillet 1758 à Schwetzingen pour SAE Mgr. l'Electeur Palatin."

the moment be considered the *Urform* of *Candide*, Mr. Wade suggests was sent to the Duchess by the middle of November 1758.

The most interesting part of Mr. Wade's discussion concerns, perhaps, the question of the first edition. Against the earlier opinions, which varied between the Geneva, Cramer edition (Bengesco, Morize, Gagnebin) and that of Paris, Lambert (Tannery and Torrey), Mr. Wade thinks a trial publication was made, probably by Marc-Michel Rey at Amsterdam, possibly by Nourse at London—the edition listed by Morize as 59x. This he supports brilliantly by textual comparisons based on the La Vallière manuscript as *Urform* and by most a careful study of typography, papers, and ornaments. He dates this publication the end of December 1758. Since his book includes both a facsimile reproduction of the manuscript and photographs of the ornaments in question, the interested scholar can follow his patient detective work in detail.

Nothing in Voltaire bibliography is every finally settled; but it will take a great deal of further factual evidence to shake Mr. Wade's conclusions in this part of his work.

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THE CRADLE OF EREWHON: SAMUEL BUTLER IN NEW ZEALAND. By Joseph Jones. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1959. 224 p.

Blending firsthand observation of terrain and culture, research into pioneer history, literary criticism, and speculation, this volume, handsomely illustrated with numerous full-page photographs and drawings, is the product of a Fulbright lectureship at the Universities of Wellington and Aukland. It is well known that Butler had an early chapter of young manhood as sheepherder in New Zealand before becoming known to the reading public as amateur theorist on evolution, eccentric critic of Homeric epic, writer of utopias, and author of one of the durable books of his age—that amalgam of fiction and autobiography, *The Way of All Flesh*. Some notion of the extent of our debt to this experience for details in *Erewhon*, as well as curious light upon his family relations, is found in Professor Jones's interesting monograph.

The quality of life in the "Canterbury Settlement" a century ago, the growing pains of youthful Christchurch, and the reputation of young Sam Butler among his contemporaries in the colony are canvassed. We see the British concept of colonialism with its conscious pride in its differences from American pioneering. Butler's remote situation on his "Mesopotamia" claim did not make him a recluse; on the contrary, he had a social urge that drew him to the young city, where he enjoyed a measure of popularity in the community and a fellowship with local wits, journalists, and writers, several of whom, like himself, had emanated from British universities.

In a chapter on geography, the conformities of island terrain to Higgs's arduous route of discovery are shown to be recognizably close. In Mr. Jones's opinion, this introduction into the land of nowhere serves to provide a convincing transition from the actualities of New Zealand range life to the sociological nightmares of the transmontane civilization. A chapter on ethnological considerations offers a brief account of Maori habits and contacts with white settlers. This again concerns *Erewhon*, since Higgs employs the moody and self-willed Chowbok as guide to the explorations which lead him to the land of the Erewhonians.

In previous readings of *Erewhon* I must confess to have felt that the "journey in" was pure convention, and that Chowbok was simply a device. The method is parallel to those in *Utopia, New Atlantis, The Isle of Pines, Robinson Crusoe,* and *Gulliver,* in none of which the preliminaries gain more than our toleration. Although in rereading *Erewhon* after noting Mr. Jones's account, one recognizes Butler's fidelity to the geography of the Rangitata River and the passes of the Southern Alps, and Chowbok gains somewhat in stature, still these debts to New Zealand remain little more than a topical method of getting started; for all real interest attaches to the sociological and psychological inversions in the hypothetical land.

Mr. Jones speculates upon the question whether Butler should have returned to England when he did, or whether he might not have fared beter by remaining a colonial. He cites the futilities in Butler's life during the extended residence in Clifford's Inn, with bad investments, sponging friends, wrongheaded literary battles, bitternesses with family, and only the redeeming circumstance of his friendship with Miss Savage to balance the account. Nothing can be much more futile than such a speculation; there is no Butler who stayed on the range; and, if there were, he might well have dropped into obscurity. It is in the nature of things that a New Zealand-inspired study should focus upon *Erewhon* rather than *The Way of All Flesh*; but one may be forgiven for arguing that any sacrifice of *Erewhon* would be justified to gain for us *The Way*, which awaited his London period for writing.

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ARTHURIAN LITERATURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES. A COLLABORATIVE HISTORY. Edited by Roger Sherman Loomis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959. 563 p.

The publication of the history known familiarly as *ALMA* is a major event for comparative literature; the subject is one which must be treated comparatively and the character of this history suggests both a method and a procedure for comparative study. Roger Sherman Loomis of Columbia, Jean Frappier of the Sorbonne, and Eugene Vinaver of Manchester planned this collaborative history in 1951 and gathered together the work of thirty scholars from five nations to bring it to completion. The task of editing the volume fell to Roger Loomis, who has made of the forty-one chapters, differing widely in character and emphasis, a coherent whole.

To a considerable extent the volume represents the fruit of intellectual exchange within the International Arthurian Society conceived by Loomis, Frappier, Vinaver, and their associates in 1935 at Quimper in Brittany. World War II interrupted plans for organization, but in August 1951 nearly one hundred Arthurians met at Winchester for the reading of papers and the discussion of Arthurian problems. A second congress followed three years later at Rennes in Brittany and a third in 1957 at Bangor in North Wales. In August 1960, the Fourth Arthurian Congress met at Vannes in Brittany, with twelve of the contributors to *ALMA* present, and six of them contributing papers. The annnal *Bulletin Bibliographique de la Société Internationale Arthurienne* first appeared in 1949. By discussion and exchange of views those working in this vast field attempt to give their investigations the order and coherence of literary history.

It is by no means accidental that Roger Loomis, who has had a large part in this achievement, should edit the collaborative history.

In a preface he refers to the need of bridging the chasm between present scholarship in the field and James Douglas Bruce's *Evolution of Arthurian Romance from the Beginnings down to the Year 1300*, which appeared in 1923, and to the desirability of carrying the account of Arthurian literature beyond 1300 to include significant later developments. Both objectives have been achieved.

The planning began in time to include the work of four scholars who had made the thirty-six years since Bruce's book appeared notable for Arthurian study. Laura Hibbard Loomis, whose recent death brings deep sorrow to all who knew her, not only completed her charming chapter on *Gawain and the Green Knight*, but had the pleasure of seeing the publication of the volume, to which she had contributed in many ways. The late Ernest Hoepffner and William Allen Nitze brought the chapters on the Breton *lais* and the *Perlesvaus* to completion and revised them in accordance with the plans for the entire volume. The death of John Jay Parry after he had sent in the chapter on Geoffrey of Monmouth made it necessary for another to undertake its preparation in final form. The selection of Robert Caldwell for the task was admirable, since his careful study of the manuscripts, both of the so-called vulgate text of Geoffrey and of the variant version, has broken new ground for future investigation. He has shown the highest regard for the chapter as Parry planned it, but has at the same time indicated some of the lines along which future inquiry is likely to proceed. Many readers will regret that the untimely death of Dorothy Everett of Oxford prevented her from writing the Layamon chapter after many years of exacting study which she gave to everything she undertook. They will be grateful that the editor himself supplies the chapter, showing here, as elsewhere, editorial wisdom and a wide knowledge of the present state of Arthurian studies.

The consideration of works later than 1300, while evident throughout, is most marked in the final chapters, in which English studies necessarily take the central place. Robert W. Ackerman discusses twenty-three English Arthurian tales in couplets, tail-rime stanzas, ballad metre, and prose which have been dated between 1300 and 1550, and which vary greatly in quality and length. Except for Henry Lovelich and Thomas Chestre, the authors are unknown, and the poems in general belong to the South of England and to the East Midlands. In the West Midlands and the North, and even extending into Scotland, a literary movement was at the same time producing alliterative romances, which J. L. N. O'Loughlin discusses in a chapter centering in the *Morte Arthure*, a masterpiece, considering also two less important works, the *Awntyrs of Arthur* and *Golagros and Gawain*. The greatest poem of the school, *Gawain and the Green Knight*, is given a chapter to itself, in which Laura Hibbard Loomis combines an account of the sources and analogues with a critical discussion of the literary art of the poem. Eugene Vinaver, in his chapter on Malory's *Morte Darthur*, not only summarizes the known facts about the writer, his sources, and the text, but shows the place of Malory in the history of Arthurian literature and makes the discussion of his art central to the chapter. The emphasis upon the art of the works brought together in *ALMA* makes it a volume of good reading for anyone who enjoys literature, rather than a mere handbook. The editor in the final chapter gathers evidence of "Arthurian Influence on Sport and Spectacle" from 1225 to 1493, reminding us of the extent to which Arthurian legend permeated the life of Europe in the Middle Ages.

Although the weight of information and detailed study prevents mention of all parts of the history, certain groups of chapters should be noted because they provide new knowledge or arrange the romances in significant ways.

The most striking feature of the volume is the appearance in the first five chapters of a body of Welsh scholarship of the highest quality, much of it otherwise inaccessible except to those who read Welsh. Kenneth Jackson of Edinburgh has in the first two chapters given us "The Arthur of History" and "Arthur in Early Welsh Verse" with meticulous sifting of evidence and restrained statement. Of the historicity of Arthur he says: "The nature of the evidence is such as proof is impossible," and sets aside firmly the enthusiasm which has clouded the identification of persons and places. So succintly has he summarized the present state of fact and opinion that some readers will regret his not including more of the valuable results of recent scholarship in Wales. With like restraint A. O. H. Jarman of the University of Wales presents "The Welsh Myrddin Poems," providing excellent translations of the *Afallennau* and the *Hoianau*, and making clear the association of the legend of Myrddin as preserved in the Welsh texts with the well-known folklore theme of the "wild man of the woods." Two stories, *Culhwch and Olwen* and *Rhonabwy's Dream*, which show no trace of continental or Anglo-Norman contamination, are dealt with by Idris Foster of Oxford, who combines a summary of the scholarship and criticism of recent years with a convincing appraisal of the quality and excellence of the two works. Rachel Bromwich of Cambridge, whose studies of the Welsh triads have revealed their character and their importance for Arthurian investigations, completes the group of five chapters, giving an account of the manuscripts in which the triads are preserved and indicating the need for further work on certain problems. To readers unfamiliar with recent Welsh scholarship, the first five chapters will come as a revelation. Careful sifting of evidence, rigorous linguistic and palaeographical discipline, and critical acumen have added immeasurably to our knowledge of the early centuries of Arthurian literature.

In Chapter XVI, Idris Foster discusses in another connection three Welsh tales—*Gereint, Owein*, and *Peredur*—the subjects of a long controversy, already extensive and complicated in Bruce's day, the early stages of which Loth had summarized as early as 1892. Inaccurately termed "die Mabinogion-Frage" (for these tales are not, strictly speaking, mabinogion), the moot question is that of the relationship between the Welsh tales and Chrétien's *Erec, Yvain*, and *Perceval*. This chapter forms part of a group of seven in which the Grail romances are discussed. Only careful planning and the cooperation of seven scholars working in Welsh, French, and German could have achieved the interesting series, which concerns some of the most controversial questions of Arthurian scholarship. Frappier begins with an account of Chrétien, and is followed by Foster on the Welsh tales. A. W. Thompson then supplies the "Additions to Chrétien's *Perceval*," and the central chapter of the seven, by Otto Springer, adds "Wolfram's *Parzival*." Pierre le Gentil of the Sorbonne contributes "The Work of Robert de Boron and the Didot *Perceval*." Nitze's "*Perlesvaus*" concludes the series. Since there remains the necessity of looking backward from evidence to origins, the editor adds a chapter entitled "The Origin of the Grail Legends," saying of the problems involved in the tradition of the Grail: "Every reader of the preceding chapters, every student of the Grail romances, cannot help being struck most forcefully by the astonishing disharmony, the consistent inconsistency, of those strange narratives." The complication of problems and solutions makes this sec-

tion of the history particularly valuable to students. The writers have combined to show more clearly than any comparable source of information how readers of the Grail romances have puzzled over the problems and have, in a measure, set them in order.

Another group of chapters, closely related to those of the Grail romances, begins with Frappier's discussion of "The Vulgate Cycle." Alexandre Micha of Caen follows with a chapter entitled "The Vulgate Merlin," part of which is a redaction of Robert's *Merlin*. After chapters on the *Suite de Merlin*, the post-vulgate *Roman du Graal*, and the *Livre d'Artus*, Vinaver concludes the group with a chapter on the sequel to, and elaboration of, the French vulgate cycle, "The Prose *Tristan*."

Another and shorter series of three chapters is concerned with the story of Tristan. Less complicated and more compact, this group begins with Helaine Newstead's "The Origin and Growth of the Tristan Legend," in which she combines onomastic and linguistic disciplines to provide a clue to the earliest stage of the legend. Commenting on the consistency of the various forms of the Tristan legend, she shows it in striking contrast to the inconsistency of the Grail romances. She makes clear also that a considerable number of Oriental motifs have been drawn into the legend. Her mention of three poems—of Béroul, Thomas, and Eilhart von Oberge—then becomes the subject of the following chapter by Frederick Whitehead of Manchester, entitled "The Early Tristan Poems," which includes mention of certain minor poems. Third in the series, a critique of the work of the German poet, Gottfried von Strassbourg, is written by W. T. H. Jackson. Such grouping of romances, with cross references from chapter to chapter, performs a highly valuable service both for specialists in the field and for students approaching the maze of Arthurian literature for the first time.

Arthurians will welcome two chapters contributed by Hendricus Sparnaay of Utrecht entitled "Hartmann von Aue and His Successors" and "The Dutch Romances," particularly for their trenchant criticism and clear-sighted examination of recent scholarship. He sees a source of error in "neglect of the results of comparative literary studies," which has been a central concern of many scholars who hope to see increased international cooperation with corresponding extension of linguistic competence.

The editor has emphasized the grouping of certain chapters by supplying needed links and additions. Following the first five chapters on Welsh literature, he prepares the way for studies of Geoffrey and Wace by two discussions: "The Oral Diffusion of the Arthurian Legend," and "The Legend of Arthur's Survival." Among the chapters not necessarily grouped, which bear the titles "Miscellaneous French Prose Romances," "Miscellaneous French Romances in Verse," "The Troubadours," "*Jauffré*," "Arthurian Literature in Spain and Portgual," "Arthurian Influences on Italian Literature from 1200 to 1500," and "Scandinavian Literature," he supplies a chapter, "The Latin Romances." In fitting the parts together and providing introductions and cross references, he has been aided by several of the collaborators who have shared the vision of the whole.

It is such cooperative endeavor and exchange of views, particularly when they involve differences of opinion and conflicting results of investigation, that can best advance research in any field. Yet no Arthurian will be satisfied with the present volume, in spite of the excellence of parts and the successful welding into a whole. To some, the unevenness of the performance will seem striking; to others the failure to include certain recent scholarship will appear inexplicable. The

nature of the undertaking demands that it be followed before many years by another such history. Omissions are unavoidable and problems remain unsolved or partially solved. Meanwhile, research goes on, and such a history is out of date before it can be printed. What is most important in the appearance of *ALMA* at this time is that thirty scholars of five nations have written the book together. They have achieved a highly significant and useful history of a body of literature exceedingly difficult to reduce to order and coherent plan. Their work will stand as the authority in the field, until a successor appears.

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ESSAYS, LETTERS, AND REVIEWS BY MATTHEW ARNOLD. Collected and edited by Fraser Neiman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. xvi, 398 p.

Professor Fraser Neiman has made an important contribution to Matthew Arnold scholarship by collecting in this volume articles that have not been reprinted since their original publication, articles that were not included in *The Works of Matthew Arnold*, Edition de Luxe (London, 1903-04), and anonymous and pseudonymous articles that have recently been added to the Arnold canon. The uncollected pieces available to the editor were numerous, but he has increased the merit of his work by excluding selections that could only be considered "curiosities" or that could only be of interest to the bibliographer. It is unlikely that this volume will alter our estimation of Arnold; but it will enhance our knowledge of the development of his style and intellectual growth, since the forty-three selections span most of his writing career—from "On the Modern Elements in Literature" (1857) to "Disestablishment in Wales" (1888).

Neiman has used the first published version of each selection. He has added prefatory notes for the orientation of the reader and supplemented Arnold's footnotes with those of his own when references are obscure. When it was apparent that typographical errors existed in the original version, he has made corrections; otherwise, peculiarities in spelling and punctuation have been retained.

For the student the most interesting pieces of the collection are the anonymous and pseudonymous articles lately ascribed to Arnold. The remaining selections, though scarce, have been available. For identifications other than his own (*MP*, LV, 84-92; *MLN*, LXXIV, 492-494), Neiman is indebted to Miss Marion Mainwaring (*MP*, XLIX, 189-194) and Professor R. H. Super (*MP*, LVI, 268-269). It is to be regretted that Professor T. H. Vail Motter, who did so much to coordinate Arnold material (*SP*, XXXI, 600-605), receives no recognition for his contribution to Arnold studies.

Certainly the most significant additions to the Arnold bibliography were made by Neiman. By means of Arnold's *Notebooks* (London, 1952) and entries of payment by the *Pall Mall Gazette* in Arnold's financial accounts, he has approximated the date of the appearance of works in that newspaper. In most instances, he has supported his identifications with internal evidence. Neiman is to be respected for an admirable ability to detect the Arnoldian manner and style. As it happens, for at least four of the pieces identified by internal evidence, there is clear evidence in Arnold's own handwriting in his unpublished diaries (Yale University Library) —a source of information not used by Neiman. For his identification of the two letters to the *Pall Mall Gazette* entitled "Education and the State" (December

11, 1865; December 22, 1865), Neiman cites the pseudonym "A Lover of Light," sarcastic remarks concerning the Duke of Marlborough, the Bishop of Oxford, and the *Times*, the mentioning of Coleridge, Guizot, and G. Shaw Lefevre, the use of the pejorative "claptrap," and the tenor, tone, and subject matter as evidence of Arnold's authorship. The identification is confirmed by entries in the unpublished diaries, which reveal that Arnold planned to finish the first letter for the *Pall Mall Gazette* by December 8, 1865 (it appeared, undated, on the 11th) and that he finished the second for the same paper on December 21, 1865 (the actual date appearing on the published letter). Neiman identifies "Savings Banks in Schools" (*P.M.G.*, November 22, 1873) by the theme of self-culture, the Arnold manner, the introduction of Goethe as an authority, and the use of a Goethian quotation recurrent in the *Notebooks*. In this case too the unpublished diaries bear him out. Arnold indicated that he planned to complete and send off "Savings Banks" on November 11, 1873. Neiman identifies "A Genevese Judge," a review of *Eugène Colladon études et fragments littéraires* (*P.M.G.*, July 13, 1881), by the praise for French classics, French style, and the eighteenth century, and by the mention of Joseph de Maistre and Edmund Burke—men much in Arnold's thoughts at the time. Here again the unpublished diaries are conclusive. They indicate that in 1881 Arnold was reading or working at a review of Colladon on June 7, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24. On July 6, Arnold recorded that the project had been finished.

In one case, the review of *The Autobiography of Mrs. Fletcher* (*P.M.G.*, June 10, 1875), Neiman's ascription lacks persuasion. It may be that this is Arnold's review, but the Arnoldian manner and style are less evident here than in the other selections. Neiman himself realizes that the "little fling" that characterizes Arnold's reviews is absent. Furthermore, the temper is unobservable and Neiman's citing of the characteristic of compounding predicates as evidence is unconvincing. Finally, it is unlikely that Arnold would review any work with which he could be so easily associated. The friendship of the Arnold family with Mrs. Fletcher was a fact widely known.

Neiman is to be commended for making available in a one-volume edition the newly attributed and the less-accessible articles of Matthew Arnold. The real significance of his work, however, lies in his reminding Arnold students of the great difficulties to be encountered and the tremendous work remaining to be done before the Arnold canon can be established.

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DIE DRAMATISCHEN GATTUNGEN IN DEN POETIKEN DES SIGLO DE ORO. EINE EINLEITENDE STUDIE ZUM THEMA DER DRAMENTHEORIE IM GOLDENEN ZEITALTER. By Margaret Newels. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1959. vii, 192 p.; 4 plates. (Untersuchungen zur Sprach- und Literaturgeschichte der romanischen Völker, Band II.)

Surveying the problem of dramatic genres in poetic theory since Menéndez Pelayo's Chapter X of his fundamental *Historia de las ideas estéticas en España* (1st ed., 1883), Margaret Newels finds that neither Menéndez Pelayo nor Antonio Vilanova, author of the latest publication on Spanish aesthetic theory,

"Preceptistas españoles del siglo XVI y XVII," in *Historia general de las literaturas hispánicas*, III (Barcelona, 1953), had an opportunity to study the problem in sufficient detail. She intends "einen Einblick in diejenigen Theorien zu geben, aus denen sich die ästhetische Konzeption des Dramas im Siglo de Oro erst bilden konnte" (p. 3). The conclusion of her investigations is that the undoubtedly existing contrast between the theory of the Aristotelians and dramatic practice has been exaggerated. Actually, the Spanish poetic treatises are not so much a rigid fixation of a priori rules for poetry as a fruitful critical discussion ("Auseinandersetzung") between successful dramatic practice and dramatic theory, resulting in a more flexible interpretation of Aristotle's *Poetics* ("Schlußwort," p. 173).

The Hauptteil of the book is divided into eight chapters of increasing length, except for the shorter last one: I, "Das Problem der Gattungseinteilung"; II, " 'Comedia' als Gattungsbegriff"; III, "Über die Rangordnung des Dramas unter den übrigen Gattungen"; IV, "Die Definition der Tragödie und Komödie"; V, "Komik"; VI, "Tragik"; VII, " 'Comedia Española' und 'Tragicomedia' "; VIII, "Der 'Entremés' in der spanischen Poetik." The study rests on a firm knowledge of the sources, of which we find a generous and well-chosen selection in the Textanhang. The bibliography of both primary and secondary material and the notes based on them give testimony of the author's zeal and industry.

Her main conclusions are correct. They were at least foreshadowed already in Menéndez Pelayo's treatment (see above), in Menéndez Pidal's famous article, "Lope de Vega, el arte nuevo y la nueva biografía," *RFE*, XXII (1935), and in Edwin S. Morby's "*Comedia* and *Tragicomedia* in Lope," *HR*, XIII (1943), 185-209; see particularly pp. 206 ff. New support for Fräulein Newels comes from Professor Edwin S. Morby's Introduction to his edition of *La Dorotea*, pp. 16-17, who finds that "Lope, no cabe duda, tenía muy presente su concepto de las leyes de la tragedia, fuese para seguirlas, fuese para desentenderse de ellas; siendo lo más sorprendente cómo las sigue tantas veces."

Yet, the reader leaves this book with a feeling of misgiving. It appears that the author is the captive of her material, which she has not well organized. There is a considerable amount of repetition, which would be expected from the chapter headings. It may be that the more conventional historical author-by-author arrangement, which Menéndez Pelayo and Antonio Vilanova followed successfully, would have produced greater clarity. But it must also be said that the arrangement of the material under the subheadings is not satisfactory. One example must suffice.

The section "Die Mittel zur Erzielung der Komik" (p. 40) begins with the question, "Nach welchen Gesichtspunkten aber ist das komische Material geordnet?" But instead of an answer we get first a brief report on the difficulty of the problem as stated by the *preceptistas* from Cicero's *De Oratore* onward, and after eleven lines we learn in a secondary clause that these *Mittel* are *dicta et res, palabras y obras* according to El Pinciano who follows herein his predecessors Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Next, Cascales' and Rizo's opinions are summarized, then back to a discussion of Cascales' sources, ending in the conclusion "Wenn auch Cascales in diesen und jenen Punkten mit ihnen übereinstimmt . . . so tut das doch der Auffassung von der Komik und dem Lächerlichen keinen Abbruch." Whose Auffassung? The author wishes to say, if I understand her correctly, "seiner (i.e., Cascales') originellen Auffassung." Next Pinciano's enumeration of comic *obras* is discussed, Rizo mentioned, then back to Cascales's opinions on the matter (before, only his sources had been mentioned) with quotation of

examples for *dicta*. We are now, evidently, in the *dicta* section. Again Rizo's name appears, and the section concludes with a recording of certain opinions of Pellicer on the matter (p. 42). Such a procedure makes for hard reading.

We would have been lacking in candor had we not pointed out these defects; for future publications in the series a stronger editorial control would benefit the authors as well as their readers. With all this criticism, however, the affirmative outweighs the negative. We have a more detailed discussion of these problems than we had before and a reliable guide towards—although not through—the opinions the Spanish preceptists held on the question of the dramatic genres.

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GERMAN ROMANTICISM IN GUSTAVO ADOLFO BECQUER'S SHORT STORIES. By Henry Charles Turk. Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, 1959. xvi, 71 p.

In the creation of his own unique and very Spanish art, Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer had an unusual capacity for assimilating and responding to the work of other poets, both Spanish and foreign. These sometimes complicated contacts have been the subject of studies by D. Alonso, Englekirk, Hendrix, Monner Sans, and others.[1] Bécquer's interest in German poets is so clear and explicit that it can hardly be overlooked, and his debt in the *Rimas* to Heine has been rather fully documented.[2] It has been the general consensus that some of Bécquer's short stories or *leyendas* are reflections of his interest in the German romantics, but most writers have contented themselves with conclusions without demonstrations. Valbuena's remarks are typical:

"Otras [leyendas] se refieren a temas inefablemente líricos, borrosos, de misterioso confusionismo, que sugieren paralelos germánicos del siglo XIX ... Encanto de la naturaleza viva, en *El gnomo,* cuyo diálogo entre el Agua y el Viento es típico de un sentido de las fuerzas de los elementos, mucho más británico o germánico que latino. *La corza blanca, Los ojos verdes,* son muestras de misterioso sentido trágico de la naturaleza y del amor, en forma de leyenda brumosa, de confusión de contornos, muy poética, muy de niebla septentrional siglo xix." In the letters *Desde mi celda* there is revealed, according to Valbuena, "la fantasía de un alma en cierto modo nórdica."

In this book Mr. Turk has as his purpose the analysis of Bécquer's treatment of nature in the light of the German romantic philosophy of nature, and to present specific German works that offer parallels with certain of Bécquer's *leyendas* and may have served as models or inspiration for the Spanish stories. He discusses four of Bécquer's stories separately, three others as examples of Bécquer's romantic treatment of music, and adds as a kind of appendix brief comments on similarities in the remaining prose works of Bécquer. The first of the stories studied is *Los ojos verdes,* which everyone has thought to be very Germanic. It has an atmos-

[1] See José Pedro Díaz, *Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer: vida y poesía,* 2nd ed., (Madrid, 1958).

[2] Particularly by Dámaso Alonso, "Originalidad de Bécquer," in *Ensayos sobre poesía española,* (Madrid, 1944). Spaniards of Bécquer's day had an interest in German letters that was both broader and deeper than has been generally acknowledged. Udo Ruckser's *Goethe in der hispanischen Welt* (Stuttgart, 1958) has contributed to the clarification of some aspects of this literary relationship.

phere of supernatural mystery and a water sprite who lures the hero to his death. Mr. Turk has several pages of "examples of watersprites in German literature" taken from Goethe, Brentano, Heine, Uhland, Eichendorff, Müller, and others. Fouqué's *Undine* and Goethe's "Der Fischer" give "the general background of the German romantic world, the general mood we find in Bécquer" (p. 24); and, following a suggestion made by Jarnés *(Doble agonía de Bécquer),* Mr. Turk suggests similarities of "mentality," of nature, and of character to Hoffmann's *Der goldene Topf,* an interesting parallel if not urged too strongly. For Bécquer's *La corza blanca* Mr. Turk finds similarities in Tieck's *Der blonde Eckbert;* he suggests that Bécquer may have found the idea for *La rosa de pasión* ("... a mixture of the ancient *Virginius,* of *The Merchant of Venice,* of Romanticism, and bitter anti-Semitism") in the description of the passion flower in Heine's "Für die Mouche"; Bécquer's *Rayo de luna* may owe something to Heine, Novalis, and Chamisso; the Spaniard's *Miserere* seems indebted to several poems by Heine. And so on.

The reader may not be as convinced as Mr. Turk "of the vast, so far undetected, direct sources of German literature at Bécquer's finger tips" (p. 39). That the German sources are "direct" is certainly not true in many cases, and I am not sure that Mr. Turk offers anything more than parallels and similarities in any instance. If what he says is true, that Bécquer knew Chamisso's *Peter Schlemihl* and F. Schlegel's *Lucinde,* a new fact has been added; but the evidence is extremely thin. However, if proof of sources is lacking, the wealth of German parallels confirms the widely held opinion that a number of Bécquer's *leyendas* are strongly "nordic" in some sense.

Mr. Turk's enthusiastic approach to his problem provides its own pitfalls, the chief of them being a loss of perspective. German literature shifts from being *one* source of Bécquer's inspiration for his *leyendas* to being *the* source, and Bécquer himself becomes a kind of transplanted German. We receive a slight shock when we read (on p. 63) the phrase "following his [Bécquer's] undeniable Spanish Muse..." Even if the adjective were an adverb, we should still be startled by "Spanish." We don't know what the statement means to Mr. Turk, since we don't know what any of the stories mean to him. Because he is looking for similarities in two or more objects, his view narrows so that it does not see the objects themselves—only those parts which seem to bear some resemblance to one another. When Mr. Turk reminds us that Bécquer's muse was "undeniable Spanish," we may ask whether there is not a good deal in the "nordic" tales that could be called Spanish. My point is that any such analysis distorts its object, which then requires a new synthesis if it is to be accurately assessed.

This book was written as a thesis for an M.A. degree and has the defects of its genre. Too many pages neither add to our knowledge nor stimulate our interest. Chapter III, "Analysis of the *Leyendas,*" could have been turned into a useful article—*e basta.* Chapters I and II are superfluous and the Conclusion is on the whole irrelevant, since no one has ever thought of Bécquer as a philosopher ("Rather than a philosopher, he was a 'do-it-yourself' psychologist," p. 62). The useful bibliography could have been included in the notes.

The English style of the book is uniformly bad. Examples: "Bécquer's spiritual makeup eliminated suicide as an escape from life, although some of his protagonists might end up in a convent" (p. xvi). "First of all, Bécquer became acquainted with the Heine translations of Eulogio Florentino Sanz..." (p. 6). "Bécquer, with his life of wishful thinking, expressed himself as only an artist with suppressed desires

could" (p. 23). "The story is well motivated throughout, which lends it a touch of realism" (p. 28). The author's stylistic ineptness reflects an intellectual and critical confusion.

The translations from German are on the whole pedestrian, but there is a lighter touch to the translation of "Die schoene Muellerin" (the press had no umlauts) as "The beautiful miller's wife" (p. 14); and in the sentence, "The boorish, quixotic knight's sweetheart comes in wearing a meerschaum dress" (p. 15)—*Wellenschaumkleide!* Well, why not?

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THE LICHTENBERG READER. SELECTED WRITINGS OF GEORG CHRISTOPH LICHTENBERG. Translated, edited, and introduced by Franz H. Mautner and Henry Hatfield. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. xii, 196 p.

Before the publication of this volume, the English-speaking reader introduced to German thought in the last quarter of the eighteenth century must have been perplexed by the sharp break with the Enlightenment, whose last worthy spokesman would have seemed to be Lessing. But the selections from Lichtenberg's aphorisms, *Göttingen Pocket Almanac*, and letters presented here attest the survival of the Enlightenment tradition—nourished, among other things, by a warm love and intimate knowledge of contemporary England—in a mature, urbane, and many-faceted intellect.

Lichtenberg was a scientist who believed in the primacy of experience, careful observation, thorough scholarship, and clear rational thinking. His contempt for "the cult of enthusiastic love" and for the tendency to identify "genius" with ignorance prompted the observation that, "if a later generation were to reconstruct the man of today from our sentimental writings, they would believe he had been a heart with testicles." But Lichtenberg saw depeer into the limitations, complexities, and contradictions of the human mind, the problems inherent in verbal communication, and the irrational as we understand it today than did any young disciples of Klopstock or Lavater. He knew that it was possible to "become a madman through sheer intellect"; that "a person doesn't only love himself in others; he also hates himself in others"; that "all our philosophy is an improving of linguistic usage"; that, "just as people find water whenever they dig, man everywhere finds the incomprehensible, sooner or later"; that "dream is a life which, combined with the rest of us, makes up what we call human life."

However, this volume will not be read simply for a more accurate insight into German thought in the late eighteenth century but—as Professors Mautner and Hatfield intended—for its own and for its author's sake. Readers will quickly find themselves fascinated by the breadth, the sparkling wit, and the deep religious feeling of Lichtenberg, by his warm love and understanding of fellow humans of all classes, and by the deeply human paradoxes in his own personality. They will then study the volume for what this profound but kindly observer of humanity has to say to all of us. And they will be deeply grateful to the two scholars whose sensitive, idiomatic translation, unpedantic editing, and balanced introduction have made this unforgettable acquaintance possible.

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